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ABSTRACT 
This thesis evaluates the macroeconomic impact of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) in Jordan during the period 1992-2001. The study has made an attempt to 
address and find answers to the following three interrelated questions. Firstly, to 
what extent have the programs achieved their own targets? Secondly, have the SAPs 
resulted in an improvement on the initial economic situation in Jordan before the 
introduction of SAPS? Thirdly, what are the effects of typical SAP's instruments on 
the main macroeconomic variables in Jordan? 
In investigating these questions, the thesis has applied three different approaches: (i) 
the before-after approach, (ii) the actual-target approach, (iii) using some statistical 
tests, the study estimated an Error-Correction Model for the main macroeconomic 
targets of the structural adjustment programs. 
The statistical findings, in general, suggest that the most successful aspect of 
Jordanian experience, under the structural adjustment programs, were the remarkable 
increase in the international reserves and exports. These programs, however, did not 
have much impact on the economic growth, the inflation rate and the imports. 
As to the effectiveness of the SAPs instruments, the results have shown that the 
domestic credit, the interest rates and the devaluation have significant impact on the 
behavior of key macroeconomic targets, while there was little effect to fiscal policy. 
Although the variation in these instruments seems to lead macroeconomic targets 
towards the desired goal, it also appears, in some cases, to have unfavorable effects 
on the program objectives. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Study Background 
Jordan is a small open economy with very limited natural resources and high 
population growth rates. Its economic structure has been intricately tied to its 
relations with the external world, particularly with neighboring Arab countries, in 
terms of population movements and inflows of finance and trade. Indeed in the 
1970s, Jordan has enjoyed substantial financial aid from neighboring Arab oil states, 
which also benefited Jordan by attracting hundreds of thousands of its educated and 
skilled workers and by opening up markets for Jordanian products. Consequently, 
Jordan enjoyed high growth rates, reflected in almost 11 per cent average annual 
growth rates for real GDP, with an average of 7.5 per cent growth rates in real per 
capita income during the 1970s. Moreover, Jordan achieved full employment for the 
same period [CBJ, 1996 and Piro, 1998]. 
The plethora of foreign aid, as well as income from other sources, had made the 
government lax in its spending habits. The overall budget, deficit during the 1980s, 
constituted almost 23 per cent of the GDP [CBJ, 1996]. In that period, the country 
witnessed prosperity and expansion in the basic infrastructure and welfare services, 
education, health care, transportation, communication, etc. However, despite these 
achievements, Jordan could not overcome its basic imbalances in its economic 
structure, where the increases in external finance led to an increase in total 
I 
consumption to levels higher than GDP, resulting in negative domestic savings. 
Thus, large budget deficits emerged during the 1970s and significantly so during the 
1980s. Indeed, in 1983, after the decline in oil prices having led to a large fall in the 
oil revenues of the Arab oil countries, this resulted in an overall recession both in the 
Gulf countries and in the whole region. Consequently, this influenced the Jordanian 
economy by lowering the demand for Jordanian labor, reducing the demand for its 
exports and more seriously reducing the regional assistance to the country. Whereas, 
in the 1970s Jordan was able to cover its deficits easily by foreign aid and soft loans, 
during the 1980s, as the subsequent decline of foreign aid was not matched by 
substantial budgetary cutbacks, the deficits were heavily covered by high interest 
commercial loans from international commercial banks and other external sources. 
The result of the regional and international climate combined with mismanagement 
of the economy was a growing balance of payments deficit, declining foreign 
exchange reserves and a much larger and more onerous burden of foreign debt. The 
macroeconomic indicators show that real GDP growth rates decline from 11 per cent 
on the period 1973-1980 to about 2.5 per cent during 1983-1987 and as a result, per 
capita income decreased by an average rate of -1.7 per cent and unemployment 
increased to about 9 per cent in 1988 [Kanaan and Kardoosh, 2002]. 
As the situation continued to deteriorate, the crisis came to a head in 1988, when the 
country became one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world, with its 
external debt at twice the size of GDP. As a result, the government could not service 
2 
its debt - the foreign reserves at the central bank declined considerably to only US$ 
109 million [CBJ, 1988]. This was followed soon after by a devaluation of the JD, 
which lost about 50 per cent of its value. The government attempted to correct these 
imbalances by domestic efforts only and accordingly, austerity measures were 
announced in the late of 1980s, which included expanding the tax base and 
increasing tax rates for certain items and a complete ban on luxury imports. These 
measures, however, were not sufficient to improve the foreign exchange position, 
and the budget deficits remained high. By the spring of 1989, the Jordanian 
government realized that the burden had become too large and without debt 
rescheduling and external resources the costs of these austerity measures would be 
too high. Therefore, the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank was required to reschedule debt repayments. 
The government reached an agreement with the IMF and World Bank for an 
economic Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) for the 1989-1993 period. This 
program called for economic austerity measures and restructuring to overcome the 
economic crisis and revitalize economic growth. Indeed since 1989, Jordan has 
gradually been involved in a process of macroeconomic adjustment and market 
reform. On the other hand, at the same time, various changes have been taking place 
involving domestic, regional and international transitions with regard to the 
Kingdom. The main dramatic transitions that began roughly in 1989 and then 
transformed the country into new direction include: 
3 
(i) Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) 
(ii) Political liberalization and democratization, mainly through new national 
parliamentary elections and legalized political parties. 
(iii) Opening the economy to a globalizing international environment, most 
notably through Jordan's World Trade Organization (WTO), the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Free Trade Area Agreement with 
USA. 
In addition to the above dramatic changes, Jordan experienced two other significant 
political developments. The first was a major shift in Jordan's foreign policy in 
which a formal peace treaty with Israel was signed, ending 46 years of war and tense 
relations between the two countries. The second was the succession of King Hussein 
after ruling the country for almost half a century by his eldest son King Abdullah II 
in 1999. 
In this study, however, the focus will be on the stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs for the period 1989-2001. We will explore the Jordanian 
experience under the SAPs and this study will mainly assess the macroeconomic 
impact of stabilization and structural adjustment programs. It is also important to 
note, however, what this study is not about - it is not intended to examine the social 
and welfare impact of SAPs or even the political economy of SAPs. Instead, this 
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study will focus on the evaluation of the effectiveness of SAPs on the main 
macroeconomic indicators. 
Structural adjustment programs are a controversial issue. First and foremost, 
because these programs are based on neo-liberal economic theory that assumes 
automatic market adjustments towards full equilibrium. Secondly, the major debt 
crisis that faced most developing countries in the early 1980s is so very much deeper 
than structural adjustment can possibly responded to. Thirdly, theory and evidence 
have shown that when the IMF and World Bank policies are implemented, the 
outcome is often a drastic increase in poverty, unemployment and inequality. 
Finally, SAPs failed in some cases to achieve their objectives. 
In the light of the above, the Jordanian experience provides an interesting case study, 
as the onset of economic crises in Jordan in 1988/1989 was singled out by a serious 
deterioration in the balance of payments and pressure on reserves and exchange 
rates. The consequence was that the country had become a victim of the "debt trap" 
and thus the country had to call on the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) as a last 
resort. On the other hand, while the economy was under SAP during the period 
1989-2001, several regional factors, which had nothing to do with SAPs, strongly 
affected the performance of the Jordanian economy, including the Gulf war/ 1991 
and the following peace agreement with Israel in 1994. 
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Jordan's economic reform efforts, however, were supported by a series of 
agreements with the IMF and the World Bank covering almost 14 years from 1989- 
2004 - in 1989,1992,1995,1999, and 2002. These agreements combined 
stabilization with structural adjustment. The orthodox stabilization policies limit 
money and credit growth, reduce the fiscal deficit and implement devaluation. The 
structural adjustment policies increase the efficiency of the economy through 
privatization, trade liberalization along with financial deregulation. 
Although Jordan, as a country in transition, has attracted several international group 
of scholars to undertake research or publish books, most of these studies have 
focused on the political economy of reform, the political liberalization and 
democratization and state-business relations { see Carroll (2003), Joffe (2002), Ryan 
(2002) and Piro (1998)). Yet compared to other regions there has been a serious 
dearth of empirical research concerning the macroeconomic impact of SAPs in 
Jordan. Here we hope to fill an important gap in the literature. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this study is to assess the macroeconomic effect of structural 
adjustment programs in Jordan. In fact Jordan has been under several programs 
(1989-1993,1992-1998,1999-2001 and 2002-2004). The first structural adjustment 
program 1989-1993 (SAP I) entered into force in early 1989; however, the program 
was suspended by the Gulf crisis in 1990/1991. Soon after the end of the first Gulf 
war, a second agreement with the IMF and World Bank was signed in 1992-1996. 
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This program was reviewed in 1996 and the result was the extended structural 
adjustment program 1992-1998 (SAP II). Once the country had implemented the 
second program (SAP II), the authorities renewed the reform efforts by adopting a 
new SAP to cover the period 1999-2001 (SAP III). Of course, according to IMF 
advice, the country needed a last phase of SAPs (according to the government 
announcements) to cover the period 2002-2004. In general, by the end of 2004, the 
country will end almost 14 years of SAPs. 
For the purpose of this study, we will consider the period (1992-2001) recognized as 
a period of stabilization and structural adjustment. The study excluded the 2002- 
2004 program from the analysis because when the study embarked on the empirical 
analysis of SAPs the 2002 official data were not available. In short the main 
objective of this study is to fill the gap in the literature concerning the impact of 
SAPs in Jordan and to contribute something new by addressing the following 
questions: 
(i) To what extent have the programs achieved their own targets? 
(ii) Has the SAPs resulted in an improvement on the initial economic situation in 
Jordan before SAPs? 
(iii) What are the effects of typical SAP's instruments on the main macroeconomic 
variables in Jordan? 
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1.3 The Research Methodologies 
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, it was necessary to consider the 
following aspects: 
(i) The related theory of SAPs and the alternative approaches that are usually used 
to estimate the effects of the SAPs. 
(ii) An assessment of the program's performance by conducting comparison 
between actual macroeconomic performance under the SAPs with targets set at 
the inception of the programs. 
(iii) Using the before-after method, which basically compares the macroeconomic 
performance before with the performance after the program, was initiated. 
(iv) To provide some empirical foundation for the analysis, the effects of such 
programs are illustrated through simple econometric modeling of time series 
data using regression analysis. 
The main sources of data collection that were used for the preparation of this study 
and for estimation include: 
(i) Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), several Annual Reports and Monthly Bulletins. 
(ii) The International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
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1.4 Limitations of the Study 
This study is essentially an evaluation of the recent experience of the Jordan's 
structural adjustment programs during the period 1992-2001. This study, however, 
is neither intended to present all aspects of SAPs nor to present all defects the 
Jordanian economy. Indeed, it is hoped that by focusing the research on the 
macroeconomic effects of SAPs, the results obtained would be helpful for both 
Jordanian policy makers and those working on the SAPs. Due to limited time, data 
availability and quality, material and the wide scope and diversity of the literature on 
the SAPs, it was difficult to carry the research any farther. On the other hand, the 
study had to neglect many related issues concerning the impact of the SAPs, which 
were important for the structural adjustment perspective, particularly the social and 
sectoral impact of SAPs. It is also important to emphasize that this study is neither 
about SAPs nor about Jordan economy, but both. Finally, it must be stressed that 
the results of this study should be seen in the light of methods applied and the period 
covered (1992-2001) which implies that the last SAP (2002-2004) was excluded, as 
the official data for this period was not available in time of this study. 
1.5 Outline of the Study 
The rest of this study contains seven chapters: Chapter Two provides historical 
background of the Jordanian economy and some main issues related to the features 
and performance of the Jordanian economy. Chapter Three discusses both the 
theoretical and empirical aspects of SAPs. Particular attention is paid to the 
objectives and main instruments of SAPs towards which they are directed thereby 
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hoping to achieve the goal of macroeconomic adjustment. Related topics, which are 
also covered in Chapter Three, are: the main critiques and impacts of SAPs, the 
models that will be used for estimation purposes. Chapter Four offers some 
discussion on the main approaches to the evaluation of SAPs and another objective 
of this Chapter is to provide an overview of the main existing evaluatory literature on 
SAPs. Chapter Five contains two main parts: the first part presents the structural 
adjustment programs which Jordan implemented during 1989-2001, showing the 
objectives and polices of these programs. The second part, offers preliminary 
assessment of Jordan's SAPs. Chapter Six which focuses on the macroeconomic 
effect of Jordan's SAPs, contains two main parts. The first part, detailed use is made 
of the target-actual evaluation methodology to assess the macroeconomic impact of 
Jordan's SAPs. The second part of this Chapter utilizes the macroeconomic effect of 
SAPs using a before-after approach. Chapter Seven reviews the existing time series 
literature relevant to techniques that are applied in estimating the suggested models 
in Chapter Three. Finally, Chapter Eight summaries the main achievements and 
contributions of this study and hence offers some recommendations and indicates the 
areas which are worth considering for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY-AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Jordan has been recognized in the literature, as a small open or as a semi-rentier 
economy. Indeed, the economy of Jordan is characterized by these two terms, in 
one hand; Jordan is price taker in the world market and has a high degree of 
openness (measured by the ratio of its exports and imports to the GNP). On the other 
hand, given its economic structure and minimal resource endowments, Jordan has, 
throughout its entire history, been dependent on various sources of external financial 
flows (foreign aid and workers' remittances). 
By the end of 2004, Jordan will have implemented almost 14 years of structural 
reform programs supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
It is hoped, after the completion of the reform program process, that the Jordanian 
economy will have the ability to boost economic growth, restore domestic 
macroeconomic stability, build foreign reserves and alleviate the Kingdom's twin 
problems: poverty and unemployment. 
The aims of this chapter are to present a general review of the performance of 
Jordanian economy as well as examining, briefly, the main features of Jordanian 
economy. In general, this chapter will include a brief history of Jordan, the land and 
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people, Jordan's recent economic history and the main features of the Jordanian 
economy. 
2.2 A Brief Historical Background of Jordan 
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the liberation of Jordan 
from Ottoman sovereignty was achieved in 1918. In 1920, the newly formed League 
of Nations awarded the territory now comprising Jordan, the West Bank, the Gaza 
Strip (Palestinian Authority), Israel and Jerusalem to the United Kingdom as the 
mandate for Palestine and Trans-Jordan. In 1922, the British divided the mandate 
into two parts, designating all lands west of the Jordan's river as Palestine and that 
east of the river as Trans-Jordan. 
The Emirate of Trans-Jordan was placed under the rule and leadership of Emir 
Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein who had been one of the principal figures of the Arab 
Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Jordan became fully independent in 1946 with 
the ending of the British mandate. King Addallah changed the name of the country to 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. ' 
In 1950, the West Bank was annexed to Jordan, and as a result the population of 
Jordan grew to more than three times the level of the original population of Jordan in 
1947. It was the period of recovery from the effects of the 1948 Palestinian tragedy, 
and adjustment to the enlargement of the country with the expansion of its territories, 
including the West Bank. This has, however, provided Jordan with more 
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demographic and economic features. Indeed, this increase in population size created 
economic pressure on the country's limited resources, to meet the increasing local 
demand for consumer goods and other services like education, health, 
communications and also, to meet the military requirements to face the unstable 
situation on the front line with Israel. Jordan ruled over the West Bank until 1967 
where the Palestinians living there enjoyed Jordanian citizenship. 
In the 1967 war with Israel, Jordan lost the West Bank, which was occupied by 
Israel. Moreover, the 1967 war imposed a heavy burden on Jordan. It brought a 
flow of refugees, estimated at 300 thousand, from both the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip [Kanovsky, 1976: 36]. The period after 1967 war was a period of recovering 
and adjusting to the consequences of the loss of territory and the influx of the second 
wave of refugees. Once again Jordan faced a most critical time in Jordan's history 
when the 1970 civil war broke out between the Fedayeen Group -the Palestinian 
member of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) - and the Jordanian army. 
By ending the conflict with the Palestinian military groups, Jordan enjoyed a period 
of prosperity with the first boom in oil prices in 1973. However, in the mid of the 
1980s and in particular, on July 1988, Jordan announced that it was officially 
severing all legal and administrative links with the West Bank and surrendering its 
claims to the PLO. In fact this made the Palestinians of the West Bank anxious and 
pushed them into selling their Dinars, sparking a downward slide in the value of the 
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Jordanian Dinar (JD). In the panic that ensued the Central Bank of Jordan had to 
regulate providing foreign exchange to the private sector or even to the public. 
The crisis came to a head in 1988, when the Jordanian government was unable to 
meet its debt service obligations that reached US$ 8.3 billion [Al-Nabulsi, 1994: 
175]. This was soon followed by sharp devaluation of the JD, which was a 
precondition in reaching an agreement with the IMF and World Bank, to adopt the 
so-called structural adjustment program. 
On the political side, the year 1989 was a turning point in Jordan's history, when a 
parliament and the first multiparty elections were established. Since that time, 
Jordan has became the most democratic Arab country [Malik, 1999] where the 
government has taken action to rescind martial law, re-legalize political parties and 
introduce new press legislation. In 1990/1991 the breakout of the Gulf crisis and 
first Gulf war imposed a heavy burden on the country and its weak economy. To 
make the situation worse, the Gulf war suspended the SAP and thus aggravated 
Jordan's already serious economic problems. 
In July 1994, the Jordanian government signed a peace agreement with Israel, ending 
46 years of war and offensive relations between the two countries. It was widely 
believed that in the aftermath of the Jordan-Israel peace agreement, there would be 
economic cooperation yielding substantial economic prosperity to Jordan. However, 
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in realty, the peace was to prove an economic disappointment, providing little and 
much less investment than was hoped for. 
In February 1999, after 46 years of ruling the country, King Hussein died. It was 
certainly a dramatic and historic turning point for Jordan and to a large extent for the 
region as well. However, the death of King Hussein and the succession of his son, 
King Abdallah II, have had a pronounced effect on the liberalization process. The 
New King has directed the government to speed structural and market reform by 
further liberalizing the economy as a means of lifting the country out of a recession, 
marked by unemployed and widespread poverty. 
2.3 Jordan's Topography 
Jordan is a small Arab country, occupying a strategic position at the crossroads of the 
Middle East. It borders Syria to the north, Iraq to the East, Saudi Arabia to the South 
and Palestine and Israel to the west. The country enjoys a variety of geographical 
areas with unique features - the fertile areas in the north and the Jordan valley, the 
desert (Badia) covering more than two thirds of the country in the east and south 
east, high mountains like the Al-Sharah mountains in the south and the Dead Sea, the 
lowest area in the world, 400 meters below sea level. Jordan occupies an area of 
92.300 Sq. Km with a 5.3 million population and an annual growth rate of 2.8 per 
cent for the year 2001 [Department of Statistics (DOS), 2001]. 
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Jordan has a similar population structure to the rest of the Arab states. More than 67 
per cent of the population is under 25 years [World Bank, 1998]. The mortality rate 
is 5 per cent (per 1000 population), while life expectancy is 70 years for male and 72 
years for female for the year 2001 and about 79 per cent of Jordan's population is 
urban, most of them living in the capital [DOS, 2001]. 
2.4 The Recent Economic History of Jordan 
To understand the main features of the Jordanian economy, it is helpful to introduce 
a brief review of the main events, which have had significant effects on the economy 
of Jordan from the time of independence to the present day. 
2.4.1 Period (1948 -1967) 
In 1948, after the arrival of the refugees as a result of the Palestinian tragedy war, the 
population of Jordan tripled in one year [Abdallah, 1994: 57]. It was a drain on the 
economy to meet these sudden demands. Hence, as the country had limited natural 
and capital resources, the Jordanian government began its dependence on foreign aid 
and in the same time it began expanding the main services, even the government 
itself increased in the size and range of its activities, including military expenditure 
[Day, 1986: 97]. 
In the 1950s, the services sector grew gradually, along with the mining and 
manufacturing sectors as a consequence of government investment in these sectors, 
as well as an influx of the refugees who worked mainly in services and trade. 
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Therefore, the economy shifted dramatically away from its limited agricultural 
orientation to a more service based economy [Piro, 1998: 30]. By 1961, almost 45 
per cent of the labor force was employed in the service sector [Gubser, 1983: 54]. 
This period witnessed the adoption of planning policies, leading to the first Five-year 
plan 1963-1967 for economic and social development, later changed to the 1964- 
1970 Seven-year plan [Ministry of Planning (MOP), 1986]. This plan was disrupted 
by the 1967 war, which created new social and economic problems, which we will 
refer to in the next subsection. It is notable that despite all of the above, the Gross 
National Product (GNP) grew briskly at an annual rate of 11 per cent per during the 
period 1954-1967 [Gubser, 1983: 51]. 
2.4.2 Period (1967-1973) 
The years from 1967 to 1973 were the most difficult period in Jordan's economic 
history, as a result of two wars in almost four years. On the one hand, the 1967 Six 
Day war with Israel imposed a heavy burden on Jordan resulting, not only in the 
change in population, increasing it by about a quarter in one year but also the loss of 
the West Bank (the most productive land) [Mazur, 1979]. On the other hand, the 
civil war during 1970-1971 disrupted the development efforts and created more of a 
burden on Jordan's economy. This particularly stopped the Arabic aid (budgetary 
grants) from states like Kuwait and Libya to the Jordanian government because of 
Jordan's actions against the Palestinian members of PLO [Piro, 1998: 62]. 
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The Jordanian government had to meet the most turbulent times it had seen, 
increasing military expenditure from over 12 per cent of GNP in 1960 to a peak of 
almost 20 per cent in 1969 [Kanovsky, 1976: 23]. In spite of the bad situation in the 
Jordanian economy, GDP continued to grow, recorded at 6.5 per cent in this period, 
while the per capita figure remained stable due to the influx of 260 thousand from 
the West Bank [Mishal, et al., 2001]. 
2.4.3 Period (1974-1983) 
The saying that "Jordanian economy is the only oil economy without oil" [Al- 
Wazani, 1994a] is true if we understand the nature of the relationship between the 
economy of Jordan and Gulf countries. In spite of Jordan's lack of oil, the oil price 
evolution in 1973 reflected positively on Jordan's economy. It has enjoyed the 
sustained boom where GDP grew over 10 per cent per year [World Bank, 1998]. 
The prosperity in Jordan's economy was a result of influxed aid and soft loans from 
the Gulf States, which were significant monetary transfers to the country. On the 
other hand, the large number of Jordanian citizens working throughout the oil 
producing countries provided their family, as well as their country, with another 
important source of income. Both the external aid and workers' remittances 
constituted 58 per cent of Jordan's GDP during the period 1974-1982 [Mishal, et. al., 
2001 1. 
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This period, also witnessed an expansion in the basic infrastructure, welfare services, 
education, health care, transportation and communication; which mainly financed by 
external resources. Indeed, the effect on Jordan with this sudden wealth has brought 
full employment and at the same time Jordan imported about 120 thousand foreign 
workers, to fill the gaps in the local labor markets. In addition, there were almost 
300 thousand Jordanians working in the Gulf countries, especially in Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait [Day, 1986: 98]. 
It is worth noting that most of these transfers were used to support consumption, 
whether it was private or public. Total consumption annual growth rate was 23 per 
cent of GDP during the 1973-1980 period, constituting 119.8 per cent of GDP in the 
same period. This expansion in consumption led to accelerated imports, which 
registered an annual growth rate of 28.7 per cent for the period 1973-1980. As the 
average share of imports in GDP during the same period was 83.3 per cent, the 
average share of domestic exports was 12 per cent during the same period, 
consequently, this gap was reflected in the trade balance deficit, which become 
chronic and its ratio to GDP - at factor cost - was 65 per cent in same period [MOP, 
1986: 16-18]. This, in fact, represents one of the fundamental imbalances in the 
structure of the Jordanian economy. 
2.4.4 Period (1983-1988) 
The collapse of the international oil market in the 1980s caused a significant decline 
in the economy of the Arab oil countries. At the same time, the steep decline in oil 
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prices had the most dramatic effect upon Jordan's economy, particularly on the level 
of external aid from the oil Arab states, which fell from US$ 1.1 billion in 1981 to 
less than US$ 600 million in 1989 [Mishal, et. al., 2001]. On the other hand, the 
wages and the supply of jobs for foreign workers had also shrunk in the oil exporting 
countries. Accordingly, the level of remittances sent home by Jordanian workers 
from abroad had dropped. The decline in oil prices also, hurt Jordanian exports to 
these countries, which was the main market for Jordanian exports. 
On the political side, the long war between Iran and Iraq, badly affected Jordanian 
exports to Iraq. As a result of this war, Iraq the major trading partner with Jordan 
reduced its imports. Between 1983 and 1987, Jordan's real GDP growth rates 
declined to about 2.5 per cent [Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), 1996]. In this 
environment, instead of adopting substantial budgetary cutbacks (fiscal discipline) to 
meet the decline of foreign aid and external flows, the government resorted to 
internal and external borrowing. While Jordan in the 1970s was able to cover its 
deficits mainly by long-term low interest loans, however, during the 1980s more of 
the deficits were covered by high interest commercial loans. 
Thus, the government had to borrow heavily to meet its budgetary requirements as 
well as to compensate for the excessive decline on foreign assistance and workers' 
remittances. The result of these policies, of course, was a growing balance of 
payments deficit, declining foreign exchange reserves and a much longer and more 
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onerous burden of foreign debt. This debt has become intolerable, and poses 
extremely difficult problems for the Jordanian economy. 
2.4.5 Period (1989-2001) 
As the regional economies entered into a recessionary period, the flow of foreign 
grants from traditional regional countries and inflows of workers' remittances started 
to decline in the aftermath of the oil price collapse. Moreover, an important feature 
of the economic environment of the 1980s was the combination of high interest rates 
in the world market and moderate economic growth in Jordan, which resulted in the 
rapid growth of the debt to GDP ratio. By 1988, Jordan was on the verge of an 
economic crisis -the crisis and its symptoms were as follows [Mishal, et. al., 2001: 
32-34 and Piro, 1998: 71-72]: 
(i) GDP growth was -3.7, -16.7 in 1988 and 1989, respectively. 
(ii) Debt burden increased from US$ 1 billion in 1980 to US$ 8.3 billion in the 
end of 1988 [Al-Nabulsi, 1994: 175]. 
(iii) Between US$ 20 to US$ 30 billion of Jordanian capital was held abroad. 
(iv) At this date, Central Bank official reserves were only US$ 109 million. 
(v) At this date, the prices for some goods like Gasoline, Sugar and Steel Bars, 
and other several goods, increased from 10 per cent to 65 per cent. In general 
by 1989 the inflation rate had risen to 25 per cent [Milton-Edwards and 
Hinchcliffe, 2001: 78]. 
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Finally, these crises lead to a devaluation of the JD by 50 per cent [Piro, 1998: 73]. 
Indeed, not all of Jordan's economic malaise was caused by external factors. The 
government response also led to deterioration in the situation. Rather than listening 
to the advice of foreign and local economists, who began calling for austerity 
measures from the early 1980s, the government followed an expansionary policy 
based on running down reserves and increasing foreign borrowing [Dougherty, 1988: 
5]. 
The authorities financed the increase in government expenditure from two main 
sources. The first was the running down of the Central Bank's foreign reserves, 
which plummeted to cover of just ten days of imports. The second was borrowing 
from external commercial financial markets and international institutions, especially 
the IMF and the World Bank. Between 1985 and 1988, the government obtained 
credit of US$ 262 million from the IMF and US$ 107 million from the World Bank 
[The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1993: 35]. 
Jordan's deep economic crises forced the government to begin debt-rescheduling 
negotiations with the IMF. The IMF agreed to this, on condition, that the 
government must adopt a medium term recovery plan for the period 1989-1993, 
which instituted some progress towards the reduction of macroeconomic imbalances 
and the introduction of structural reform measures during the program period. 
However, the 1990 Gulf crisis suspended the IMF and the World Bank-supported 
program and aggravated Jordan's already serious economic problems, by increasing 
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the population to more than 10 per cent as a result to return of 300 thousand 
Jordanians from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, raising the unemployment rate to a record 
high of 25 per cent2 [Feiler, 1993]. 
These adverse developments made it impossible for Jordan to achieve the program 
targets. After the regional had crisis ended in 1991, the IMF again agreed to assist 
Jordan with a new economic reform program for the period 1992-1998, designed to 
gradually reduce structural problems in need of correction. A new structural 
program was also implemented in the period from 1999 to 2001 after the previous 
one had finished. The main aim of this program was to increase real economic 
growth by 3-4 per cent per year during the program period. 
Moreover, the government has renewed its structural reform program, to cover the 
period 2002-2004, mainly, to enable Jordan to win debt rescheduling from the Paris 
club and other official creditors. In addition, this program will seek to raise the 
annual economic growth 6 per cent in 2004 and reduce foreign debt to 65 per cent of 
GDP from its current level of 80 per cent. 
It is worth noting here, that the program 2002-2004 will run hand-in-hand with the 
government's socio-economic reform program or as it is now called, the Plan for 
Social and Economic Transformation (PSET). This plan aims to increase economic 
growth and living standards through the strengthening of structural reforms, the 
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continued implementation of sound macroeconomic policies, human resource 
development and employment creation. 
2.5 The Main Features of the Jordan Economy 
2.5.1 Limited Natural Resources 
Jordan has a limited amount of natural resources, only 6 per cent of its land is fit for 
agriculture and the rest is desert or semi desert [Day, 1986: 95]. The most important 
natural resources are Phosphates and Potash, in addition to some other minerals such 
as Feldspar and Glass Sand. Moreover, Jordan faces serious problems with its water 
resources; with the amount of rainfall it receives being fickle. Renewable water 
supplies per capita are amongst the lowest in the world [World Bank, 1998]. 
We can argue here that although Jordan's limited resources might handicap its 
economic performance, however, the experience of East Asian counties (i. e. Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea) prove that lacking of natural resource did not stop these 
counties to achieve sustainable high economic growth, and to be designated as "high- 
income" or "industrialized" countries. Indeed, the experiences of East Asian 
countries identify how international trade; good management and peaceful region 
can transfer poor counties, within few decades, to developed economy. In this 
context, it is worth noting that although resource abundance should confer an 
economic advantage on resource owning countries, however, empirical studies 
suggest that resource abundance can lead to negative development and economic 
growth outcomes, see for example, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) and Auty (1994). 
24 
2.5.2 Small Economy 
Jordan as a developing economy has two features, which are central to understand 
how macroeconomic imbalances occur and can be corrected. Firstly, Jordan is a 
small economy in terms of: 
A) Size: in this regard, Jordan geographically and demographically is small with an 
area of 92.300 Sq. Km and a population of 5 million and modest per capita income 
US$ 1152 in 2000 compared with an average US$ 5600 per capita in the Arab 
countries [Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 2002a]. Table (2.1) shows 
comparative economic indicators, comparing Jordan with some other countries in the 
region. 
B) Economically: Jordan had been classified as small, meaning that neither its supply 
of exports nor its demand for imports has a noticeable impact on the world prices of 
these commodities and services. Economists call this country a `price taker' in 
world markets. Therefore, the economic activity and investment atmosphere in 
Jordan is subject to sudden political and economic developments in the region, which 
makes the national economy more vulnerable than any of the other economies in the 
region. As noted earlier, Jordan's economy remains extremely vulnerable to external 
shocks, which has been highlighted in many ways during the last four decades. 
Jordan also, is an open economy, in that trade and capital flow across its borders in 
sufficient quantities to influence the domestic economy, particularly prices and the 
money supply. In 2001, the trade sector (Exports and Imports) and workers' 
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remittances and foreign aid, constituted 80 per cent, 23 per cent and 4 per cent of 
GDP, respectively [CBJ, 2002]. 
2.5.3 A Wealth of Human Resources 
Although Jordanian economy has limited natural resources, Jordanian people are 
amongst the most educated in the region [World Bank, 1998]. Thus, Jordan's 
educated and skilled labor force, gives it the opportunity to become a regional leader 
in businesses, especially in banking and high education. In the last three decades, 
Jordan has provided part of the workforce for all the Arab oil countries and has been 
classified as a major supplier of skilled and educated manpower in the region. 
Indeed, Jordan has made significant strides in its education system in recent decades. 
Whereas 30 years ago, 46 per cent of the population was literate; today that number 
stands at more than 80 per cent [ibid: 12]. 
Jordanian development plans emphasize that education and training programs are a 
basic requirement for its development of human capital. Therefore, 7.3 per cent of 
GNP in 1996 represents the amount of public expenditure on education in Jordan, 
compared with 5.3 per cent in the high-income countries [MOP, 2000]. In the light 
of the above, it is clear that Jordan's development strategy was to develop itself as a 
provider of skilled manpower for Arab oil countries. Consequently, the policymaker 
has chosen a strategy, which will sustain its local needs and links with rich Arab 
countries. However, this strategy also created many problems by increasing 
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unemployment rates amongst university and higher education graduates, particularly 
in 1980s during the recession period. 
2.5.4 Service Economy 
The sectoral structure is one of the main aspects of the Jordanian economy. Jordan's 
economy is mainly service oriented. The service sector contributed around 73 per 
cent to GDP in 2001, as in Table (2.2), and employs 74 per cent of the labor force 
[DOS, 2001]. It can be seen from the table that the major contributors to the service 
sector are; finance, real estate and business services which accounted for 21 per cent 
of the GDP, followed by 20 per cent for government services in 2001. 
Such a trend towards the service sector in the Jordanian economy, can be attributed 
to Jordan's unique and historic location at the crossroads of the Middle East, 
enabling it to play an important role in trade and commerce with the surrounding 
countries, and also, as a transit center for the region. On the other hand, the limited 
availability of natural resources weakens the productive sectors (will be highlighted 
in the following subsection) and hence gives an advantage to the service sectors. 
2.5.5 Structural Weaknesses in the Productive Sectors 
Jordan's economic performance was handicapped by the deficiencies of the 
productive sectors, which are suffering from structural imbalances. Traditionally, 
these sectors have experienced many difficulties and hindrances, which resulted in 
the stagnation of productive activities in the economy. In this regard, the total 
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contribution of the producing sectors was only 27.5 per cent of GDP in 2001, Table 
(2.2). The major productive sectors are the Agricultural, Industrial and Construction 
sectors, which are illustrated as follows: 
(A) Agricultural Sector: the performance of the agricultural sector declined in the 
1990s. Available data indicates that the contribution of this sector to GDP dropped 
from about 8.1 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 2.2 per cent in 2001, Table (2.2). The 
percentage of Jordanians employed in the agricultural sector is still modest, about 
4.05 per cent in 2001 [DOS, 20011. This fall is mainly attributed to the decline in the 
rainfall season, particularly the drought period in the second half of the 1990s. As a 
consequence, not only is agricultural output insufficient to meet the needs of the 
country but also, Jordan is a net importer of food and agricultural products. 
In spite of the fact that Jordan is an importer of food and agricultural products, it has 
also, traditionally been a supplier of food, primarily fresh fruits and vegetables to 
regional markets. Agricultural exports represented approximately 10 per cent of 
Jordan's exports in 2001, Table (2.3). As renewable water supplies per capita are 
amongst the lowest in the world, agricultural land is very limited in Jordan. 3 Thus, 
the problems facing the agricultural sector are illustrated mainly by the meagerness 
of agricultural resources, agricultural land and water, which is reflected in the 
instability of agricultural production due to excessive reliance on fluctuating climatic 
conditions. 
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To enhance investment and increase the value-added in the agricultural sector, the 
authorities offer facilities for the investors, according to Jordan's investment 
promotion laws, state that: 
"Agricultural projects enjoy full exemption from income and social 
services taxes, and the inputs inputted for these projects are exempt 
from customs duties" [Jordan Investment Board (JIB), 2001]. 
In addition, the World Bank assists Jordan with Agricultural Sector Adjustment 
Loans to address the water supply challenge. In practice, notwithstanding these 
exemptions, the number of registered agricultural companies reflects the 
unwillingness of investors to invest in the agricultural sector. Table (2.4) shows that 
there were only 91 new companies with a capital of JD 14.4 million over a period of 
ten years; this indicator is very modest, especially if we compared it with other 
sectors, which will be done in the following subsections. 
(B) Industrial Sector: Jordan's industrial sector includes manufacturing and mining. 
In 2001 their contribution was 19 per cent of Jordan's GDP and they also employed 
13.6 per cent of the country's labor force [DOS, 2001]. As for the scope and 
magnitude of industrial exports (these include Crude Materials, Mineral Fuels and 
Machinery), as illustrated in Table (2.5), industrial exports increased from JD 552 
million in 1990 to reach JD 1216.1 million in 2001 its highest level in the last ten 
years. Mining industries are the mainstay of Jordanian industry, which is comprised 
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of two main companies, Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC) and Arab Potash 
Company (APC). 
The JPMC was incorporated in 1953 with the state owning 90 per cent of the 
company and the APC was established in 1956 with the government of Jordan 
owning 53 per cent of the company shares4 [Piro, 1998: 47-51]. Phosphates and 
Potash are Jordan's main revenue resources; their export provides an important 
source of revenue. In 1990 Potash and Phosphates exports together accounted for 41 
per cent of Jordan's industrial exports, this share has declined to 19 per cent in 2001, 
Table (2.5). 
The manufacturing sector has a vital role in the Jordanian economy. In the 1990s, it 
witnessed a remarkable increase - it contributed almost 16 per cent of GDP in 2001. 
Jordan's Pharmaceutical industry is one of the most successful local industries in 
terms of foreign currency earnings; its exports earned JD 114 million in 2001 [CBJ, 
2002]. Other successful stories in Jordan's manufacturing sector are Cement 
Manufacturing, Petroleum Refining and Fertilizers which with (JPMC) and (APC), 
share approximately 40 per cent of the industrial added value [Kreishan, 1997]. 
The main handicaps of Jordan's industrial sector are structural cost, production 
quality and productivity. These factors will determine the role of the industrial 
sector as a growing sector in the future. To develop the industrial sector, the 
government offered various incentives, for instance, it has offered tax exemption to 
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industries, which are located outside Amman and Zarqa, the biggest cities, where 
most industry is presently placed. Also the incentives include the establishment of a 
Free Trade Zone and Qualifying Industrial Zones, which gives their products duty 
free access to USA markets. 
Irbid Industrial Estate in the north of Jordan and Karak Industrial Estate in the south 
are both already attracting the interest of investors [EIU, 2001a: 29]. Available 
indicators on the performance of this sector in 2001, as in Table (2.6), show that 501 
new industrial companies were registered with a capital of JD 23.6 million, against 
446 companies with a capital of JD 25.3 million in the previous year. 
(C) Construction Sector: Jordan's construction sector took the leading role in driving 
economic growth during the first half of 1990s, largely because of a rise in the 
demand for housing from about 300 thousand Jordanians returning from the Gulf 
countries, after the 1991 Gulf war. The indicators in Table (2.2) show that the 
contribution of this sector to GDP reached 8.9 per cent in 1993 and dropped 
dramatically to 3.5 per cent in 2001. 
On the employment side, the percentage of Jordanians employed in this sector was 
6.8 per cent in the year 2001 [DOS, 20011. Available data on investment in this 
sector during the last decade, Table (2.7) shows 79 new construction companies in 
2001 with a total capital of JD 4.2 million. Even though there was a fall in the role of 
this sector as percentage of GDP in the second half of 1990s, the prospects for this 
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sector indicate that Jordan's construction industry might achieve positive growth, 
considering that Jordan has one of the lowest land and construction costs in the 
region [Kinghussein, n. d]. 
2.5.6 A Chronic Balance of Trade Deficit 
As previously mentioned, Jordan's economy is a small open economy. Theoretically, 
small countries are more dependent on foreign trade than large countries. Also, it is 
found that there is an inverse relationship between the size of a country and the 
openness proportion of its economy [Share, 1991: 107]. In practice, external trade 
plays an important role in the economy of Jordan. Jordan's exports and imports 
constituted nearly 80 per cent of GDP in 2001 [CBJ, 2002]. The country depends on 
imports to satisfy its needs, especially for crude oil, machinery and transport 
equipment. 
Jordan's exports are geographically concentrated towards Arab countries, almost 40 
per cent of its exports are directed towards Arab neighbors - the most important 
trading partners for Jordan are Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
Other destinations of exports are India, 16 per cent of total exports (the main market 
for Jordanian Phosphate and Fertilizers) and the European Union (EU) 3.3 per cent. 
On the imports side, the EU was one of the largest single suppliers, providing JD 
1063 million which constituted 33 per cent of total imports, whereas only 24 per cent 
came from the Arab countries [CBJ, 2000]. Jordan's balance of trade has been 
chronically and radically in deficit since the early days of recording trade statistics in 
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1936 [Share, 1991: 105]. However, Jordan's trade balance, Table (2.8), shows that 
the trade deficit as percent of the GDP declined from 40 per cent in 1992 to 28.9 in 
2001. 
The Jordanian foreign trade policy, under SAP, based on the norms of economic 
openness and trade liberalization. Its principal aim was to enhance Jordan's export 
potential. So within a short time, Jordan entered into an association agreement with 
the EU and signed a free trade agreement with the USA in 2001. Moreover, Jordan 
and the EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) signed a free 
trade agreement after joining the WTO in April 2000. 
On the Arab scene, Jordan has a number of bilateral trade agreements with Arab 
states. It has signed agreements with Saudi Arabia for the progressive establishment 
of a free Trade Area, with the United Arab Emirates, and is working on an agreement 
with Egypt. It also has a bilateral agreement with Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen 
and the Palestinian Authority [EIU, 2001a: 34]. All this development is hoped to 
contribute positively to boost Jordan's exports. 
2.5.7 Heavy Dependency on the External World 
Jordan has been recognized as a semi-rentier economy, see for example, Ryan 
(2002), Piro (1998) and Joffe (2002); meaning that it relies on external sources of 
income or rents. 5 The main sources of its external finance can be highlighted as 
follows: 
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(A) Workers' Remittances: Jordan still relies on its citizens working abroad as a 
major source of hard currency. The figures in Table (2.9) reflect the magnitude of 
remittances and their importance over the last decade. The remittances increased 
over the period to reach JD 1426 million in 2001, but the highest rate of growth was 
87 per cent in 1992. While their proportion to GDP reflects their significant effect 
on the economy, this proportion has amounted to an average of 18.7 per cent of GDP 
over the last decade. Another side of the positive effects is that workers' remittances 
have played a major role in financing the balance of trade. Their proportion to 
imports was 19.5 per cent in 1990, increased to 41.0 per cent in 2001. It is worth 
noting that this source of capital flows to Jordan showed in the three decades a high 
degree of uncertainty. This is largely drawn from having special relationships with 
the Gulf rich countries which has not always been the case, as has been highlighted 
early in this chapter. 
(B) Foreign Aid: the story of Jordan's dependence on foreign aid started from the 
World Bank's mission to Jordan in 1955 to study the economy of Jordan. This 
mission reported that the country was heavily dependent on foreign aid [Hammad, 
1987: 11-12]. During the 1940s and the 1950s, the United Kingdom (UK) was the 
main source of Jordan's foreign aid while the USA shared about 45 per cent of total 
aid in the form of technical assistance in the 1960s. After the oil price boost at the 
beginning of the 1970s, the flow of aid started from Arab oil countries. Between 
1967 and 1985 aid received from the Arab oil states represented about 82.4 per cent 
of total aid received by Jordan [Khatib, 1991: 65]. 
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The USA, the EU and Japan became the main sources of Jordan's foreign aid, after 
the Arab countries had stopped their aid after the 1990s Gulf war [EIU, 2001a: 35]. 
To examine the importance of external aid, the best way is to show its proportion to 
GDP. Table (2.10), shows this proportion was 6.2 per cent in 1990 recently, 
however, declined to almost 4 per cent in 2001, while its proportion to total revenues 
usually constitutes about 13 per cent of total revenues. 
(C) External Debt: Jordan's external debt is an indicator reflecting Jordan's 
dependency on the external world. Historically, the UK was Jordan's main creditor 
country along with the USA. This situation had changed since the boom in the oil 
price at the beginning of the 1970s. In fact, Jordan benefited from massive transfers 
from oil states (soft loans) during the 1970s. However, these transfers dropped in the 
middle of the 1980s, therefore Jordan started to extend its foreign sources by 
borrowing heavily on the international market, from both the commercial banks of 
Europe and development funds from World Bank [Piro, 1998: 671. 
Jordan's external debt has grown sharply during the 1980s to reach its peak of 189.9 
per cent of GDP by 1990. As a result of the marked decline in remittances, exports 
and the slow down in foreign aid, the total external debt rose from 60.3 per cent of 
GDP in 1982 [CBJ, 1996] to 189.9 per cent in 1990 Table (2.11). But this percentage 
fell to 75.8 per cent in 2001 as a result of some debt forgiveness from donor 
community, particularly after Jordan signed the treaty of peace with Israel in 1994 
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and debt repayment during the SAPs period, in addition Jordan used privatization 
remittance to repay some of its debt. 
2.5.8 High Military and National Defense Expenses 
For more then four decades, the Middle East Arab countries were on the front line in 
recurrent wars and in a prolonged conflict with Israel. Jordan, being one of these 
countries, has the longest border with Israel, about 400 k. m. It was a good reason for 
Jordan to spend more then 10 per cent of GDP to build up military strength during 
the 1970s and 1980s [Maciejewski and Mansur, 1996: 21]. Jordan's military 
expenditure on its armed forces increased sharply to reach its record of 20 per cent of 
GDP in 1969, as a result of the Six Day war [Kanovsky, 1976: 22]. 
Recently, even after a peace treaty was signed with Israel in 1994, military and 
security expenses were still high, considering that the Jordanian government's ability 
to finance arms imports depends on military aid in the form of large grants or loans 
which will significantly contribute to increase Jordan's debt. It is apparent from 
Table (2.12) that military and national defense expenses remain stable with rates 
varying from 7.8 per cent to 9.7 per cent of the GDP in the last decade or so. 
2.5.9 The Role of the State 
The public sector in Jordan has traditionally been large, particularly since the early 
1970s, when the state experienced a dramatic growth in terms of its economic and 
social activities and the size of employment. The state in Jordan provided society 
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with a wide range of services including basic services, health and education; public 
utilities; water, electricity, media, infrastructure support and telecommunications. 
Central government expenditure accounted for about 43 per cent of GDP during 
1972-1994 [CBJ, 1996] and employed about 55 per cent of the labor force [DOS, 
2002]. 
The rapid rise in oil prices in the early 1970s was the most important factor that 
contributed to increasing expenditure on the public sector and the state, within the 
Jordanian economy. Aid and grants to Jordan rose from JD 46 million in 1973 to JD 
122 million in 1977. The state's role expanded in terms of expenditure magnitude 
and created new public institutions - as has been highlighted by El-Said (2000: 4-6): 
(i) Army expenditure on defense and security rose from JD 48 million in 1973 to 
JD 268 million in 1989. 
(ii) The government established the Ministry of Supply with the aim of providing 
people with essential food stuffs at reasonable prices and it also set and 
subsidized the price of nearly 40 basic items 
(iii) The Civil Consumers Corporation was also established to provide civil servants 
with consumer goods at cost price. 
(iv) In 1975, the Ministry of Trade and Industry was replaced the Ministry of 
National Economy. It began regulating and licensing all activities in the private 
sector. 
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(vi) In 1984, the National Planning Council was replaced by the Ministry of 
Planning. The main concern of this ministry was creating development plans 
in the country - many development plans were formulated. 
In addition to these key state institutions, several other institutions and ministries 
were also established between 1970 and 1989. The number of ministries rose from 
thirteen to twenty-four, and also the number of civil servants increased by more than 
300 per cent over 15 years. In the period 1970-1985 the state also increased its role 
in the productive sectors. In the early 1990s, the government owned over 85 per cent 
of assets of all public services companies. In fact, state intervention influenced all 
aspects of people's lives and almost all Jordanians benefited from the state, either 
directly through employment or indirectly through subsidies. This is reflected in 
what King Hussein declared in 1983 that: 
"It was the duty of the government to set the welfare of the people 
and to provide a decent standard of living for all" [ibid: 6]. 
It is worth noting that, despite the fact that Jordanian economy includes both private 
and public sectors, the private sector had a limited role in the economy and most of 
its gains have depended on the implementation of government commissioned 
projects or privileged relations between business and the state institutions. 
As the flow of foreign grants from traditional regional countries and inflows of 
workers' remittances started to decline in the aftermath of the oil price collapse, 
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associated with five years of recession between 1983 and 1987, this culminated in an 
economic and financial crisis at the end of 1988. At that time the authorities realized 
that it was a suitable time for reform in the public sector. Indeed, the new 
government presented in the second half of 1980s a project to promote the role of the 
private sector in development. This plan made an attempt to minimize market 
distortions by allowing market forces to determine prices and also, called for the sale 
of state owned shares in mixed enterprises to the private sector. 
The Privatization program was an important element of the reform measures, 
designed to reduce government-induced distortions in the economy. However, 
although the government announced its plan to sell state owned shares in 1985, the 
first steps were taken in 1994, when the government announced a bid to sell 87 per 
cent of its stake in the Jordan Intercontinental Hotel. In fact, progress in privatization 
was slow and only began in earnest in 1998 with the sale of its 33 per cent stake in 
the Jordan Cement Factories Company; further progress was made in 1999 and 2000. 
To date almost 10 key state-held firms have been privatized and the government 
presently intends to privatize more key state held firms, with seven companies being 
readied for sale during 2001/2002 as the government sought to shore up the 
economy. Lately, with this rapid privatization progress, the World Bank has praised 
Jordan for its privatization schemes saying in a quarterly report: 
"This program ranks as one of, if not the most, successful 
programs in the Middle East region" [World Bank, 2001: 1]. 
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2.5.10 Socio-economic Problems 
Poverty and unemployment are fundamental ongoing problems facing Jordan, 
particularly after the economic recession during the second half of 1980s. As a result 
of the Gulf war of 1991 and its aftermath, per capita real income dropped sharply 
through a slowdown in domestic activity. Unemployment also rose sharply, as a 
result of the influx of Jordanians working in neighboring Gulf countries -which 
represented about 10 per cent of the population. The unemployment rate, as 
illustrated by Table (2.13), reached its peak in 1991 at nearly 19 per cent, while in 
2001 this rate declined to 14.7 per cent. However, unofficial report indicated that 
unemployment levels were 27 per cent at the end of 1990s7 [Milton- Edwards and 
Hinchcliffe, 2001: 87]. 
In addition to the above reasons for unemployment, it is worth mentioning that, 
despite Jordan suffering from high unemployment rates, Jordan is also, an importer 
of labor. Recently, the government estimates that there are about 1 million people, 
mainly from Egypt, Syria and Iraq [EIU, 2001a: 11] working in the agricultural and 
construction sectors, whereas the Jordanian jobless do not like to work in such 
activities. 8 
On the poverty scene, also the economic crisis in the late of 1980s and the Gulf war 
in 1991 had a negative effect on living standards. Per capita income fell from a peak 
of US$ 2180 in 1986 to US$ 843 in 1990 [Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001: 
781. Now a third of the 5 million in Jordan's population lives below the poverty line 
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[EIU, 2001b: 3]. Associated with the SAPs, the action taken to reduce domestic 
imbalances, particularly the budget deficit and price adjustments contributed to 
reducing real income. Indeed, one of the SAP measures was the dramatic decrease 
in food subsidies from its peak in 1990 of 2.5 per cent of GDP to slump to zero in 
2000 and 2001 as illustrated by Table (2.14). 
The government to complement the economic restructuring program and to treat the 
negative effects of SAPs, adopted a comprehensive social productivity package. 
This strategy aims at alleviating Jordan's crucial problems, poverty and 
unemployment. The program includes [MOP, 1993]: 
(i) Expanding the cash transfers of the National Assistance Fund (NAF) to cover 
more eligible beneficiaries. 
(ii) Training and rehabilitation of the unemployed. 
(iii) Providing Micro-financing for small farms in poor regions. 
It is worth noting that, the dangerously rising rate of poverty and unemployment, 
pushed the King to direct an integrated socio-economic plan aimed at reducing 
unemployment and poverty in the country. The government directly announced a 
new executive program of social and economic transformation, mainly designed to 
prop up the national economy, to raise the humble per capita income and alleviate 
the Kingdom's twin problems, by allocating a JD 300 million extra budgetary 
spending program for 2002-2005 [EIU, 2001b]. 
41 
2.6 Conclusion 
Jordan has been recognized as a small open economy with limited natural resources 
and high population growth rates. These factors made Jordan extremely dependent 
on foreign aid and workers' remittances, leaving the national economy extremely 
vulnerable to external political and economic developments in the region, which has 
been highlighted in a number of ways during the last five decades. Jordan's major 
balance of payments crisis of 1988/1989 and the onerous burden of foreign debt was 
understood to be the cumulated outcome of changing of international economy 
combined with mismanagement of the local economy by the government. 
Since 1989, Jordan has embarked on a program of macroeconomic adjustment and 
market reform, that is designed to restore economic growth through re-establishing 
fiscal and monetary stability as well as reducing the state's economic influences and 
boosting the private sector. From what preceded, one can conclude that the effective 
improvement in the regional political climate and the liberalization of the economy 
under structural adjustment program are seen now as the essential means by which 
Jordan can attract investment and progressively shift from rent-seeking to more 
efficient economy as a long-term objective. 
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Table (2.1) 
Comparative Economic Indicators (1999) 
(IIS` billion) 
Jordan Lebanon Egypt Israel 
GDP 7.5 16.6 89.0 100.8 
GDP per capita 1.152 5.039 1.324 16.472 
Current account balance 0.4 -2.3 -1.7 -1.9 
Exports of goods 1.8 0.7 5.2 25.6 
Imports of goods 3.3 6.2 15.2 30.0 
Source: The Economic Intell igence Unit (2001a) "C ountry Profile: Jordan 
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Table (2.3) 
Agricultural Imports and Exports (1990-2001) 
(JD Million) 
Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural 
Imports Imports As Percent Exports Exports As Percent 
of Total Imports of Total Exports 
1990 403.9 23.4 59.8 9.8 
1991 417.7 24.4 86.0 14.4 
1992 416.0 18.8 92.0 14.5 
1993 435.1 17.7 140.0 20.3 
1994 409.7 17.3 91.2 11.5 
1995 419.2 16.2 99.5 10.0 
1996 685.9 22.5 160.1 15.4 
1997 539.6 18.6 181.3 17.0 
1998 532.2 20.0 165.0 15.8 
1999 484.1 18.4 127.4 12.1 
2000 529.9 16.3 116.4 10.8 
2001 519.8 15.1 135.6 10.0 
Source: CR. 1 (19OO-')O0%) ., Mont%1/1' 
. 
SIU/] 
. 1iical 
Bulletin Re. 1eaic/, er C aleulatio 
.1. 
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Table (2.4) 
Development of' Agricultural Investment (1990-2001) 
Number of Registered Capital 
Agricultural Companies (Jll Million) 
1990 8 0.2 
1991 17 0.4 
1992 19 1.6 
1993 21 2.5 
1994 10 0.5 
1995 8 4.1 
1996 1 4.0 
1997 0 0 
1998 0 0 
1999 0 0 
2000 0 0 
2001 7 1.1 
Source: C BJ (1990-2001) "Annual Report 
Table (2.5) 
Development of Industrial Exports (1990-2(M)1)* 
(. 11) Million) 
Industrial Phosphate and Potash Phosphate And Potash 
Exports Exports Exports As percent of 
Total Industrial Exports 
1990 552.5 227 41.1 
1991 512.6 219 42.9 
1992 542.0 209 38.6 
1993 557.0 184 33.0 
1994 703.0 193 27.5 
1995 905.0 228 25.2 
1996 879.7 253 28.8 
1997 885.8 234 26.4 
1998 881.3 252 28.6 
1999 924.0 241 26.1 
2000 963.4 229 23.4 
2001 1216.1 230.9 19.0 
Source: CH J( /990-2()Ol) "Monthly Siut i., tieul Bulletin - -Rc. svarchrr ('(ih ulruiu/t. s " 
Industrial Exports = (Total Exports - Agricultural Exports), ý, it includes: ('rule 
Materials. Mineral Fuels. Chemicals Ma nufactured Gu, ds. Marhinrrv and 'I ranýlx, rt 
Equipment and other items. 
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Table (2.6) 
Development of Industrial Investment (1990-2001) 
Number of Registered Capital 
Industrial Companies (ii) Million) 
1990 488 16.7 
1991 710 46.5 
1992 813 101.0 
1993 665 122.3 
1994 648 182.2 
1995 533 155.2 
1996 301 28.5 
1997 306 50.1 
1998 387 24.0 
1999 400 28.0 
2000 446 25.3 
2001 501 23.6 
Source: CBJ (1990-2001) 'Annual Rehort 
Table (2.7) 
Development of Construction Investment (1990-2001) 
Number of Registered Capital 
Construction Companies (JD Million) 
1990 49 1.5 
1991 126 4.8 
1992 177 8.2 
1993 140 8.1 
1994 145 11.1 
1995 155 12.5 
1996 68 5.3 
1997 61 3.3 
1998 75 5.6 
1999 82 4.9 
2000 85 7.3 
2001 79 4.2 
Source: CB. / (1990-2001) "Anniuul Report .. 
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Table (2.8) 
The Trade Balance of Jordan (1990-2001) 
(. 11) Million) 
Total Exports (%) Total Imports Imports (%) Trade Trade Deficit 
Exports Growth Rates Growth Rates Deficit As percent 
of Gllp 
1990 706.1 1 1.6 1714.8 39.4 -1008.7 -37.8 
1991 770.7 9.1 1764.8 2.9 -994.1 -34.8 
1992 829.3 7.6 2291.0 29.8 -1461.7 -40.0 
1993 864.7 4.2 2449.9 6.9 -1580.2 -41.7 
1994 995.2 15.1 2357.6 -3.6 -1362.4 -32.6 
1995 1241.1 24.7 2588.2 9.8 -1347.1 -29.2 
1996 1288.2 3.7 3041.6 17.5 -1753.4 -37.3 
1997 1301.4 1.0 2906.9 -4.4 -1605.5 -31.3 
1998 1277.9 -1.8 2712.4 -6.7 -1434.5 -25.6 
1999 1298.8 1.6 2622.5 -3.3 -1323.7 -23.2 
2000 1345.3 3.6 3203.9 22.2 -1858.6 -31.9 
2001 1625.6 20.8 3434.5 7.2 -1808.9 -28.9 
Source: CBJ (1990-2 001) "Annual Report" "R('. tir'rurc {er- ru/c Hlcrtirm 
Table (2.9) 
Development of Jordanian Workers ' Remittances (1990-2001) 
(. II) Million) 
Workers' Remittances (%) Remittances as Remittances as Percent 
Remittances Growth Rates percent of GDP of Imports 
1990 331.8 -- 12.4 19.4 
1991 306.3 -7.7 10.7 17.4 
1992 573.1 87.1 16.4 25.0 
1993 720.7 25.8 18.7 29.4 
1994 763.7 6.0 18.0 33.7 
1995 871.7 14.1 19.1 33.6 
1996 1094.8 25.6 22. O 36.0 
1997 1173.5 7.22 22.6 40.4 
1998 1093.8 6.8 19.4 40.3 
1999 1179.8 7.9 20.6 45.0 
2000 1308.2 10.9 22.1 40.6 
2001 1426.0 9.0 22.8 41.5 
Source: CBJ (1990-2001) "Annual Report., . 'Rese archer calculation 
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Table (2.10) 
Foreign Grants and their Proportion to Total Revenues 
and GDP (19 90-2001) 
(ii) Million) 
Total Revenues and Foreign Grants Foreign Grants as Foreign Grants 
Foreign Grants Percent of Total As Percent of GI)P 
Revenues 
1990 938.0 164.3 17.5 6.2 
1991 1112.0 225.2 20.3 7.9 
1992 1358.7 137.4 10.1 3.9 
1993 1406.3 163.2 11.6 4.2 
1994 1421.9 175.5 12.3 4.1 
1995 1620.6 169.7 10.5 3.7 
1996 1677.1 247.0 14.7 5.0 
1997 1574.9 205.0 13.0 3.9 
1998 1699.5 203.0 12.0 3.6 
1999 1783.8 198.5 11.1 3.5 
2000 1804.7 238.8 13.2 4.0 
2001 1885.1 247.0 13.1 3.9 
Source. - ('8.1(1990-2001) "Monthly, Statistical Bulletin " "Re, wareher- calculation 
Table (2.11) 
Selected External Public Debt Indicators (I990-200I ) 
(. 11) Milli(m) 
Outstanding External Debt Ratio tu (: 1)P Debt Service Ratio Commitment* 
1990 5064.3 189.9 43.2 
1991 4958.6 173.7 41.1 
1992 4577.6 131.1 39.5 
1993 4229.6 108.1 35.1 
1994 3914.8 91.8 29.1 
1995 4465.9 97.9 26.4 
1996 4722.8 94.8 25.9 
1997 4580.6 88.2 24.1 
1998 5009.8 88.7 21.9 
1999 5186.2 90.6 22.0 
2000 4794.7 91.1 20.7 
2001 4742.8 75.8 20.7 
Source: C 8. l (1 990-2001) Annual Report -Rc. se reh("r c ýtr nlulinii 
* Repre, cenls the ratio o pavinent. du(' (principal + intere. 4) to 1(1)(11 ('Sj)ort. 1 0f011[1 
Non-%uctor service. 
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Table (2.12) 
Defense Expenditure and its Proportion to Total Expenditures 
and GDP (1990-2001) 
(JD Million) 
Total Defense Defense Expenditure As Defense Expenditure 
Expenditures Expenditure Percent of Total As Percent of GDP 
Expenditures 
1990 1120.0 263.2 23.5 9.5 
1991 1234.2 278.5 22.6 9.4 
1992 1348.7 282.0 20.9 7.8 
1993 1647.3 310.2 18.8 8.4 
1994 1504.2 348.2 23.1 8.2 
1995 1697.5 389.9 23.0 8.5 
1996 1717.9 417.2 24.3 8.9 
1997 1906.1 444.5 23.3 9.0 
1998 2055.1 491.0 23.9 9.5 
1999 2007.4 512.1 25.5 9.7 
2000 2004.6 530.5 26.5 9.0 
2001 2075.5 537.2 26.8 8.6 
Source: CBJ (1990-2001) "Monthly Statistical Bulletin " 'Rc. sear her calculation 
Table (2.13) 
Unemployment Rate (1990-2001) 
Unemployment Rate 
1990 16.8 
1991 18.8 
1992 18.0 
1993 18.6 
1994 15.8 
1995 15.3 
1996 13.0 
1997 14.4 
1998 12.6 
1999 14.4 
2000 14.1 
2001 14.7 
Source: DOS I"Inp/o 711(! 1/ and Ulle lJ)lO\711('lll ill-vcv 
%'ul-iuu-c i. 'Mies. 
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Table (2.14) 
Food Subsidies and Their Proportion 
to GDP (1990-2001) 
(JD Million) 
Food Subsidies Food Subsidies AS Percent 
Of GI)P 
1990 63 2.5 
1991 69 2.4 
1992 53 1.5 
1993 54 1.4 
1994 43 1.0 
1995 64 1.4 
1996 30 0.6 
1997 71 1.4 
1998 38 0.7 
1999 15 0.3 
2000 0 0 
2001 0 0 
Source: CBJ ( 1990-2001) "Annual Report " 
"Researcher calculations " 
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Endnotes 
' Jordan became a member of the United Nations on December 1955. 
2 The United Nations considered Jordan as most country had hurt as a result of Gulf war 
after Iraq and Kuwait. See ESCWA (1991: 5). 
According to the World Bank, per capita water supply in Jordan is among the lowest in the 
world, and is falling rapidly as population rises. By 2025, it will be 17 per cent of its level 
in 1960 [World Bank, 19981. 
4 The government announced that there is a plan to sell its shares in these companies as part 
of the privatization program, under the SAP recommendations. 
5 There is an enormous literature now on the concept of the rentier state. See for instance, 
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, (eds. ) (1987). 
6 For more details regarding state-business relations in Jordan, see Carroll (2003). 
The independent estimate of unemployment was the result of 1997 study by the university 
of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies. One possible explanation of the difference can be 
accounted for the different measurement techniques. 
$ Most of the Non-Jordanian workers in Jordan doing jobs that Jordanians refuse to take, 
mainly physically demanding jobs, Jordanian prefer jobs in the public sectors. These 
phenomena, however, explained in Jordan as "Culture of Shame". The degree to which 
Jordan's " Culture of Shame" contributes to unemployment is debated in the country. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM: 
OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and end of the era of development 
planning, a new development approach emerged which became known as the 
Washington consensus. ' Its elements included macroeconomic stability, 
microeconomic liberalization and openness. This model of development was 
promoted by the World Bank and the IMF through conditionality in the 1980s [Bird, 
2001: 331. The World Bank and the IMF intervention through the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP), tried essentially to achieve the desired goals of 
macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries, by imposing very particular 
model of development and a tight set of economic instruments. 
The adoption of the World Bank and the IMF policy was seen as the key for 
achieving the development objectives in the Third World, by generating rapid and 
sustained economic growth. However, the IMF and the World Bank package 
became a controversial issue, especially in the last decade after the liberalization 
process created problems such as increasing income disparities leading to social and 
political instability. 
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The need for macroeconomic adjustment essentially arises when a country has a 
fundamental imbalance between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. These 
imbalances could be generated by exogenous shocks, such as adverse changes in the 
terms of trade or natural events. Disequilibria could also be generated due to 
distortions on account of unsustainable domestic policies. Whatever the underlying 
reasons for this demand-supply imbalance, in principle, a country can delay 
adjustment by borrowing from abroad and consequently, the dis-equilibrium in the 
economy can be made to persist for an extended period. There are, however, severe 
economic costs involved with such a strategy that are well known. These include 
overvaluation of the domestic currency leading to unsustainable reserve depletion, 
increasing inflation, reduced economic growth and loss of international 
competitiveness leading to a widening current account deficit as well as higher 
foreign debt. 
In these circumstances, SAP must be aimed at meeting the country's principle 
macroeconomic objectives. Indeed, the fundamental objectives of a structural 
adjustment program are to provide for an orderly elimination of the imbalance 
between aggregate domestic demand and resource availability. Consequently, to 
achieve these objectives, the adjustment program has necessarily included a variety 
of policies that simultaneously reduce aggregate demand and increase the availability 
of total resources. These policies typically include monetary and fiscal instruments 
designed to affect the aggregate level of demand relative to production. On the other 
hand, there are other policies to improve international competitiveness and expand 
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the supply of tradable goods through both reduced consumption and increased 
production and this principally involves devaluation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe theoretically and empirically how these 
instruments can be expected to affect the targets towards which they are directed and 
thereby achieve the goal of macroeconomic adjustment. Based on the main links 
between policy instruments and SAP objectives, the chapter suggests the main 
features of the econometric models, which will be used for estimation purposes. 
However, first of all, the background of SAP will be illustrated briefly in the 
following section. 
3.2 A Historical Background of SAP 
The experience of structural adjustment policy should be seen against the 
background of its causes, the oil price shocks of 1970s and the subsequent debt 
crisis. The aftershocks have manifested themselves in a variety of ways, most 
notably in a global tendency towards recession and unemployment, rising debt 
levels, low and declining primary commodity prices and balance of payments 
deficits [Dixon, et. al. 1994: 2]. 
Table (3.1) offers a picture of the oil prices growth rates and current account deficits 
for industrial countries, oil-exporting developing countries and oil-importing 
developing countries, during the period 1973-1982. Developing countries in order to 
maintain the development process, responded to the serious current account deficits 
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of US$ 108 billion in 1981 by borrowing in most cases from international capital 
markets. 2 On the other hand, the behavior of the world economy during the early 
1980s in particular, the high interest rates, the fall of developing countries' exports 
and the sluggish growth of the industrial countries played an important role in 
exacerbating the crisis in most developing countries. 3 
Since the situation was so bad, most developing countries were forced to deal with 
these deficits by borrowing rather than by following deflationary policies and 
reducing their imports. Commercial banks responded with an enormous increase in 
lending between 1975 and 1982. Consequently, the developing world's long-term 
foreign debt more than tripled, growing from US$ 162.5 billion to US$ 551.2 billion. 
By the late 1980s, indebtedness had become a major problem in one country after 
another, particularly after Mexico's announcement in 1982 that it was facing serious 
financial difficulties. In spite of significant efforts to adjust by some countries, the 
financing gap has been closed mainly after the involvement of the IMF and the 
World Bank who provided packages of funds [Edwards, 19891. This pattern was 
repeated over and over again in the following years, as other countries found 
themselves in similar situations to Mexico. Indebted countries in order to cope with 
their debts, had to agree to impose an orthodox IMF and World Bank stabilization 
and adjustment program in order to reschedule their debt or borrow more money. 
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By the middle of the 1980s, SAP had taken over as the main tool for correcting 
macroeconomic imbalances such as balance of payments deficits and national 
budgets deficits, which were seen as a handicaps to sustained economic growth 
[Zack-Williams, et. al., 2000: 4]. By the end of the 1990s, many countries around 
the world had applied similar packages, from Africa to Asia, Latin America, Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East. 
Historically, the World Bank created structural lending programs in the early 1980s 
as one of several responses by the Bank to encourage reforms and to alleviate the 
pressure of the growing payments difficulties facing many developing countries. 
The World Bank outlined its first proposal for structural adjustment lending in its 
annual meeting in Belgrade in 1979. The objective was to provide support for 
member countries with serious BOP difficulties. 
Any countries, despite significant differences in their economic circumstances, 
wishing to qualify for such lending were required to adopt specific changes in their 
policies to enable their economies to adapt over a reasonable period to the changes in 
the international environment, without sacrificing their long-term growth objectives 
[Wright, 1980]. However, the World Bank approach was mirrored by the IMF and 
many other bilateral lenders. For all of these donors, structural adjustment loans 
were closely tied to medium term adjustment programs with conditions that 
stipulated policies and institutional changes. The Bank adjustment program placed 
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the emphasis on a country's supply capacity, whereas the IMF's program 
concentrated on demand management, as will be explained in the next section. 
3.3 Definition of Structural Adjustment Program 
There are several reasons for macroeconomic disequilibria, but fundamentally they 
arise whenever imbalances persist between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. 
External shocks / internal shocks or in many cases both may generate these 
imbalances. Exogenous shocks include negative changes in the terms of trade or 
natural disasters, whereas internal shocks could be generated due to political 
breakdown, national or regional conflict or perhaps unstable domestic policies 
[Toye, 1994]. 
Most of the developing countries experienced problems as a result of the two oil 
price shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the debt crises in the 1980s, which was reflected 
in balance of payments deficits, budget deficits and high rates of inflation. In 
response to this situation, the IMF and the World Bank advocated SAPs as a policy 
response to help developing countries to improve macroeconomic stability and to 
pay back their debt. 
The word "adjustment" during the 1970s and the 1980s usually referred to balance 
of payments adjustment; however, by the 1990s the meaning had changed to signify 
something quite different [Holsen, 1991]. The term structural adjustment has come 
to have more distinct usage, referring to the specific sets of economic policies, linked 
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to the conditional loans from the IMF and the World Bank to developing countries. 
With regard to this, Ankie Hoogvelt (1997: 167) defined SAPs as: 
"The generic term used to describe a package of measures which 
the IMF, the World Bank and individual western aid donors have 
persuaded many developing countries to adopt during the 1980s, in 
return for a new wave of loans. " 
However, in recent years, the IMF and World Bank, in addition to their concern 
about BOP adjustment, have also given increased emphasis to prospects of economic 
growth and income distribution. They are now more interested in social welfare 
when designing and implementing their development programs. According to Rao 
and Nallari (2001: 3) adjustment is now seen as follows: 
"An ongoing process with reforms impacting upon all aspects of 
economic life, including not only sustainable development and 
poverty reduction but also, a major shift in the economic systems 
of developing countries towards a market-friendly orientation. " 
To do so, the IMF and the World Bank packages have involved a combination of 
macroeconomic adjustment (stabilization), imposed by the IMF as short-run 
measures, to restrain aggregate demand. On the other hand, the packages also 
include the World Bank's structural adjustment, designed to deal with the supply 
side of the economy for long-term structural reforms. In other words, SAP has come 
to represent a large range of policy reforms, macroeconomic, microeconomic and 
sectoral policies aimed at improving resource allocation and increased economic 
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efficiency. Figure (3.1) represents the main instruments of structural adjustment 
program. 
IMF stabilization policy (Demand Management Policies) is used to achieve external 
and internal balance, internal balance means that the aggregate expenditure of the 
economy is matched by output at stable prices, and external balance means that the 
current account is met by a sustainable capital net inflow. Typically the IMF 
stabilization program includes: expenditure reduction, which includes measures to 
reduce the public sector deficit and domestic credit. However, expenditure reduction 
must be accompanied by expenditure switching measures in order to reduce the 
prices of non-tradables relative to tradables and, consequently, encourage the 
production of tradables, such policies, includes devaluation, taxes and subsidy 
reforms. 
The World Bank structural adjustment (Supply Side Policies) that might be used in 
an attempt to develop the growth potential of the economy by improving the 
efficiency with which capital, labor and other factors of production are allocated 
among competing markets. It extends over a long period of time, usually 3-5 years 
and includes policies, such as market liberalization and privatization. World Bank 
structural adjustment, in contrast to the IMF policies, requires the contribution of 
thousands of people across many agencies in the economy. This is because changing 
the structure of an economy takes a longer time to achieve, as well as more effort. 
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It is worth noting that despite the difference between IMF stabilization and World 
Bank adjustment, both the IMF and World Bank argue that the distinction between 
stabilization and structural adjustment should not be over emphasized. The two 
programs are complementary to each other and not completely separate [Silva Lopes, 
1989: 22]. In other words, successful structural adjustment requires a stable 
macroeconomic environment and stabilization is easier when economic structures are 
sound. 
Many other studies suggest that the demand management side, as promoted by the 
IMF, is an integral part of structural adjustment, which is promoted by the World 
Bank. Therefore, the two sides are complementary, and it is difficult to isolate the 
structural effect from the possible effect of IMF stabilization policies [Harrigan and 
Mosley, 1991: 78]. For example, temporary fiscal measures to reduce the budget 
deficit (short-run IMF's policy) without an accompanying sound tax reform (long- 
run World Bank's policy) will lead to recurrent fiscal crises and will eventually 
affect the credibility of the program as a whole. Consequently, stabilization and 
structural adjustment measures have become part of one package, ultimately 
intended to restore macroeconomic equilibrium in developing countries. 
Indeed, the intensity, timing and sequencing of all the different components of a 
structural adjustment is highly debatable in the literature, see Rao and Nallari (2001: 
9-13). Generally speaking, the usual recommendation is that in countries with acute 
macroeconomic problems, the structural reforms should be undertaken only after 
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sufficient progress has been made in reducing the macroeconomic imbalances. In 
this sense the sequencing of SAPS requires stabilization and then structural 
adjustment. 
However, some potentially serious conflicts may arise in trying to achieve both 
objectives at the same time. For instance, many times there will be an important 
trade-off between a trade liberalization policy that reduces import tariffs and the 
achievement of fiscal balance. In many developing nations, governments use tariff 
proceeds extensively to finance their expenditures, and if such policies call for the 
removal of import taxes, this may seriously reduce government revenues making 
fiscal balance harder to achieve, and potentially leading to the expansion of 
government deficits. On the other hand, restraints on government spending and 
falling revenues have been associated with a halt in government investment, which 
has led to deterioration in the country's infrastructure and perhaps diminishing 
private sector investment. 
Theoretically, the policy measures embedded in these programs are undoubtedly 
based on the neo-liberal economic theory that assumes automatic market adjustments 
towards full equilibrium. Policies like fiscal and monetary restraints are expected to 
reduce aggregate demand, balance of payment deficits and inflation, whereas 
devaluation is expected to increase the prices of tradables relative to nontradables 
and promote export and import substitutes. Liberalization is expected to improve the 
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efficiency of resource allocation and thereby increase aggregate output, and financial 
liberalization is expected to increase savings and investments. 
Practically, the SAPs have been the main method for helping the neo-liberal theory 
to be put into practice through its policies in the real world. This was especially true 
in the case in the early of 1980s, when the old orthodoxy began to lose its popularity 
compared to the revived neo-liberal ideas. In fact, there were many factors that 
contributed to the spread of the neo-liberal paradigm. These can be summarized as 
follows [Toye, 1993]: 
(i) The collapse of the "Socialist Bloc" and its alternative strategies for 
development in Eastern Europe. 
(ii) The failure of Keynesian interventionist policies. 
(iii) A series of economic crises throughout the world. 
(iv) The spread of globalization. 
Kiely (1998: 31) argued that the New Right ideas, such as Margaret Thatcher's in 
Britain and Ronald Reagan's in America, reinforced the neo-liberal reforms both 
nationally and internationally. As the neo-liberal view is based on a critique of the 
old orthodoxy, the main aim of the neo-liberal theories is to emphasize market forces 
as the main instruments for allocating resources and reducing the role of government. 
In order to achieve these aims, the neo-liberal thinkers aim at privatizing state-owned 
enterprises, encouraging foreign investment by creating greater hospitality for 
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foreign investment and a general opening up of the economy to international 
commerce, thereby encouraging both economic growth and economic efficiency 
[Todaro, 1997: 86-88]. 
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the IMF and World Bank structural 
adjustment policies are designed on the basis of neo-liberal theory, and on the belief 
that market forces are superior to state planning and intervention for resource 
allocation and output distribution. At this point, the question arises, how is this 
theory put into practice in many countries in the world? An attempt to answer this 
question is made in the next sections. 
3.4 Macroeconomic Adjustment: A Policy Perspective 
As discussed earlier, the IMF and the World Bank approach shows that the typical 
candidate for a structural adjustment program has a large external deficit, a large 
fiscal deficit and often a high inflation rate. The external deficits arise from a larger 
external debt, an overvalued currency and excessive fiscal deficits. The fiscal 
deficits come from large government sectors and high goods subsidies. The inflation 
stems in part from a fiscal deficit financed initially by borrowing from abroad or by 
money creation. In these circumstances, structural adjustment must be aimed at 
meeting the country's principle macroeconomic objectives. Consequently, SAPs 
combine stabilization with structural adjustment. The stabilization policies limit 
money and credit growth, reduce the fiscal deficit, and implement a real devaluation. 
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The structural adjustment policies increase the efficiency of the economy through 
privatization and liberalization, along with currency devaluation. 
Generally speaking, in a program, aims at growth oriented adjustment, long term 
macroeconomic adjustment would involve elements of both demand management 
policies as well as supply side polices. While an attempt is made here to cover the 
main links between policy instruments and SAPs as the ultimate objective, this 
section does not deal with all the possible effects of macroeconomic policy 
measures. The main elements of SAPs will be explained in the following sections. 
3.4.1 Specification of Monetary Policy 
The emphasis on monetary considerations in the analysis of external balance 
problems is called the monetary approach to the BOP. The monetary approach has 
been used extensively by the IMF in its analysis and design of SAPs for countries in 
balance of payments trouble. The model was originally developed by Polak in 1957, 
which suggests explicit links between the external balance and the monetary side, 
with the objective of arriving at a formal relationship between the domestic 
component of the money stock and changes in international reserves. 
Polak's results were powerful and continue to form the theoretical basis of the IMF 
packages [Tarp, 1993]. Polak's model was specified in nominal terms and, 
consequently, no explicit distinction was made between nominal and real income 
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changes. The main behavioral assumptions of this model as briefly stated in Rao and 
Nallari (2001: 71-77) include: 
1. The demand for money (Md) depends on nominal income (1) with the 
income velocity of money (v) being assumed to be a constant as follows: 
Md = vY... (1) 
2. Imports (M) are a constant fraction (m) of nominal income (Y) that is: 
M= mY... (2) 
3. The money supply (Ms) is endogenously determined through the identity of 
monetary balance as the sum of domestic credit (DC) and international 
reserves (R) of the domestic banking system as follows5: 
4Ms = dR + 4DC ... (3) 
4. The (BOP) identity links changes in international reserves (JR) with the 
current account (X-M) and changes in capital inflows (dF) as follows: 
dR=(X-M)+AF... (4) 
5. Finally, Polak assumed that there is equilibrium in the money market as 
follows: 
AMd=AMs... (5) 
Polak, used the above model to reach a conclusion regarding the effects of changes 
in the policy variable, domestic credit (4DC), on the target variable, international 
reserves (AR). On the above basis, assuming that X and F are given exogenously, the 
transmission mechanism through which an increase in (ADC) works is firstly to 
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increase (MS), equation (3). This brings an increase in money demand, given 
equation (5) and, consequently, nominal income increases, equation (1). This 
increase in nominal income increases imports through equation (2), and, 
consequently, the (BOP) deteriorates given equation (4), with a resulting fall in 
international reserves. The above process will continue in standard fashion and it 
can be shown that the initial expansion in money supply through the increase in 
domestic credit is eventually offset by the depletion in international reserves. Thus, 
the Polak model focused on the links between changes in domestic money supply 
and changes in the external accounts. 
Practically, in order to develop a monetary type of approach to structural adjustment 
packages, the first step is to decide on a BOP target AR*, then the IMF by knowing 
how much of deficit the country can afford, then can suggests policies to make the 
projected deficit no larger (based on the availability of loans and credit from abroad 
and the possibility of drawings from existing reserves). The next step is to predict 
how much the demand for money in the country will increase dMd7*. Now given 
JR* and dMd* the policy's conclusion is that improving the external BOP implies 
domestic credit restraint, so accordingly, a good external performance depends on 
controlling domestic credit expansion [Dornbusch, et. al., 2001: 470-474]. 
As is now apparent, the IMF places such great emphasis on controlling domestic 
credit expansion in a country under SAPs. However, the IMF model does not 
provide analysis of the impact of external factors (such as a deterioration in the terms 
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of trade) in relation to BOP performance, and instead finds a direct and causal 
relationship between excessive credit creation and deterioration of the external 
accounts. 
According to Zaki (2001), the IMF staffs justify this monetary approach to the 
balance of payments for two main reasons. Firstly, as is often the case in developing 
countries, the reasons for balance of payment difficulties are directly linked to 
monetary phenomena (expansionary monetary policy) it also could be a sharp drop 
in capital inflows or capital outflows. Therefore, under these circumstances, the 
reserve losses tempted the central bank to sterilize these losses by allowing net 
domestic credit to grow at an even faster rate. Thus the best way to protect the 
balance of payments from excessive money creation is by having a ceiling on 
domestic credit. Secondly, monetary data is the most accurate and available in both 
developed and developing countries and thus is made to play a crucial role in the 
performance criteria that allow the IMF staff to determine whether the program 
conditions are met. 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of changes in the rate of 
domestic credit expansion on macroeconomic indicators is still a matter of 
controversy. The simple version of the monetary approach to the BOP suggests that 
in a small open economy operating under a fixed exchange rate regime, a reduction 
in domestic credit will be offset by international reserve flows -due to a rise in 
interest rates- that will restore the money stock to the level desired by the public. 8 
70 
Consequently, this policy would have no long run effects on output [Khan and 
Knight, 1985]. In short, this model suggests that under fixed exchange rates, the 
money supply adjusts to money demand through international flows of money via 
balance of payments imbalances, of course such analyses assume closely integrated 
markets and a perfect capital mobility. 
Indeed, most efforts by developing countries to promote economic development, 
through controlling interest rates and directing credit to priority sectors, have 
undermined financial development. Interest rate controls discouraged savers from 
holding domestic financial assets and discouraged institutions from lending longer 
term .9 This 
lack of money and capital markets has limited the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in such countries [Tahir, 1997a]. On the other hand, while the 
IMF's programs stress the importance of the monetary authorities ability to control 
money and credit, according to Zaki (2001) there is a large body of evidence 
indicates the instability of money demand in most developing countries as well as the 
difficulty of controlling the money supply in the environment of a highly 
underdeveloped financial system. 
Considering what has been said, the success of such a policy is a condition of the 
ability of the monetary authorities to control money expansion, by using effective 
monetary instruments, without any contractionary effects on output. Whereas in 
developing countries control over bank credit is the main instrument used to control 
money expansion. 1° At the same time in these countries, bank credit is the major 
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means of financing public expenditure. Therefore, the effects of a contractionary 
monetary policy (defined as a reduction in the growth of either domestic credit or the 
money supply) on output needs to be tested empirically. In general, the evidence on 
the effect of changes in the rate of domestic credit on the BOP shows that credit 
expansion in several developing countries was reduced and the overall balance of 
payments improved substantially. These results were achieved at the cost of a 
relatively modest reduction in the average growth rate of output during the program 
period [Gylfason, 1987: 30]. 
A study by Doroodian (1993) on 43 developing countries, of which 27 are program 
countries, shows that decreases in money growth can have a significant and 
favorable effect on the current account. Most empirical results reviewed by Khan 
and Knight (1985) confirm the hypothesis that a monetary contraction does indeed 
tend to exert a deflationary effect on domestic output in the short run. 
It seems that the effect of contractionary monetary policy improves the external 
imbalances but at the cost of a reduction in economic growth only in the short run, 
however, a reduction in domestic expansion exerts no long term effects on economic 
growth as confirmed by Khan and Knight (1985). This is likely due to the SAPs 
including measures (in the long run) that might improve the productive sectors, for 
example, privatization and trade reform policies. 
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3.4.2 Fiscal Policy 
A change in fiscal policy, whether through changes in government spending or tax 
revenues will be reflected in changes in the size of the budget deficit which will 
affect aggregate demand and hence, via absorption, the allocation of resources and 
the external balance. Accordingly, the need for fiscal adjustment may be seen in the 
context of the impact of fiscal policy on SAPs objectives, and the linkages between 
fiscal policy and other policy instruments. In this context, much of the theoretical 
debate on SAPs has focused on the relationship between the fiscal deficit and the 
external deficit. This relationship between the fiscal deficit and external deficit, is 
based on the current account of the balance of payment being equal to the gap 
between national saving and investment [Rao and Nallari: 51-53] that is: 
M-X= (1 -S)+(C -T)... (1) 
Where is 
M= Imports of goods and net services 
X= Exports of goods and net services 
I= Investment 
S= National savings 
G= Government expenditures 
T= Taxes 
Equation (1) shows the fiscal deficit (G-7) or government deficit must be matched by 
a private sector investing more than it saves and by a current account deficit (M-X). 
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More specifically, by dividing the investment (I) and the savings (S) into private and 
government sector components as follows: 
I =Ip+Ig 
S =Sp+Sg 
So M-X= (Ip - Sp) + (Ig - Sg) +(G - T) ... (2) 
Where (p) and (g) refer to the private and government sector, respectively. This 
equation shows that an improvement in the external balance can take place only if 
sectoral savings rise relative to sectoral investments or by government borrowing 
reductions. In other words, as Dornbusch and Helmers (1988) argue, if policies do 
not have any effect on either government or private savings, the external balance 
cannot be expected to improve. 
Empirically this hypothesis has been tested by Kelly (1982) and the evidence 
indicates an association between the government deficit /surplus and external deficit 
/surplus. Doroodian (1993) shows that a growing fiscal deficit leads to inflation and 
deterioration in the BOP. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) results indicate that budget 
deficits have very little impact on the external deficits. 
In order to draw attention to the links between fiscal policy and economic growth, in 
standard Keynesian models, a reduction in government expenditure or an increase in 
taxation is expected to have a multiplier effect on the level of real income, at least in 
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the short run [Roa and Nallari, 2001: 173]. A basic description of the way fiscal 
policy may work in a small open economy, under fixed exchange rates, is that, in 
such a model, fiscal policy will have a strong effect on income and can be used also 
to stimulate the domestic economy [Husted and Melvin, 2001]. 
In developing countries, few studies have introduced fiscal variables directly into a 
growth model, and those that have done so, have not generally found the effects to be 
statistically significant. This is because, as Khan and Knight (1985) argued the 
effects of fiscal deficits on growth also turn out to be difficult to establish 
empirically due to the tight linkage between fiscal policy and monetary policy as 
such in models that include domestic credit expansion. 
" Empirical tests tend to 
suggest that fiscal variables have only a relatively modest role to play. Nevertheless, 
Iqbal, et. al, (2000) using Three-Gap analysis of structural adjustment in Pakistan 
suggests that fiscal contraction through reducing subsidies and public current 
consumption appears to have a positive effect on GDP. Doroodian's (1993) 
evidence shows that the estimate is positive but statistically insignificant in a growth 
model. 
The literature shows that the impact of the budget deficit on macroeconomic 
imbalances depend on the source of financing it [Rao and Nallari, 2001: 168]. 
Indeed, a fiscal deficit can be financed in three ways: domestic credit from the 
banking system, borrowing from the private sector and foreign borrowing. The most 
visible dangers of borrowing either from the banking system or from abroad are that 
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both of them imply an expansion in the money supply, which is inflationary. 
12 On 
the other hand, the direct effects of domestic or external borrowing is the increase in 
debt servicing and thus puts an additional burden on the government budget and calls 
for even more borrowing. Moreover, borrowing from the private sector may also 
crowd out private investment, leading to a fall in output13 [Dahel, 1997]. 
In SAP context, fiscal reform can be implemented via increasing government 
revenue or decreasing spending or both. On the revenue side, a fundamental tax 
reform appears to be a major factor in fiscal adjustment. In such a context, tax 
reform will not only enhance the revenue elasticity of the tax system but also, it can 
help remove distortions in incentives and resource allocation. Taxes influence 
relative prices through their differing impact on supply and demand for different 
products or factors of production. Thus, over time, tax reform affects resource 
allocation and growth [Gray and Linn, 1988]. Improving the administration of taxes 
is a key component of institutional fiscal reform in any country implementing 
adjustment programs. 
According to the IMF (1998), tax administration reform refers to a wide range of 
activities including three different areas: the organization of tax administration, 
systems and procedures and enforcement. With respect to this point, countries which 
have to implement a new tax system, must also develop systems for classifying new 
categories of taxpayers and new forms of economic activity. However, the 
experience of many transition countries confirms that improvements in tax 
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administration are likely to be sufficient only if there is a strengthening of the 
political willingness to collect taxes. Tax reform, including some tax measures, 
might have a negative effect in the short run. For instance, the removal of an export 
tax may reduce government revenues and thus increase the fiscal deficit. However, 
in the long run the situation will change because such a policy should expand output 
and export earnings and bring in other new tax sources for government [IMF, 1988]. 
On the expenditure side, expenditure reductions often tend to be stressed in the initial 
stages of adjustment, with particular emphasis on cuts in current spending. In 
general, adjustment programs on the expenditure side involve [Chowdhury, 1991: 
122]: 
(i) Reduction of subsidies to enterprises and consumers. 
(ii) Establishment of a core investment program to protect the higher priority 
projects. 
(iii) Well-targeted social safety nets to protect vulnerable groups. 
It is worth noting that, fiscal adjustment in the IMF supported programs has been the 
subject of criticism from academics and several Non-Government Organizations. 
The main issues raised in this context include the following [IMF, 2002a]: 
(i) The program has not paid enough attention to protecting social spending 
especially, spending on education and health. 
77 
(ii) The IMF programs impose tax increases as a major tool to reduce fiscal 
deficits, which has adverse effects on welfare and growth. 
(iii) Structural adjustment programs, particularly fiscal reforms, have not been 
serious in implementing compensatory measures to protect vulnerable groups 
from the adverse effects of the reforms. 
Moreover, in some cases adjustment reform includes measures that hurt the poor and 
cause social unrest. In Jordan, for instance, the removal of food subsides and the 
increase in the power resource prices caused riots in the whole country causing social 
and political unrest. In response to these criticisms the IMF and the World Bank 
announced a new strategy for the inclusion of Social Safety Nets to tackle the 
negative effects of the adjustment policies. 
14 
In summary, reducing the size of the fiscal deficit is a primary objective of fiscal 
adjustment. Essentially, this requires an increase in government revenue and a 
reduction in government expenditure. However, in practice the implementation of a 
fiscal package is not as straightforward as its design might indicate. Indeed, the 
biggest obstacle facing a fiscal program is the conditions in the countries in which it 
is implemented. Typically the economy of these countries exhibits unemployment, 
inflation and limited financial resources. Under such situations, raising tax rates or 
imposing new taxes may be a real challenge. On the other hand, reducing subsidies 
can be politically risky and could cause an undesirable social reaction. Therefore, 
the timing and magnitude of a fiscal adjustment is an important factor in the 
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implementation of fiscal reform. Moreover, fiscal adjustment needs to be 
accompanied by an effort to improve the macroeconomic environment as a part of an 
overall economic package. 
3.4.3 Devaluation 
Devaluation is usually considered as an important tool of stabilization and 
adjustment of the foreign sector of an economy. It is argued that devaluation results 
mainly in expenditure switching policy, which leads to increase in the prices of 
tradables relative to nontradables, a devaluation thus expected to induce resource 
switching from the production of nontradables to the production of exports and 
imports substitutes. A devaluation is also expected to discourage imports thus 
improve the balance of payments position. Obviously, such policy falls back on the 
powers of the price system to induce improvement in the BOP. 
In the literature, the effectiveness of devaluation as a stabilization device is a 
controversial issue. Such policy has been criticized on the grounds that it may lead 
to a decline in output. Firstly, devaluation lowers real domestic absorption through a 
reduction in real wealth due to a higher price level, which in turn may decrease the 
level of output. Secondly, as Edwards (1986) and Krugman and Taylor (1978) 
pointed out that devaluation might generate contractionary effects on aggregate 
demand and output, through a redistribution of income from the groups with a lower 
to a higher marginal propensity to save, thus lowering aggregate consumption. 
Thirdly, if the price elasticities of exports and imports are very low, then the trade 
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balance expressed in terms of domestic currency may deteriorate causing a 
recessionary effect in the economy. 
Figure (3 2) illustrates a hasic demand side and supply side aspect of' devaluation in 
the case of a small open economy as cxpIained by Khan and Knight (I982: 718-721). 
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Now, suppose that with the world price level (in domestic currency) equaling Po, 
there is excess real aggregate domestic demand equal to (Do-So) and a current 
account deficit equal to Po (Do-So). The devaluation increases the world price level 
to Pi (in domestic currency terms). The main demand side effects are a reduction in 
real wealth and expenditure owing to the fall in real value of financial assets, and an 
increase in the domestic price of tradable goods. For these reasons, devaluation 
decreases domestic demand to a point like C and thus devaluation, from the point of 
view of current absorption is contractionary. 
On the supply side, the effects tend to move the productive sector in the opposite 
direction, to the extent that the prices of domestic labor, land and capital, rise less 
than proportionately to the domestic currency price of final output in the short run, so 
devaluation thus has a temporary simulative impact on aggregate supply (SL to So). 
In these circumstances, devaluation tends to reduce excess domestic absorption and 
the payments deficit. Since foreign demand for domestic output is infinitely elastic at 
the price level Pi, the short run effect of the devaluation is to turn the current account 
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from the deficit (Do-So) to a surplus of (Si-Di). In the long run, as nominal factor 
prices gradually rise, output will tend to move back to equilibrium level curve SL At 
the same time, the gradual rise in real income factors and financial assets resulting 
from a payments surplus will cause aggregate demand to shift gradually towards the 
long run curve D'. Thus, the effects of devaluation will shift the economy to point 
F, where demand/ supply balance and the current account are in equilibrium as a 
result of the effects of devaluation of both the demand and supply side of the 
economy. 
Considering what has been said in the figure above, this approach suggests that 
devaluation does improve the current account, while the effects on the supply side 
depend on the extent to which devaluation raises product prices relative to factor 
prices in the short run. According to the elasticity approach, an improvement in the 
trade balance following devaluation, takes place, if the sum of demand elesticities for 
exports and imports is greater than unity, Marshall-Lerner condition (M-L) 
[Thirlwall, 1982]. 
This condition is necessary so that the change in the quantity of imports and exports 
demands together is sufficiently great to offset the loss in foreign earnings 
consequent upon lowering the price of exports in foreign currency and boosting 
economic growth. However, it is worth noting that the M-L condition does not hold 
in many developing countries. 15 This is because the elasticity of demand for imports 
is inelastic, due to imports being concentrated on raw materials and capital goods, 
which are necessary for the country's development, thus the devaluation impact, 
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might be inflationary according to Krugman and Taylor (1978). In fact the 
contribution of such policy to achieve a significant increase in exports, or a 
substantial substitution of imports, as Silva Lopes (1989) indicated can be effective 
in a medium-term adjustment program. This is largely due to the productive sectors 
of the developing countries not being flexible enough to allow for such transfers of 
output and of demand. 
The obvious question now is whether the evidence supports such policy action or 
not? The evidence is decidedly unclear; advocates argue that devaluation is a 
valuable policy for strengthening the balance of payments. Others see it as having a 
bad effect on the BOP. The review of this controversial issue is briefly discussed as 
follow: Khan (1999) indicates that Miles (1979) tested the effects of devaluation on 
the balance of payments for 14 industrialized and developing countries in 1960s. He 
found that devaluation reduced the balance of payments deficit. Graham Bird in his 
paper (1983: 474) provides an overview for various empirical studies about the 
effects of currency depreciation in developing countries and he strongly suggested 
that: 
"Currency depreciation 
complementary policies 
payments. " 
accompanied by appropriate 
will strengthen the balance of 
On the other side, Khan (1999) indicates that Rose (1991), Hughes and Singh (1991) 
rejected the existence of a relationship between the BOP and devaluation after they 
provided evidence from both industrialized and developing countries. 
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As to whether devaluation has expansionary or contractionary effects on the 
economy, the empirical findings are mixed. Both studies, Khan and Knight (1985), 
Gylfason and Schmid (1983) indicated that devaluation generates an expansionary 
rather than a contractionary effect on the economy. Branson (1986) found different 
conclusion, that devaluation was contractionary. Edwards (1986) suggested that in 
developing countries devaluation has led to contractionary effect only in the short 
run, and he explained that 10 per cent depreciation leads to a one-time loss of almost 
1 per cent of GNP. However, in the long run its effects are found to be neutral. 
Interestingly, most of the studies mentioned above used time series data without 
testing for stationarity. 16 A recent study by Upadhyaya (1999), attempts to reassess 
the effects of devaluation on aggregate output in 6 Asian countries, utilizing the 
recent econometric methodology. The study suggests that devaluation is in general 
neutral in long run, although in some cases it might have a contractionary effect. 
Silva Lopes (1989) indicated that with respect to evaluating the efficiency of 
devaluation the following should be taken into consideration: 
(i) Sufficient time to produce the effects of devaluation, usually devaluation 
effects take time (more than one year) to be obvious, with respect to this 
point, exchange policy in the medium term program will be a tool for 
improving the allocation of resources by shifting the resources from 
production of nontradable goods to tradable good. 
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(ii) The possibilities of reducing the undesirable effects of the exchange rate 
changes, in this sense, whilst there is agreement that depreciation will raise 
the prices level and wages, its consequences will be inflationary. Therefore, 
Lopes argues that it will be indispensable to combine the measures of 
adjustment of the exchange rate with anti-inflationary demand management 
policies. 
(iii) The alternative policies that might be used in place of devaluation, in this 
context, devaluation still needs to be evaluated against alternative policies 
that might be used in its place. Such as increasing the restrictions against 
imports, import quotas, import licenses, higher tariffs, exchange controls and 
credit controls - such policies are favored in many developing countries, 
particularly tariff or imports licenses. '7 However, such policies cannot be 
used easily, mainly because there are international organizations like the 
WTO and the IMF who do not accept such restraints in international trade. 
To sum up, at the empirical level, the issue of the effect of exchange rate devaluation 
on the economy remains unsettled. It would seem to be interesting to compare the 
path of some macroeconomic targets after devaluation with the same path applied 
before devaluation. The literature unfortunately does not offer empirical studies in 
this regard. 
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3.4.4 Interest Rate 
The interest rate becomes a necessary instrument in a broader financial reform 
program, in order to achieve SAP targets. This is because interest rate reform entails 
a move towards a market-oriented system through the freeing of interest rates and 
capital mobility. In fact full financial liberalization includes, in addition to the 
freeing of official interest rates, privatization of public financial institutions, free 
entry into the banking sector and also, different measures aimed at enhancing 
competition in financial markets and free capital movement. However, this section 
deals only with the interest rate as an instrument in the context of SAPs. 
In an open developed economy, the interest rate may have several roles. As a price of 
money, it will serve to allocate credit and to moderate the level of investment. It 
may influence the level of savings out of income or the amount of saved resources 
that goes to formal sector intermediaries. Its movement will also attract or repel 
short term capital from abroad and will thus serve for shoring up or reducing the net 
external balance. Because of its influence on investment and consumption, it may 
affect the general level of both activity and prices, and it can be regarded as an 
instrument for setting the level of the money supply or liquidity [Ross, 1991: 235]. 
The role of interest rates in the development process has been studied extensively in 
recent years. A mainstream of theoretical thought dealing with these issues has 
emerged from the Mckinnon-Shaw (1973) model [Roa and Nallari, 2001]18. The 
model suggests that the elimination of distortions in the financial markets can be 
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expected to yield a higher growth rate not only because the quantity of investment 
increases but also, because the quality of investment improves. Broadly speaking, 
there is empirical evidence supporting the Mckinnon-Show claim that there is a 
positive association between the degree of development of the financial sector and 
the overall economic performance of developing countries [Khan, 1985: 481]. 
Nevertheless, disagreement remains on the possible effects of interest rates on such 
macroeconomic variables. Several studies have found no direct relationship between 
the level of savings, investment and the interest rate [Tahir, 1997b: 72]. 
In Jordan, like other developing countries, the financial sector is said to be 
financially repressed. Financial repression is defined as a situation in which 
government regulations, such as interest rate ceilings and the imposition of reserve 
requirements for commercial banks as well as compulsory credit ceilings. Therefore, 
the influence of the interest rate as an instrument is affected by the practice of 
government where the interest rate is set according to national policy. 
19 
Other factor affect the importance of interest rates for economic decision-making in 
some Islamic countries is the Islamic economic system. For instance, the Islamic 
economic system prohibits the payments or receipt of a predetermined rate of 
interest, which is considered usury [Ghamdi, 1989: 168]. This view states that banks 
must be transformed into equity based firms that operate under the principle of profit 
/ loss sharing. 20 
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In the context of SAPs, the IMF and the World Bank literature has emphasized the 
potential gains of interest rate reform. It suggests that interest rate reforms would 
bring down inflation, improve the BOP through restoring the external 
competitiveness of the economy and promote more efficient allocation of productive 
resources [IMF, 1983]. However, the outcomes of these reform analyzed within the 
context of an SAP has been mixed. While freeing interest rates improved economic 
performance in some countries, as indicated by and Tahir (1997b), it has had 
negative consequences in many others, Giovannini (1983) and Burkett and Dutt 
(1991). 
It was argued that the lack of success in the other experience was mainly due to the 
influence of many factors on the outcomes of such policies [Nashashibi, et. al., 
2001]. The main factors are the design and sequencing of the reform package, the 
macroeconomic environment and the speed of reform. Therefore, changes in interest 
rates and other financial reforms must be coordinated with the policy actions that are 
part of SAPs. 
3.4.5 Privatization 
Privatization programs are typically recommended by Bretton Woods Institutions 
(BWIs) as policies that will enhance economic efficiency, strengthen market forces, 
and generate economic growth. They are understood as a process whereby the 
public sector relinquishes ownership and management of state enterprises to the 
private sector. The theme of privatization is based on the neoclassical hypothesis 
that private ownership enhances both greater efficiency and economic growth. Many 
88 
leading writers of this school argue that too much close state intervention in 
economic activity slows economic growth in most of the Third World [Todaro, 1997: 
86-87]. 
The question arises; does privatization lead to greater economic efficiency? As 
Todaro (1997: 631-632) mentioned in high and middle income countries, most 
studies indicate that privatization appears to be successful in promoting greater 
efficiency and more output, while in low income countries the results are still mixed. 
In a recent study by Al-Obaidan (2002) attempts has been made to provide 
quantitative evidence of the magnitude of the macroeconomic effect of privatization 
in 45 developing countries, using the concept of frontier production functions. Al- 
Obaidan suggests that developing countries can increase the utility of human assets 
and the capital stock by nearly 45 per cent by adopting privatization and converting 
to market based economies. With respect to this point, it should borne in mind that 
privatization of public enterprises will not make them efficient until it is coupled 
with financial and economic liberalization. 
Indeed, privatization can improve efficiency only when it takes place in open 
competitive markets [Ayres, 1995], otherwise privatization will replace public 
monopolies with private monopolies, thereby allowing a few groups to gain the 
profits that formally accrued to the government. Thus, privatization under these 
circumstances is likely to cause adverse income distribution by increasing the gap 
between rich and poor. 
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Stiglitz (2002) sees the long-term effects of privatization and trade liberalization as 
no doubt beneficial; on the other hand, Stiglitz contends that the short-term effects 
can be disastrous. Stiglitz also, believes that forcing privatization before sound 
regulatory frameworks and strong financial institutions are in place needlessly 
creates monopolies; see Stiglitz, (2002) and Snowdon (2001). This argument, 
however, is an important, particularly with respect to the developing countries where 
financial institutions and frameworks are unsound. 
In any country adopting privatisation, governments and people must prepare 
themselves for the costs they have to pay both economically and socially, such as 
unemployment, high price levels and cutbacks in services that might be severe in the 
short-run. This is because the benefits of privatization, such as high employment and 
high investment, do not appear until the medium-term [Shirley, 1988]. Therefore, 
the success of privatization should be evaluated in terms of the net benefits that the 
economy gained as a whole not in terms of the contract itself or the price paid to the 
government. 
Finally, the World Bank, despite its market ideology, emphasizes that the 
government does have a role to play, not only overall macroeconomic management 
and facilitating a suitable economic environment for the private sector, but also by 
investing in social infrastructure, health care and the education sectors [Chowdhury, 
1991: 156]. 
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3.4.6 Trade Liberalization 
As far as the World Bank and the IMF are concerned, trade liberalization enhances 
economic growth and leads to better resource allocation. Therefore, trade policy 
reforms are considered an important component of structural adjustment policies. 
These reforms include: 
(i) Import liberalization, including the elimination of non-tariff barriers 
(quantitative restrictions), unifying and reducing tariffs and removal of import 
licenses. 
(ii) Exports Promotion, including the elimination or reduction of export taxes and 
promotion of non-traditional exports. 
With respect to the reasons for trade reform, as trade optimists, Bhagwati (1994) and 
Balassa, et. al., (1986) argue that trade liberalization provides a number of benefits. 
The most important of these benefits are: 
(i) It promotes competition, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources. 
(ii) It extends economic growth. 
(iii) It attracts foreign capital and generates needed foreign currency that can be 
used to finance imports. 
The optimists also, argued that there are other direct gains from free trade. As the 
experience of most developing countries indicates, the cost of trade restrictions and 
domestic government intervention are most severe when the country faces external 
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shocks. Such was the case in the 1970s and the early 1980s when developing 
countries were hit by severe shocks like deteriorating terms of trade and rising 
energy prices [Abdallah, 1997: 265]. Thus the results were large trade and budget 
deficits, debt crises and both internal and external pressures for reform and structural 
adjustment. 
As mentioned previously, trade liberalization is considered as an important policy of 
a structural adjustment package. This is mainly because of the relationship between 
trade and economic growth. Removal of trade restrictions and the reduction in state 
intervention will increase exports and thereby achieve a high rate of economic 
growth. Researches used by Abdallah (1997: 265) indicate that Greenaway and 
Sapstord (1994) having reviewed 14 empirical studies found that the relationship 
between export growth and economic growth was positive in 12 countries out of the 
14 countries. 
Thomas and Nash (1991) found evidence to support the idea of economic openness 
encouraging long-term economic growth. In a recent study by Jang (2002) 
investigates the validity of the relationship between export growth and economic 
growth for the 4 largest provinces in Korea. He indicated that export expansion had 
a significant short-run effect on output growth for all the provinces. However, in the 
long run, the effects of export expansion on output growth are insignificant. 
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On the other hand, trade pessimists concluded that trade liberalization hurts Third 
World development, mainly because of the limited growth of world demand for their 
traditional exports. Also they argue that there is a high possibility of balance of 
payments deficits as result of the high price elasticity of their imports. So import 
liberalization will lead to an increase in imports leaving the BOP in a worse position 
[Todaro, 1997: 479]. It was found the trade liberalization has more than doubled 
import growth on average across 22 developing countries, but in most cases imports 
increased by more than exports, causing trade imbalances and thus balance of 
payment crises [Santos-Pavlino, 2002]. 
However, many economists argue that the degree of success of trade reforms mainly 
depends on the level of economic development, such as nature of imbalances in the 
economy, macroeconomic imbalances, market distortions and the properties of the 
reform program [Abdallah, 1997]. Liberalization need to be accompanied by an 
export promotion strategy, in order to maintain a sustainable balance of payments 
position, otherwise such a policy will hurt the BOP more than it improves it. 
3.4.7 Social Safety Nets 
Needless to say that much of the analysis and technical advice and policy on social 
issues is undertaken by international agencies other than the IMF, such as the World 
Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). However, with the 
shift of the IMF financial lending from industrial countries to developing countries 
since the 1970s and to economies in transition since the late 1980s, much greater 
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attention has been given to the complementarily of macroeconomic policies and 
structural reforms. The interrelationships between economic and social issues have 
also increasingly been recognized. According to Chu and Gupta (1998), the 
increasing involvement of the IMF in social issues has been discussed by its 
executive board on several occasions, Chu and Gupta (1998: 4) argued that: 
"In 1988, for example, the Bord stressed the need to assist 
member countries in evaluating the implications of IMF- 
supported adjustment programs for income distribution and 
poverty, to strengthen the staff's understanding of the channels 
through which adjustment policies affect the poor, and to draw 
more extensively on the expertise of the World Bank and UN 
institutions. " 
On the other hand, the joint World Bank-IMF Development Committee, which also 
has discussed social issues, has encouraged both the World Bank and the IMF to 
further intensify their efforts, working closely together, in helping to design and 
implement well-targeted measures to mitigate the costs of adjustment [Chu and 
Gupta, 19981. 
The experience of many developing countries has shown the need for protecting 
vulnerable groups during the adjustment by constructing well-targeted social safety 
nets and by safeguarding access of these groups to basic public services. Practically, 
the IMF involvement in dealing with the social dimensions of SAPs was a response 
to the critique of its policies in developing countries, particularly after the 
publication of the well known UNICEF's Report in 1987 and more recently, the 
international debt reduction campaign Jubilee 2000, which highlights that policies 
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implemented under SAPs contributed to aggravating poverty and causing social 
setbacks, because of its debt management and neo-liberal structural adjustment 
policy vis-a-vis the developing countries. 
Practically, in 1999, the IMF and the World Bank together introduced its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which include different measures in dealing 
with 70 low-income countries. With regard to the SAPs, the IMF has advised the 
authorities, with varying details, on the integration of Social Safety Nets (SSNs) in 
designing reform programs. According to the IMF (1995: 28): 
"SSNs are a combination of measures aimed at mitigating the 
short-term adverse effects of economic reforms on the poor. " 
Typically, the major components of SSNs have included the following measures as 
in IMF (1995) and Chu and Gupta (1998), which can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Technical Assistance: most of the technical assistance work has highlighted 
the interactions between measures to mitigate the adverse effects of 
adjustment and formal social security instruments. 
(ii) Reforming Consumer Subsidies: the main recommendations here involve 
eliminating generalized subsidies within a short time of implementing the 
program, mainly to allow a reduction in production distortions. In general, 
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the IMF recommendations might include different measures such as limited 
quantity food stamps, which may be targeted by region or category. 
(iii) Improving Social Security Arrangements: these include the need for pension 
funds, disability insurance and child allowances. 
(iv) Unemployment Benefits: as the reforms usually involve a temporary increase 
in unemployment, an important aspect of SSNs has been enhanced 
unemployment benefit schemes, provision of severance pay, and low-wage 
public works schemes. 
The IMF assistance and recommendations regarding the SSNs are different 
according to the country's varying conditions, administrative capabilities, 
macroeconomic constraints and aggregate resource potential. Therefore, evaluation 
of the SSNs should be taken on a country's experiences base. In fact, according to 
Wood (1997) the safety programs generally have been ineffective, because of the 
difficulty in ensuring that the benefits reach the most needy and because of delays 
and shortfalls in financing. 
3.5 Structural Adjustment Program: Impacts and Critiques 
Although there is many empirical studies researched the effects of adjustment 
policies on the economy using different methods, these studies do not give any clear- 
cut evidence. Whereas the results obtained differ from country to country and from 
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one region to another. However, the mainstream literature shows opposing two teams 
regarding the effects of structural adjustment programs, as summarized by Crisp and 
Kelly (1999): 
The proponents argued that reforms would sustain growth in developing economies 
and inhibit high inflation. Policies such as trade liberalization, financial liberalization 
and privatization are necessary to stimulate investment. Moreover, it was argued 
that state intervention had created the crises in these countries, so a restructuring of 
the role of government was required to restore growth and lower inflation. 
The opponents of structural adjustment argued that the economic stabilization 
package has significantly contributed to increasing levels of poverty. Elements such 
as devaluation and the removal of food and energy price supports (relatively 
representing large parts of poor people's budgets) lead to higher prices. Moreover, 
cutbacks in government jobs and spending would cause more poverty and social 
setbacks. Obviously, well-known opponents like Stiglitz (the former senior vice 
president at the World Bank) argued that the IMF approached the LDCs problems 
from the perspectives and ideology of the financial community and its interests21. 
He said that: 
"The IMF may not have become the bill collector of the G-7, but 
it clearly worked hared to make sure that G-7 lenders got repaid" 
[Stiglitz, 2002: 208]. 
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Now, which claims are true? Indeed, an empirical study for a specific country would 
give a clearer answer for such a question. In summary, the available empirical 
evidence suggests that the IMF and the World bank-supported programs, have had a 
positive impact on the BOP, negative effect on investment, varied effects on the 
current account and no discernible effect on inflation and growth rates [Ul-Haque 
and Khan (1998). However, it is widely accepted that SAPs have caused social 
setbacks amongst the vulnerable groups of the adjusting countries, as will be 
illustrated in this section. The IMF and World Bank package has not escaped severe 
criticism, most apparently by Structuralists, Socialists, LDCs, NGOs and individual 
writers. In the following we will show the main critiques of the SAPs: 
(A) Criticism of the Theory: Much of the criticism against the adjustment theory 
centers on both the theoretical as well as the practical validity of the monetary 
approach to the BOP. On the theoretical level, the initial criticisms came from the 
Structuralist school. They rejected the idea that disequilibrium in LDCs is caused by 
endogenous factors (LDCs' mismanagement). They argued that macroeconomic 
imbalances in LDCs are caused by structural characteristics of these countries, which 
the IMF neglects, and are aggravated by external events [Pastor, 1987]. A similar 
line of argument has been repeated by Cline (1988: 11) who concluded that 
approximately 85 per cent of LDC debt problems are caused by exogenous factors, 
i. e. deterioration in the terms of trade, higher interest rates, and higher prices of 
imports. 
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On the other hand, the SAPs are based on the neoclassical economic theory that 
assumes an automatic market adjustment towards full equilibrium. The Structuralists 
think that this assumption is flawed or may not occur, due to rigid economic and 
social structures in developing countries. These rigidities include the presence of 
oligopolistic industries; institutionally determined wages, fixed coefficient 
production functions, rigid trade elasticities and poor credit and transport systems. 
Given these rigidities, adjustment policies may result in unemployment, inflation and 
BOP difficulties [Taylor, 1988] and [Wijnbergen, 1986]. 
The second main theoretical criticism widened by the Structuralists is that tight 
money caused by credit ceilings, often lead to an excessively high interest rate. 
These higher interest rates had a number of detrimental effects: they raise the cost of 
the country's internal debt and they lead to increases in the cost of capital for small 
and medium businesses with the result of upward pressure on prices in the long run. 
The IMF's programs stress the importance of monetary authorities in restraining the 
levels of domestic credit, based on the assumption that prices and wages are flexible, 
and thus they are expected to reduce the prices of nontradables relative to tradables 
and expand the production of tradables. 
However, given rigid prices in developing countries, monetary restraint could be 
expected to result in declining utilization and unemployment as indicated by Demery 
and Addison (1987) and Khan and Knight (1985). Taylor (1988), on the other hand, 
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argued that contractionary monetary policy may not only causes a decline in 
aggregate demand but also, an increase in interest rates and inflation. 
On the practical level, the monetary approach to the BOP emphasizes the 
significance of the monetary authorities in controlling money and credit. However, 
the evidence documents the instability of money demand in most developing 
countries, as well as the complexity of controlling the money supply with an 
underdeveloped financial controlling system. Finally, others have complained that 
the financial program has failed to incorporate formally important recent 
developments in international macroeconomics [Zaki, 2001]. 
On the fiscal side, according to Alba (n. d), the Structuralists argue that even though 
contractionary fiscal policy may be able to reduce aggregate demand. However, 
reducing public investments will have detrimental effects on output growth. It is 
believed that public investment in infrastructure and public goods stimulates private 
investment, so a decline in the level of public sector investments would dampen 
private investments and growth prospects. In summary, Structuralists are pessimistic 
about the ability of the IMF and World Bank packages to correct imbalances in 
LDCs. 
(B) Lack of a Human Face: social dimensions of structural adjustment have not 
received the attention they deserve in the design and implementation of orthodox 
stabilization and adjustment in the developing countries, at least not before the 
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publication of the well-known UNICEF's Report in 1987. This report pointed to 
some important negative social consequences of SAPs (policies, such as cuts in 
government expenditure, depressed employment and decreases in the local currency) 
contributed in aggravating poverty, causing social setbacks amongst the vulnerable 
groups. Accordingly, the UNICEF has called for an alternative approach (adjustment 
with a human face) as part of the process of poverty alleviation. 
This approach, adjustment with human face, implies that adjustment policies should 
not be intended only to reduce macroeconomic imbalances; they should be applied as 
an integral part of a long-term development strategy. Focusing on narrow economic 
policy would only endanger the future growth and development potential of the 
economy. So the UNICEF approach takes account of the both economic as well as 
non-economic aspects of society [Zack-Williams, 2000]. 
In fact there has been considerable debate and criticism on the effects of SAPs on the 
poor and vulnerable groups, see for example, Stewart (1990); Berry (1995); Michel 
(1997) and Danaher (1994). Much of this criticism has focused on the direct links 
between adjustment programs and the worsening fate of vulnerable groups, such as 
the poor and those on fixed incomes. And most recently, the international debt 
reduction campaign, Jubilee 2000, succeeded in putting the IMF under political 
pressure because of its debt management and neo-liberal structural adjustment policy 
vis-a-vis the developing countries. 
101 
In response to the sharp criticism from several world organizations, the IMF and the 
World Bank have new policies that have included anti-poverty policies to minimize 
the social effects of SAPs through Social Safety Nets (SSNs). On the World Bank 
side, it has developed its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) replacing 
conditionality as the principle of its structural adjustment lending with partnerships 
between itself as"Knowledge Bank" and the borrowing government. Moreover, the 
CDF includes country's ownership of its development program which -as a new 
principle- is supposed to give freedom to a country to design its own program. James 
Wolfensohn (the World Bank President) indicates that: 
"We have learned that there is a need for balance, we must 
consider the financial, the institutional and the social together, 
development is about putting all component parts in place 
together and in harmony" [Pender, 2001: 407]. 
The new development approach (CDF), in addition to its old style approach policies, 
will include the following policies [World Bank, 2000]: 
(i) Strong welfare measures: education, health provision. 
(ii) Good infrastructure: clean water, sewerage, electricity and transportation 
systems. 
(iii) Environmental policies: rural development, urban management policy and 
environment preservation. 
(iv) Good policy environment: open and honest government, property and 
personal rights laws. 
(v) Financial regulations. 
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As to the IMF response, although the IMF considers itself as a monetary institution 
not an aid agency or development bank, it has recently been announced in its website 
that: 
"The IMF is working to streamline its conditionality by making it 
more sharply focused on macroeconomic and financial sector 
policies (the heart of the IMF's concern) less intrusive into a 
country's policy choices, more conducive to a country's 
ownership of policy programs, and more effective" [IMF, 2002 
b]. 
In fact the concerns from both the IMF and the World Bank have led to the 
declaration of a new approach aimed at reducing poverty in low-income countries. 
They have replaced the classic SAPs by Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers 
(PRSPs). The main principles of this strategy (PRSPs) [ibid] are: 
(i) A comprehensive approach to development, with poverty reduction a priority. 
(ii) Country ownership of the goals, strategy and direction of the development. 
(iii) Partnership with civil society and the development community. 
(iv) Rapid economic growth. 
In the light of the above, poverty reduction has become one of the prime objectives 
of the BWIs and its programs and operations in low-income countries. It must be 
taken into consideration that this is a significant change in the role of the World 
Bank and the IMF in developmental strategies. In the case of both institutions, 
having implemented their plans, in practice they would have a new quality of 
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economic and social results, which perhaps led to the expression of a new face of 
structural adjustment programs. 
It is worth noting that, it is not clear whether ownership of the development program 
will lead to the freedom of a government to formulate and implement its own 
economic development policy (National Program) or just provide more room for 
countries to set their own priorities and program's objectives. Both institutions have 
different views with respect to this point 22 Khan and Sharma (2001) argue that the 
ownership of IMF programs is an elusive concept and it is hard to define. 
Implicitly ownership refers to a situation in which the policy content of the program 
is similar to what the country itself would have chosen in the situation where the 
country shares with the IMF the objectives and the policies. Pender (2001) argues 
that if we understand ownership to mean the freedom of the government to formulate 
and implement its own economic development policy, the scope of ownership in the 
CDF approach seems to be "severely constrained. " 
Wood (1997) in describing program ownership in the SAPs argues that practically 
the IMF and the World Bank in their programs tend to prescribe standard policy 
packages, which the adjusting countries can only negotiate around. Therefore, 
ownership should not be a public relations exercise aimed at convincing the 
government and civil society that there is no alternative. 
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The crucial question might be asked here is whether there are any direct effects of 
ownership on program implementation? Theoretically, government owned programs 
are likely to achieve superior results, precisely because they are developed with an 
understanding of how the economy operates and made to suit local conditions based 
on local knowledge. However, empirically there is no direct empirical evidence on 
the link between ownership and the SAP outcomes. Practically, Wood (1997) 
argued that governments prefer not to own the programs because they can blame the 
IMF or the World Bank for politically hard and unpopular policy changes which they 
privately believe to be inescapable. 
In Jordan, for instance, on many occasions it was easy for the government to blame 
the BWIs for taking difficult and unpopular measures (putting the price up and 
cutting subsides) instead of trying to convince the public that the reforms were 
essential for the economy to overcome the economic crisis. Generally speaking, 
effective and sustained reform requires government and civil society ownership of 
programs to ensure effective implementation. Therefore, government should be free 
to decide on the nature of reforms, their sequencing and timing. 
(D) Structural Adjustment Programs Are Identical: structural adjustment started in 
Latin America, moved to Sub-Saharan Africa, then to South Asia and has now gone 
further into the Middle East. Almost 100 countries around the world have 
implemented structural adjustment programs so far. Whatever the country's 
circumstances or the economic background, the cure is the IMF and the World Bank 
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prescription, the four "actions" stabilization, liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization. To the IMF's economists the reasons for the programs similarity, as 
highlighted by Zaki (2001) can be attributed to: 
(i) The similarity in the economic conditions of the member countries seeking 
the IMF help. 
(ii) The use of a similar quantitative framework to determine the performance 
criteria. 
(iii) Moreover, the IMF staff argues that although the established policies impart a 
degree of inflexibility, they also allow member countries a full understanding 
of the conditions and terms of IMF assistance. Generally speaking, in 
response to all this criticisms, the IMF changed some aspects of its operations 
and suggested future modified behavoir. 23 
However, on different occasion, different policies have been given to different 
countries. For instance, the IMF policies aimed at reducing the real wages of public 
sector workers in Cote d'Ivoire, but to raise them in Uganda and to lower tax 
revenue in Zimbabwe, but to raise it in Ghana [Collier and Gunning, 1999: 635]. On 
the other hand, according to IMF staff Mussa and Savastano (1999) in response to 
the old (new) criticism of the IMF traditional approach in dealing with the widely 
different challenges, represented by the collapse of the centrally planned economies 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and with the financial crises of Mexico, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1995-1998, Mussa and Savastano (25-26) argue 
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that the IMF approach in dealing with these recent problems was, in fact, quite 
different from the earlier IMF-Supported programs. They indicate that: 
" The IMF arrangements for Mexico during the debt crisis of the 
1980s consisted mostly of sizable fiscal adjustments, modest 
official financing and a concerted rollover of commercial bank 
credits, whereas the 1995-1996 stand-by arrangement involved 
modest fiscal adjustment and very large official financing. " 
Moreover, Mussa and Savastan illustrated other evidence to support that the IMF is 
flexible enough to respond to different countries circumstances and the IMF- 
supported programs are far from uniform, notwithstanding their superficial 
appearances. This is because the members dealing with the IMF have quite different 
economies, face different problems and thus display a variety of policy regimes and 
different ability and willingness to implement policies to correct external payments 
imbalances and their underlying causes. Therefore, the IMF programs need to be 
flexible in addressing these problems. 
(E) Political Consequences of SAP: structural adjustment not only involves 
economic and social aspects it also, implies political and institutional aspects. SAPS 
include several policies, which would have led to a change in the state's aspect, such 
as structural policies, including corporate governance policies, anti-corruption 
measures and democratic practices. On the positive side, it found that structural 
adjustment programs have a positive impact on the process of democratization in 
developing countries [Kleinberg and Clark, 2000]. On the negative side, structural 
programs are usually accompanied by a high political price, which mainly took the 
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form of riots, as in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and other developing countries. In 
many cases structural adjustment leads to the fall of governments [WhirledBank, 
n. d]. 
In Jordan case, riots broke out two days in several cities in the country; the protesters 
demanded resignation of the government as the government responded to the IMF's 
requirements by raising the prices of several goods and services without giving any 
hint to the population that such a move was coming. However, although the 
protesters were demanding the government resignation as response to the prices 
hikes, they did demand to but an end to the corruption (where the government came 
to be associated with high level of corruption as scandals involving Royal Jordanian 
and the Petra Bank) they also, did demand for greater political freedoms as 
professional organization soon joined in focusing their demands on greater political 
representation. 
In general, the future indicates that developing countries have to pay a high political 
price to qualify for donor community's loans or aid. Particularly, after September 11 
where the American President announced on March 2002 at the United Nations, 
Financing for Development Conference that: 
"... We must tie greater aid to political and legal and economic 
reforms... the additional funds would be granted to poorer nations 
that rooted out corruption and terrorism, respected human rights, 
and improved education and health care for all citizens" [Online 
News Hour, 2002]. 
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This important development, if applied in practice, means that the relationship 
between the developing countries and donor communities represent by the IMF and 
World Bank will witness a significant change in the future. 
3.6 Specification of the Model 
Form what has been discussed so far, essentially the objective of SAP is to create 
conditions, through policy measures, which would enable the country to attain an 
adequate rate of economic growth, low rate of inflation and sustainable external 
payments position. Several measures and instruments are called for to achieve these 
targets. 
In Jordan, to address the rapidly growing imbalances, the government adopted a long 
term growth oriented SAP supported by the IMF and the World Bank. Since 1989 
under the ongoing reform, Jordan has received an estimation over one billion US$ in 
IMF and World Bank adjustment lending. These loans have been contingent on a 
number of policy reforms, including: reducing budget deficit, reducing current 
account deficit, containing growth of domestic credit, curtailing the rate of inflation 
and liberalizing interest rate. The ultimate aim of these reforms has been increase 
economic growth rates. 
On the basis of the observations above, the aim here is to suggest a model, which 
would be used to examine the possible effects of SAP policies in Jordan. Before we 
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refer to the model it might be useful to make the following assumptions about Jordan 
which, by and large, represent a typical developing country, where: 
(i) The financial market is underdeveloped. 
(ii) Democratic forces are at an early stage of development. 
(iii) There is lack of international capital movement. 
(iv) The economy is strongly affected by the political situation in the Middle East, 
where it borders with Palestine and Israel to the West and Iraq to the East and 
Syria to the North. 
Consequently, the aim here is to evaluate the effectiveness of SAP policies and 
instruments in Jordan over the program period 1992-2001, using simple but 
appropriate models. To do so, this study will apply an econometric procedure 
proposed by Goldstein and Montial (1986), Khan (1991) and Doroodian (1993). In 
general, the estimation was made for several equations where the dependent 
variables were the macroeconomic targets and the program policies appeared as 
explanatory variables in each equation. In many cases, however, emphasis was made 
on the distinction between the influence of program finance and the influence of 
policy conditions attached to this finance as in Harrigan and Mosley (1991) and Iqbal 
(1993). 
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As our aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of SAPs policies and instruments, this 
study will apply what we might call Objective-Instrument procedure, where the 
change in the macroeconomic targets will be function: 
(i) Changes in macroeconomic policy instruments. 
(ii) Changes in the external conditions that would have an effect on the 
macroeconomic targets. 
Thus, the significance of the instruments in the estimated equations refer to their 
importance in achieving the targets concerned, otherwise the insignificance of these 
tools means that the target achieved is due to non-program policies. The above 
model can be set as follows: 
Yt =f (xis 9 wir 
) 
... 
(1) i=1,2,3... n 
Where 
Yr : Macroeconomic targets variables 
xt : Vector of SAP's instruments and policies 
wir Vector of external variables. 
Doroodian (1993) provides some empirical foundation for the analysis. The effects 
of such programs on macroeconomic variables investigated through regression 
analysis. The purpose of his study is to examine directly the effects that a typical 
stabilization program may have on the there main macroeconomic variables, 
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economic growth, inflation rate and current account. To do so, three models that 
examine the relationship between relevant macroeconomic variables and SAP 
instruments are used. The data are composed of time-series, cross-section 
observations for 43 countries during 1977-1983. 
To capture the effects of the external factors on the adjustment processes, Doroodian 
(1993) made further analysis to the basic models to include the percentage changes 
in terms of trade. This variable included in the economic growth and current models 
to investigate the effects that might have on the relevant variables. 
In general, the statistical results show that the IMF adjustment policies improve the 
inflation rate moderately and current account balance significantly. However, the 
program policies do not have much impact on the level of economic growth. 
Although the results presented in the Doroodian study jibe with the other evidence in 
the literature, it did not test for stationarity. Recent developments in time series 
econometrics suggest that the use of non-stationary series can produce superior 
regression coefficients. 
As the aim here is to evaluate the effectiveness of the SAP policies, considering what 
has been illustrated earlier, this study will estimate the following form: 
yj = f(x;, wr )... (2) 
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In this model, in attempt to evaluate the effect of SAPs: the macroeconomic targets 
(Yi) represent; economic growth, inflation rate and international reserves. These 
objectives are the main aims of SAPs in Jordan. As for the SAPs instruments and 
policies (Xi) comprise a typical SAP instruments, which are, fiscal and monetary 
polices, interest rate and exchange rate. This equation is a formal interpretation of 
the main theory underlying a typical SAP implemented by the Jordan. Where (Ye) 
stand for the program macroeconomic targets and (X; ) vector represent policies and 
instruments attached to SAPs included (domestic credit, exchange rate, fiscal deficit 
and interest rate). Therefore, it can be viewed as model includes both demand and 
supply side factors and linking change in each if these instruments to program 
targets. 
In attempts to capture the external factors that would have effect on the targets 
variables, the equation includes workers' remittances (Wr), this due to the particular 
circumstances of Jordan during the programs period (described in Chapter Two) 
where the workers' remittances play a vital role in the economy. The effect of the 
programs will be determined by the sign and statistically significance of the program 
dummy variable. However, the estimated coefficients of program's policies (Xi) 
would show the effectiveness of the program tools. 
Moreover, this study aims to investigate the impact of the SAPs and trade 
liberalization on the behavior of country's exports and imports. On the other hand, 
following the elasticity approach to balance of payments and M-L condition, we will 
113 
determine the validity of the devaluation of the JD as a policy measure to reduce the 
trade deficit problem. To do so, a traditional import and export demand equations 
will be estimated. By using program dummy in each equation, we will be able to 
evaluate whether the trade liberalization implemented under SAPs has any effect on 
trade balance. Following what has been discussed above; the following equations 
will be used for estimation purposes. 
3.6.1 Economic Growth Equation 
Recent developments in growth literature, Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), have emphasized that economic conditions and implementation of 
appropriate public policies influence the rate of economic growth. They link 
economic growth to fiscal variables in their models, which were tested empirically 
by Cashin (1995). Fischer (1993) extends the notion that government can influence 
growth by creating macroeconomic policies that are conducive to growth. The key 
macroeconomic policies that considered are monetary, fiscal and exchange rate 
policies. 
To measure this effect, Fischer (1993) recommends using basic indicators of 
macroeconomic policy and monetary policy. In particular, Fischer used a regression 
to identify the channels through which macroeconomic variables affect economic 
growth. For the purpose of evaluating the effect of the SAP policies in achieving 
economic growth target, the following equation will be estimated: 
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RGDP =f (DC, BD, INT, EX , WR) ... (3) 
Where RGDP is the real GD; DC, BD, INT and EX are the SAP's typical tools: 
domestic credit, fiscal deficit, interest rate and exchange rate, respectively. WR is the 
Jordanian remittances. A dummy variable will be introduced here to measure the 
impact caused by the introduction of SAPs. 
3.6.2 Reserves Equation 
Enhancing international reserves appear as one of the important targets for Jordan 
under SAPs, where the country's international reserve in 1989 decreased to the 
lowest level ever. To examine the effect of SAPs on achieving this target the 
following equation will be estimated: 
RES =f (DC, BD, INT, EX, WR)... (5) 
Where RES stand for official reserves, as the earlier equations; DC, BD, INT and EX 
represent the program tools. WR is the workers' remittances. Also a dummy variable 
for the potential contribution of SAPs will be added to the equation to measure this 
effect. Although it may be argued that the formulation of the model in a simple 
equation is extremely simple, the estimates obtained still yield useful information on 
the relative importance of the various factors affecting the international reserves. 
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3.6.3 Inflation Rate Equation 
In the literature traditional models of inflation are often based on the Monetarist and 
Structuralist clams, as it has been illustrated by Taylor (1991) and Balakrishanan 
(1994). The monetarist model attributes inflation to the excess of money growth 
over real output growth, while the Structuralist model views inflation as the result of 
sectoral disequilibrium, notably the weak balance of payments position or slow 
growth of agriculture. However, for the purpose of evaluating the impact of SAP 
instruments in controlling the inflation rate as one of SAP targets. A simple function 
links the main SAPs instruments and inflation target as follows: 
INF =f (DC, BD, INT , EX , MS, WR) ... (4) 
Where INF refers to inflation rate, MS is the money supply (M2), DC, BD, EX and 
INT are the domestic credit, budget deficit, interest rate and exchange rate, 
respectively. A dummy variable taking account of SAPs introduction will be taken 
up here and added to the right side of the model to measure the contribution made by 
SAPs. 
3.6.4 Import Demand Equation 
Economic theory determines a number of main variables that have a significant 
effect on imports. The simplest import function is one that relates the quantity of 
imports demand to the real income level and to the relative price of imports. The 
level of foreign exchange is also relevant for designing import behavior in 
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developing country like Jordan, therefore remittances of Jordanian working abroad 
included to the model, as has been elaborated by Dutta and Ahmed (1999), Bahmani- 
Oskooee (1986). Accordingly, the import demand function takes the following form: 
IMP = f(Y, PM, WR)... (6) 
Where IMP is the value of imports, Y and PM refer to: the level of real income, the 
price ratio of import price to domestic price index, respectively. WR is the workers' 
remittances. To capture the effect of the SAP and mainly trade liberalization policy 
a dummy variable will be added to the equation above. 
3.6.5 Export Demand Equation 
Similarly for the export demand function by considering the literature in Arize 
(1990), Arize, et. al. (2000) and Zaidan (1999) the equation is derived from the 
simple relationship between exports EXP, international competitiveness EP and 
world income WG. 
EXP =f (EP , WG) ... (7) 
Where EXP refers to total exports, EP and WG are the relative price of export 
demand and the foreign income. A dummy variable will be introduced here to 
measure the impact caused by SAPs. 
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3.7 Data Sources and Problems 
For under-taking a meaningful regression analysis, the data used here are on annual 
basis running from 1972 to 2001. Two main sources of data have been used in 
construction of data set. The sources for macro indicators are: 
(i) International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), several Annual Reports and Monthly 
Bulletins. 
It is notable to refer here to some problems that faced me in the early stage of data 
collection. In general, one should be skeptical of the accuracy of the official 
Jordanian data, particularly since different sources present different figures for the 
same variables. On the other hand, there was a change in the official methods of 
collecting and reporting the data. Therefore, to minimize this problem, the data set 
are based on only two sources the (IFS) and (CBJ) according to the availability and 
consistency of the data. Moreover, all data set was subject to scrutinize process. 
Data definition and measurement are summarized in Appendix (i). 
3.8 Conclusion 
Structural adjustment program design is often a difficult task, involving, not only a 
complex set of macroeconomic relationships, but also some political and social 
aspects. From what has preceded, one can realize that the World Bank and the IMF 
reviews of structural adjustment is an ongoing process. The classic SAP in the 1970s 
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and early 1980s has changed. Both institutions adopted a new development 
approach (New SAP) and this program represents a comprehensive approach 
emphasizing economic as well as social aspects in the reform process. The 
substance of the SAPs, however, remains based on neo-liberal economic theory and 
the monetarist approach to the BOP. 
These programs have generally three components. Firstly, policies that would 
stabilize the macroeconomic imbalances. Secondly, institute market reforms and 
structural changes that would improve efficiency and restore growth. Thirdly, secure 
sustainable external financing. However, the objectives of high economic growth 
and alleviating poverty are not stated explicitly among these core objectives, but 
according to IMF staff, Mussa and Savastano (1999: 4): 
"This does not imply unconcern with these objectives but 
rather the priority that a country experiencing severe balance 
of payments difficulties must assign in the shorter term to 
ameliorating these difficulties and correcting the 
macroeconomic and structural imbalances at their root, in 
order to achieve more basic objectives in a sustainable manner 
over the longer term. " 
The review of the IMF and the World Bank adjustment programs suggest that much 
of the criticism is directed at the macroeconomic policies through fiscal and 
monetary restraints introduced by the IMF to achieve external and internal balances, 
which the critics claim sacrifices growth to achieve stabilization. On the other hand, 
the IMF program emphasizes internal factors and suggests a direct and causal 
relationship between excessive credit creation (domestic economic mismanagement) 
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and the deterioration of external account, thus the external factors have been ignored 
in relation to the BOP performance. 
With respect to the effects of implementing adjustment policies, to date, empirical 
studies do not give any final verdict. The results differ from country to country, 
there are some success stories and many failures due to the fact that the 
circumstances of each borrowing country are different, and so is the economic and 
political framework of policy-making, therefore is not surprising that every 
experience tells a different story. However, whether or not the introduction of new 
SAPs will lead to different output will be a good basis for further research. 
The program have made little effort to adopt to the circumstances of developing 
countries, which are always characterized by limited economic diversification, low 
levels of industrialization, a dependence on a narrow export base, lack of mobility of 
labor and capital resources, poor government administrative and institutional 
capacity. Recently, the IMF and World Bank started to review their policy; in the 
light of this they modified and introduced new programs (PRSPs) for low-income 
countries. However, more revision is needed regarding the stringency of its 
monetary and fiscal policy packages to ensure that any recommendations for these 
policies consider the capacities and the circumstances of the developing countries, or 
even the difference in the circumstances of each individual country. 
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Endnotes 
In 1989, Johan Williamson coined the phrase Washington consensus as a descriptive term 
to refer to the policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin 
American countries. For further details, see Williamson (1990) and Snowdon (2001). 
2 Commercial banks credit had become much more attractive to Third World, mainly 
because the banks were awash with petro-dollars and because of borrowing facilities from 
these banks to Third World countries. 
3 The real interest rates increased from an average of 1.3 per cent between 1973-1980 to an 
average of 5.9 per cent during 1980-1986, see Toye (1994: 20). 
° Nontradables are goods and services whose prices are determined domestically because 
these are not easily bought or sold outside the country, for example, transportation, 
construction and retail trade, household services. Tradables are goods and services whose 
prices are determined by world supply and demand and include both exportables and 
importables. 
s For more details on the complete macroeconomic frameworks or (identities) of the Polak 
model, see, Rao and Nallari (2001: 32-40). 
6 For more details for that process, see, Tarp (1993: 59-75). 
The formulation of SAP targets is based on the assumption that there is a stable demand for 
money function. Empirical studies on the demand for money in Arab countries including 
Jordan support this assumption [Tahir, 1997a: 26-46]. 
8 For details on open economy macroeconomics policy based on Mundell-Fleming model, 
see, Ugur (ed. ) (2002: 3-30). Also, Husted and Melvin (2000: 523-535). 
9 Interest rate changes and other financial reform have been suggested under SAPs policies. 
This topic will be discussed in section 3.4.4. 
10 In Jordan for instance, raising the reserve requirements of commercial banks is the most 
powerful and effective policy instrument available, see Al-Smadi (2000: 174-184). 
This link occurs because changes in the money supply (equal changes in credit to the 
government, changes in credit to the private sector and variations in international 
reserves). Therefore, in developing countries where the financial markets are 
underdeveloped the government has to rely on bank credit for its financing needs so there 
is a close correspondence between deficit and changes in the supply of domestic credit. 
12 One common explanation for the inflationary consequences of fiscal deficits in developing 
countries is the lack of sufficiently developed domestic capital markets that can absorb 
newly issued government debt. 
13 The issue of the effect of government borrowing on interest rates is by no means settled in 
the literature, for a comprehensive treatment of this literature. See, Bernheim (1989: 55- 
72). 
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14 This topic will be explained in 3.4.7 section. 
's For further discussion and empirical evidence whether devaluation induces relative price 
changes or not, see, Killick (1984). 
16 In the presence of non-stationary variables, there might be what Granger and Newbold 
(1973) call a `spurious regression', in which regression coefficients appear statistically 
significant and have a high R2 even when the variables are, in fact, unrelated. 
17 For further discussion to the alternative policies to devaluation, see Bird (1983: 461-481). 
' See Agenor and Montiel (1996). 
19 For instance, Jordanian government is used to effect the productive sectors mainly, 
agricultural and industry through reducing interest rates in the loans toward those sectors. 
20 In Jordan, for instance, there are at least four leading Islamic Banks and institutions 
operating according to profit/loosing sharing system. 
21 For deep conversation with Stiglitz, see Snowdon (2001). 
22 A member of donor representatives express about his understood to ownership saying 
"Ownership exits when they do, what we want them to do, but they do it voluntarily we 
want them to take ownership off course they must do what we want, if not, they should get 
their money elsewhere"!? IMF (1998). 
23 For a discussion of the changes in the IMF's operational procedures, see killick (1995). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ISSUES IN PROGRAM EVALUATION 
4.1 Introduction 
The proceeding sections aim to examine the effects of different policies derived from 
the structural adjustment program. This section intends to look at the general 
evaluation of the SAPs by reviewing the evidence that is available on the effects of 
stabilization and structural adjustment, paying special attention to the methodologies 
employed in evaluating the impact of these programs on the major macroeconomic 
indicators. 
Over the past thirty years or so, there have been a number of empirical studies aimed 
at assessing the effects of the IMF and the World Bank programs; most of these 
studies are based on the cross-country empirical evidence. Although a number of 
previous studies have tried to evaluate the structural adjustment programs, there is no 
single approach agreed in evaluating the effectiveness of the SAP in countries 
concerned. Moreover, one cannot say with certainty whether such programs have 
been effective in achieving their objectives or not. The answer to this question turns 
out to be no easy task. Indeed, the literature on the IMF and the World Bank 
programs effects is dominated by obstacles in the way of arriving at firm evidence on 
the effects of structural adjustment program, these obstacles could be illustrated as 
follows [Killick, et. al., 1992]: 
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(i) The issue of program effectiveness is a broad and controversial one, mainly 
because the country under supported program is subject to many external 
shocks, such as changes in the terms of trade, the weather conditions or any 
external shocks, which will affect the country's performance to achieve the 
objectives of the program. Thus, measures of program effectiveness have to 
filter out these unanticipated exogenous shocks. Practically, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the effects of the program factors from a large number of 
other factor influences the macroeconomic performance of an economy. 
(ii) It is difficult to disentangle the effects of the policies in the IMF program and 
the effects of fund finance, which accompanies the programs. 
(iii) The degree of implementation or compliance on SAP policy conditions is 
different from one country to an other, so the effectiveness tests should ideally 
adjust for degree of implementation. 
(iv) Different measures to assess the SAP can produce different results, if not 
conflicting estimates of the quantitative impact of the program. Therefore, 
one should be careful and objective in interpreting the results and concluding 
remarks. 
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(v) As the program results are often sensitive to the period of analysis, one issue 
here is whether the impact of SAP should be assessed only for the period of 
the programs or should extend beyond them. 
(vi) The counterfactual problem "What would have happened in the absence of the 
program" appears to be one of the critical issue in evaluating of the SAP. This 
is due to the importance of disentangle the consequences of the initial situation 
in countries concerned from the effects of the programs themselves. 
To illustrate the concurrent and sometimes conflicting policies influences on 
effectiveness of programs Figure (4.1) shows that the country under structural 
adjustment programs is subject to different limitations. Firstly, the policy reforms 
and financial resources provided from the IMF and the World Bank. Both factors 
must interact with the structure of the economy and its institutions (internal factors) 
to act in way, which will yield the desired economic adjustment. 
Secondly, while the country under SAP implementation, exogenous factors might 
affect the macroeconomic outcome in a way, which may help the operation of 
macroeconomic adjustment, but also it might work against the policy reforms 
causing negative results. Therefore, both the internal and the external factors should 
be taking into consideration in evaluating of structural adjustment programs. 
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Figure (4.1) 
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4.2 Evaluation Methodologies 
As previously mentioned, the answer to the question: Do the structural adjustment 
programs work? raised a number of empirical and analytical problems. However, in 
practice the literature suggests four distinct approaches have been applied to the 
evaluation of SAPs [Khan, 1990: 213]: 
(i) The Before-After Approach: which compares macroeconomic performance 
during a program and performance prior to the program? 
(ii) The Actual-Target Approach: which compares what a program actually 
achieved with what it was planned to achieve? 
(iii) The With-Without Approach: in this approach the behavior of major 
macroeconomic indicators in program countries is compared with 
macroeconomic performance in countries without programs the (Control 
Group). 
(iv) The Comparison of Simulations Approach: which compares the simulation 
performance under program policies and simulated performance with some 
other set of polices. 
4.2.1 The Before-After Approach 
This is the most popular approach, involving comparison of the value of variables 
before and after the implementation of an adjustment program. The major attraction 
of this methodology is that: it compares two sets of actual outcomes. Therefore, this 
approach is easy to carry out and seemingly objective. Moreover, it provides useful 
evidence especially when the results are statistically strong. However, the main 
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weaknesses of this approach is that changing or improvement over time in 
macroeconomic performance may be take place due to any number of exogenous 
factors and other non-program influence (involving external factors like terms of 
trade variations, international interest rates movements as well as shifts in weather 
conditions). Goldstein (1986: 3) emphasized that the before-after approach can be 
useful to show what happened in program countries, but not why it happened. 2 In 
other words, this approach attributes all of the change in outcomes between the pre- 
program and program period to program factors. 
These limitations make it a poor estimator of the ideal counterfactual. However, this 
approach could be improved as pointed out by Khan (1990: 201), if one could make 
a judgmental correction for the influence of non-program factors that would possible 
improve upon the estimates of counterfactual, by doing so, it could be possible to 
distinguish between the effects of program factors from the possible effects of non 
program factors, particularly if this exercise carried out in single country. 
Many researchers used this approach, the main studies, which applied this approach, 
are reviewed by Ul-Haque and Khan (1998). The first used this approach was in 
1978 by the IMF staff Reichmann and Stillson (1978). They compared the behavior 
of the balance of payments; inflation and growth rates during the two-year periods 
before and after program in a total of 79 IMF supported programs implemented 
during the period 1963-1972. They found that there was a significant change in the 
balance of payments in only one fourth of all programs in a majority of cases over 70 
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per cent. In relation to growth rates, they concluded that these programs had no 
effects, while the impact on inflation rate was mixed. 
The same procedure was also used by Connors in (1979) to examine 31 programs 
that were adopted during the 1973-1977. Connors compares the behavior of the 
main macroeconomic indicators during one-year comparison period rather than two. 
He found that the IMF programs had no noticeable effects on growth rate, inflation 
and current account deficit. Pastor (1987) also used this test for 18 Latin American 
countries during 1965-1981, using one-year comparison. Pastor concluded that the 
IMF programs led to a significant improvement in the balance of payments, but there 
was no effect on the current account, the inflation rate and the GDP growth. 
A study by Corbo and Webb (1990) examined the effects of the World Bank 
structural adjustments in a number of countries that received the SAP lending during 
1970-1984. Corbo and Webb, using before-after comparison, concluded that the 
World Bank programs had improved the export rates. The study also, observed a 
decline in the investment ratio to GDP in adjusting countries over the same period. 
The most recent study used the before-after approach was by Killick, et. al. (1992) 
that updated and extended the earlier Killick (1984) study. 3 They found in 
examining the effects of programs in 16 countries over the period 1979-1985, that 
the IMF-supported programs led to an improvement in the balance of payments, the 
current account balance and the growth rate, while inflation was reduced. It is worth 
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noting here that in this study the results were quite different from Killick's 1984 
study. It is apparent that the results cited in most of these studies differ according to 
the length of comparison period and according to regions. 
4.2.2 The With-Without Approach 
The use of this approach is often intended to overcome some of the limitations of the 
before-after approach by comparing the experience of adjusting and non-adjusting 
countries (Control Group) over the same period. Thus, it is implicitly based on 
ceteris paribus, assumption that all countries are differentiated only in terms of 
having or not having an adjustment program. In particular, the external environment 
as well as the economic structure is assumed to be alike in both program and non- 
program countries. Moreover, the with-without approach also requires that each 
country exhibit highly similar performance in the pre-adjustment period. Such 
assumption does not exist, partially since adjusted countries are more likely to have 
experienced poor economic performance in the pre-program period than non- 
adjusted countries. 
Goldstein and Montiel (1986: 321) argued that a comparison of mean 
macroeconomic outcomes between program and non-program countries will, under 
reasonable assumptions, overemphasize the beneficial effects of program with 
respect to the IMF and World Bank program. Basically, the non-random selection of 
program countries means that with-without estimates of program effects may be 
biased. Mainly because under non-random selection the with-without estimator 
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attributes difference in outcomes exclusively to program status, when in fact the 
difference in starting positions itself is a cause of differences in subsequent 
performance between the two groups. 
Despite, the shortcomings of the with-without approach, many researchers rely upon 
this approach to evaluate the effect of the SAP. Khan (1990) indicated that the first 
to use the with-without approach was Donovan (the IMF staff) in two studies in 1981 
and 1982. In the first study, Donovan (1981) examined 12 programs implemented 
in 12 countries during 1970-1976. The outcome for growth was not clear cut, while 
in one-year comparisons there was a sharp improvement in economic growth in 
program counters relative to the non-program countries. In the three-year 
comparisons economic growth fell in program countries by more than it did in non- 
program counters. In terms of exports Donovan found that the improvement in the 
growth rate of exports was higher in program countries irrespective of time 
comparison. The inflation rate also rose at a slower rate in program countries. 
Donovan (1982) undertook a similar exercise as in 1981 for an expanded sample of 
78 programs covering the period 1971-1980. The results indicated relative 
improvement for program countries in the ratio of the current account to GDP, the 
ratio of the overall balance of payments to exports and the rate of inflation. 
However, the growth performance fell by more than the average decline experienced 
by non-program countries in the one-year comparisons, but by less in the three year 
comparisons. 
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To overcome the weakness of with-without approach, Gylfason (1987) carried out a 
study for 32 programs implemented during 1977-1979, taking as a control group a 
set of non-program countries that had experienced economic difficulties, mainly 
balance of payments difficulties. A non-parametric statistical test was used to 
determine if the behavior of the macroeconomic variables for program countries was 
significantly different from that of the control group. The results indicated that 
program countries experienced statistically significant improvement in the balance of 
payments of the control group. However, there was no significant difference 
between program countries and the control group in case of real growth rate. In 
relation to the inflation rate Gylfason's results indicate that it remained 
approximately the same as the average rate of inflation in the control group. 
Mosely, et. al, (1995) used the with-without approach to evaluate the impact of the 
World Bank adjustment in 25 LDCs that received the SAPs during 1980-1987. The 
evaluation indicated that countries implemented SAPs have achieved better trade 
performance, worse investment rate and a diverse effect on GDP growth rate relative 
to non-program countries. 
Now, whether applying both approaches, the before-after and the with-without 
approach to the same sample might yield different outcomes. Corbo and Webb 
(1990) used the with-without method for the same period to the same sample by 
comparing the performance of the countries receiving such programs. In general, 
they found that with-without approach like before-after approach suggested that 
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countries implemented World Bank structural adjustment have achieved more 
positive macroeconomic performance. 
The empirical analysis applied by Goldstein and Montiel (1986) to a sample of 68 
countries was called Generalized Evaluation Estimation (GEE). In this approach, 
they firstly test the program countries performance in the pre-program period and 
they found that program countries systematically demonstrated weaker performance, 
higher inflation, slower growth and balance of payments deficits. Having they adjust 
for these differences in performances between program and non-program. Goldstein 
and Montiel using regression analysis estimate the program effects and they found 
that there were no statistically significant effects of programs on the economic 
growth rate, balance of payments or on the rate of inflation. 
Ul-Haque and Khan (1998) indicated to a recent study by Dicks-Mireaux and 
Schadler (1997) covered the period 1986-1991 which concluded that the SAP do 
reduce inflation rate, on the other hand, they found that the implementation of a 
program led to an immediate improvement in growth rate and this effect was found 
to be statistically significant. It is worth noting that most of studies which applied 
the GEE approach were in favor of improve the current account and reductions in 
inflation rate, but there were different results regarding to economic growth rates. 
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4.2.3 The Actual -Target Approach 
This approach compares actual outcomes under the IMF and World Bank program 
with targets set inception of the program. Therefore, this methodology is useful in a 
situation where the objective of the evaluation is to examine why the targets were not 
achieved. This approach has not been as frequently used as the other approaches, 
mainly because its reliance on confidential information on program targets that only 
the country authorities and IMF staff has access to [Khan, 1990: 205]. However, the 
IMF's policy in recent years has changed, now it is allowed to public members to 
have access to Letter of Intent, which describes the policies and targets that the 
adjusting country intends to implement in the context of its request for financial 
support from the IMF. This decumbent is being made available on the IMF website. 
The main studies that used the actual-target approach as reviewed by Khan (1990) 
are Reichmann (1978) the IMF staff, studied 21 programs during 1973-1975. He 
found that the balance of payments targets were met or exceeded in nearly two thirds 
of the programs, while the inflation targets were exceeded in over half of programs 
and 62 of programs met their growth targets. Beveridge and Kelly (1980) focused in 
their study on intermediate targets (domestic credit expansion, government revenues, 
expenditures and deficit financing). Their results showed that a short fall in revenues 
occurred in about 40 per cent of the cases and 60 per cent of the programs achieved 
the expenditure targets. Consequently, the overall fiscal deficit targets were achieved 
in only about half the programs, as were the domestic credit ceilings, government 
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were more successful in meeting domestic non-bank financing limits than foreign 
financing targets. 
Finally, Zulu and Nosouli (1985) studied a number of the IMF programs that were 
implemented in African countries during 1980-1988. They found that the current 
account targets in about 48 per cent were met, while targets for the growth rate were 
met only in less than 20 per cent of the cases. 
Indeed, the actual-targets approach also has its drawbacks as the other approaches; 
the main weakness of this methodology is that the target values embody forecasting 
errors. In this regard Mosley (1987) argued that the targets in World Bank structural 
adjustment are merely guesses. Taylor (1988) and Kenan (1986) argued that the 
IMF consistently under-estimated the inflation rate and over-estimated the growth 
rate in 1980s for the 17 countries, which his study covered. 
Another weakness of this methodology is such approach carries a high element of 
subjectivity with possibility that results are affected by any tendency towards over- 
ambition or under-estimate in program targets. So in the eyes of the evaluator it is 
possible that to consider the program as under-performance in the first case as 
program's targets too ambitious and thus extremely difficult to achieve and over- 
performance in the second case. 
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In general, this approach still yield useful information in relation to the extent of 
which the SAPs achieved their own targets and to sheds light on how the country's 
macroeconomic performance was affected by a IMF and World Bank supported 
program. 
4.2.4 The Comparison of Simulations 
This approach is based on policy models of the behavior of a group of economies or 
a single economy. It relies on simulations of economic models to infer the 
hypothetical performance of policy packages mostly the IMF-type policies and 
alternative policy packages. Khan (1990) argued that this approach carries some 
advantages. First, under this approach one can draw on a wider body of adjustment 
experience since the data base need not restricted to countries with IMF-supported 
programs. Second, the policy simulations are specified, one does not have to worry 
that incomplete implementation of policies will blur the results. 
Like other approaches the comparison of simulations has some important problems. 
The usefulness of such approach depends on the appropriateness of the model used. 
Whereas there is as yet no single model available that covers the whole range of 
policy measures contained in a typical SAP, this approach is the most time 
consuming of all four approaches since it requires model building. Moreover, 
Killick, et. al. (1992: 578) argued that the danger of this approach is that the results 
reflect model specification rather than reality. 
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The main studies, which applied this approach, are Khan and Knight (1982 and 
1985). They used this approach twice, the first in 1982 for sample of 29 developing 
countries and the second in 1985 they extended their simulation analysis to a 
comparison of alternative policy packages. The simulation experiments in the first 
study showed that the IMF program produced a sharp price deflation in the first year. 
Then a temporary burst of inflation in the following years. Also, in the first year 
there was contract in the output followed by rose temporary about its full- 
employment level. 
The second study (1985) showed that the balance of payment improved almost 
immediately, but at the expense of temporary higher rate of inflation and a short-run 
reduction in economic growth. However, the long-run effects on inflation, economic 
growth and the balance of payment were more favorable than the short-run effect. 
It is worth noting here that although all the previous studies, which have tried to 
evaluate the IMF and World Bank programs, are based on a large multi-country 
studies, there are some case studies which focused on individual country experience. 
Indeed, any effective assessment of these programs requires a comprehensive 
country-by-country analysis. This is because each individual country has its own 
political and social environments and both the internal and external factors of each 
country need to be taken into consideration. 
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UI-Haque and Khan (1998) emphasized that case studies approach as opposed to 
multi-country studies permit one to delve more deeply into program implementation. 
Goldsbrough, et. al. (1996: 1) argued that case study analysis offers ability to 
examine the effects of policies in the context of complex economic and institutional 
setting that can not be captured using cross-section studies. In general, a case study 
approach can avoid the various approaches disadvantages and can go much further in 
explaining the reasons behind the results obtained. 
However, case study has disadvantage, it is difficult to generalize from the findings 
of country case studies. On the other hand, in single country version the hypothetical 
counterfactual scenario poses number of procedural obstacles and do not offer a full 
confidence of what would have happened in the absence of the program. Mainly 
because the target values that are contained in alternative policies, such as a 
government plan may differ significantly from what would have happened in the 
absence of actual SAP. The same thing can say in case of an optimal set of policies, 
which is also subjective matter. To sum up, Table (4.1) offers comparison between 
case study approach and the other approaches. 
As the aim of this study is to evaluate the Jordanian experience under the structural 
adjustment programs, it might be useful to point out to the main studies, which have 
tried to assess individual country experience. Iqbal, et. al. (2000) used simulation 
methods to evaluate adjustment policies in terms both the direct and indirect effects 
that they may have had in Pakistan. Igbal's statistical evidence obtained from the 
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regression and simulation results found that the overall economic performance is 
indeed improved under the IMF and the World Bank packages. 
Also, in Pakistan McGillivray, et. al., (1995) provide a methodological review of 
pre-existing studies of the effects of adjustment on macroeconomic performance. 
They argued that the more appropriate method is econometric modeling, due to its 
ability to control for the influence of non-adjustment program factors on 
macroeconomic performance. McGillivray, et. al., apply more rigorous econometric 
modeling techniques to Pakistan's economy. In general, their results suggest that 
adjustment has had little causal effect on Pakistan's macroeconomic performance. In 
relation to inflation, adjustment program seems to have had a beneficial impact on 
inflation rate during the SAP period. 
In the case of Morocco, to evaluate the effects of the World Bank policies over the 
period 1980-1986, the model used in the counterfactual analysis was a standard 
Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE). The results prove that World Bank 
policy package have a postive impact on the GDP and exports, however, it was 
found that further liberalization of capital controls appears to have an export- 
depressing effect [Mosley, et. al., 1995]. 
Karingi and Siriwardana (2001) try to evaluate the effects of some policies 
recommended, namely fiscal adjustment and trade liberalization, by the World Bank 
and the IMF in the Kenyan economy, using a the CGE model. Whereas the Kenyan 
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government has implemented only part of these recommendations, the researchers 
used alternative fiscal austerity measures and investigate the question of trade 
liberalization through the lower tariffs. Although the results do not support the 
application of that option in respect to GDP, investment, employment and balance of 
payment, they suggest that fiscal austerity through raising indirect taxes and trade 
liberalization supported by foreign inflows achieve the best overall outcomes. 
Finally, Foulo and Grafton (1998) evaluated the 1988-1990 structural adjustment 
program in Lesotho using Computable General Equilibrium model. The results 
suggest that the SAPs worsened the balance of payments, do not necessarily hurt 
wage earners and how the SAPs are applied is crucial in determining distributional 
outcomes. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the answer to the question of the successful of structural adjustment 
programs raises a number of difficult statistical and analytical problems. Therefore, 
evaluation the effect of SAP is not an easy task, which is one reason why there has 
been controversy on this issue. Although, one can say from the proceeding sections 
there is no ideal approach to assess the SAP, one should not stop evaluating this 
program but rather to be careful and objective when doing so. Particularly sometimes 
different approaches can produce different if not conflict results of the quantitative 
impact of the program. Consequently, one should be careful to recognize the 
limitations of these approaches as well as in interpreting its outcomes. 
140 
In summary, the available empirical evidence suggests that the IMF and World Bank 
structural adjustment programs have had positive impact on the balance of payment, 
negative effect on investment, varied effects on the current account and no visible 
effect on inflation and economic growth. Table (4.2) offers a summary of empirical 
evaluation of the effects of the IMF and World Bank programs reported in this 
chapter and in the existing literature. 
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Table (4.1) 
Uses and Limitations of Alternative Tests of the SAPS 
A-Program Results Before- Target- With. Comparison of Generalized Case 
After Actual Without Simulations Evaluation Study 
Does the program improve Yes Yes Yes 
... 
Yes Yes 
On the initial situation'? 
Do program countries do ,,, ... 
Yes Yes Yes 
better than non-program'? 
Does program improve upon Weak Weak Yes Yes Yes 
likely alternative outcomes? Debatable 
Are program effects secured Weak ... 
Yes Yes 
Can the results he generalized ,,, 
Debatable Yes Weak 
Debatable 
B-Result Deterntinants 
Influence of erogenous Weak ... ... 
Yes Yes Yes 
factors 
Program implementation 
,,, ,,, ,_, ,,, 
Weak Yes 
Impact on instrument ... 
Yes 
... ... ... Yes 
Variables 
Impact on financial flows 
... 
Yes 
Source: The origin n/'this table in Killic-k, er. al., (I992). 
Key: Yes =The test provides u seful info rmation 
Weak = The test is weak 
Debatable = There is disagreem ent amon gst the researchers 
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Table (4.2) 
Summary of Empirical Evaluations of the SAPs 
Study Time period Number of Balance of Current Inflation Growth Investment 
Countries payments Account Rate 
Before-After 
Reichman & Stillson ( 1978) 1903 - 72 ... 
0 
... 0 + ... Connors (1979) 1973 - 77 23 0 0 0 0 
Killick (1984) 1974 - 79 24 0 0 - 0 
Zulu & Nsouli (1985) 1890 - 81 22 0 0 (1 
Pastor (1987) 1965 -8 18 + 0 0 0 ... Combo K Webh (1990) 1970 - 84 ... + 
Sehadler, et al. (199±) 1983 - 93 19 + +- 
Killick, Mailk & Manuel (1995) 1979 - 85 16 + + _ 
_ +, 
With-Without 
Donoven (1981) 1970 -76 12 + 
Donoven (1982) 1971 -80 44 + + 
L. oxlcy (1984) 1971 -82 38 0 0 _0 Gylfason (1987) 1977 -79 14 + ... .., 0 Corho & webh (1990) 1970 -84 ... ... ... Moscly, Harrigan &Toye (1991) 1980 -87 25 ... 
+ 
Generalized Evaluation 
Goldstein & Montiel (1986) 1974 - 81 58 + 
Khan (1990) 1973 - 88 69 + + 
('orho & Rojas ( 1991) 1970 - 88 77 ... + 
Con way (1994) 1976 - 86 73 .. + + 
Bagci & pelTaudin (1997) 1973 - 92 68 + + 
Dicks-Mircaur. rt at. (1997) 1986 -91 74 + 
Simulation 
Khan & Kingth (1981) 1968 - 75 29 + + 
Khan & Kingth (1985) 1968 - 75 29 + + _ 
Case Study 
Iyhal ( 1997) 1970 - 93 Pakistan + + ++ 
Mc( illi, r y& Ahmrd ( 1991) 1978 - 94 Pakistan ... ... + Moscly, Harrigan &'I oyr ( 1991) 1980 - 86 Morocco ... + ... + Foulo and Grafton (1998) 1988 - 90 Lesotho 
Source: The origin n/ this table in UI-llayue and khan (1998). 
Key + Irid icates positive effect 
- Indicates negative effect 
0 Indicates no effect 
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Endnotes 
Most of countries adopting the SAP are often in crisis immediately beforehand and in the 
short-run from the program implementation. 
Z This conclusion based on that the evaluation exercise carried out only by compare the 
macroeconomic indicators before and after the program. 
3 Killick (1984) employed non-parametric statistics and regression analysis to gauge the 
effects of 38 programs during 1974-1979. His results showed that balance of payments and 
current account deteriorated, inflation was reduced and that economic growth was higher 
in the first year but was eroded in subsequent years. See Ul-Haque and Khan (1998: 14). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
JORDAN'S SAPs: OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES 
5.1 Introduction 
For nearly three decades, the IMF and World Bank have been sponsoring 
stabilization and structural adjustment programs in developing countries. These 
programs, broadly speaking, aimed at meeting the country's principle 
macroeconomic objectives. In Jordan, since 1989, the country has undertaken 
considerable stabilization and adjustment reforms, which have been supported by the 
IMF, World Bank, and bilateral donors. Before undertaking assessment of the 
macroeconomic effects of the SAPs, this chapter, mainly will describe in detail the 
main components of the SAPs (objectives and policies) which were implemented in 
Jordan under the supervision of the BWIs. The rest of the chapter is divided into 
several sections. The next two sections will present a brief background on the IMF 
and the World Bank and their relationships with Jordan. Thereafter, the chapter 
presents the main objectives and policies of Jordan's SAPs. Finally a primary 
assessment of Jordan's SAPs will be also given at the end of this chapter. 
5.2 Jordan's Experience with SAPs 
Jordan enjoyed an unprecedented growth in its income and expenditure during 1973- 
1984, boosted by the flow of foreign aid, loans and workers' remittances from 
traditional regional Gulf countries. But this boom unfortunately, ended in the mid 
1980s, as a result of the rapid decline in the oil price and the subsequent slowdown in 
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regional economies. As a consequence, Jordan experienced a radical slowdown in 
its growth rate and severe fiscal and external account deficits, which became more 
pronounced after 1986, unemployment and poverty also increased. The government 
responses to these developments indeed aggravate the economic problems leading 
the country into serious economic crisis. According to Maciejewski and Mansur 
(1996: 7), the government dealt with the shortage in foreign aid flows by: 
(i) Expanding public spending financed by external commercial and domestic 
bank borrowing in order to stimulate domestic aggregate demand. This 
increased the already large budget deficit. The result was high inflation, a 
worsening of the current account deficit and rapidly increasing foreign debt. 
By the late 1980s, Jordan's debt services were some 45 per cent of total 
exports. Furthermore GDP growth had turned negative. 
(ii) Maintaining domestic price stability through the regulation of prices. As a 
result there was a rapid acceleration in the external debt service burden, 
which led to the emergence of serious financial imbalances. 
By 1988, these imbalances had reached unsustainable proportions where general 
financial instability led to bank failures and a reduction in private capital inflows. In 
this regard, the banking crisis emerged for three main reasons: inadequate banking 
regulations, overexposure of the banking system to real estate markets and, more 
importantly, imprudent speculation on the foreign exchange markets. These 
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circumstances resulted in the collapse of a major bank (Batra Bank) in 1989, the 
third largest banking institution in Jordan, together with the emergence of financial 
difficulties in six other financial institutions [ibid: 39]. This deteriorating 
macroeconomic environment reflected in aggregate investment declined to some 22 
per cent of GDP. Jordan in that time had become one of the most heavily indebted 
countries in the world with its ratio of external debt to GDP increasing to 193 per 
cent. 
As a consequence of the growing budget deficits, which created new financial 
distortions such as regulated interest rates and increasing monetization, the situation 
was clearly unsustainable. Reserves were depleted and the exchange rate depreciated 
by 50 per cent by the end of 1989. This was the first step in the implementation of 
corrective macroeconomic policies under the supervision of the IMF and World 
Bank as in a last resort to tackle the economic crisis. 
In mid 1989, Jordan initiated an economic reform program, mainly to restore growth 
and reduce the macroeconomic imbalances, which the World Bank supported with 
adjustment loans complemented by a macroeconomic stabilization program 
supported by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement. This became known as the first 
correction program for the period 1989-1993. But this program lasted for just 15 
months as the country and the whole region were affected badly by the first Gulf war 
in 1991. However, the government soon resumed its reform efforts in early 1992. A 
new agreement between the Jordanian authorities and the IMF and the World Bank 
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was concluded for a new comprehensive structural adjustment program covering the 
period 1992-1998.1 In addition Jordan applied third phase of SAP covering the 
period 1999-2001. 
It is clear from the above that not all of Jordan's economic crises were due to 
external factors. In fact, the government's response to the deteriorating external 
shocks exacerbated the situation, as the subsequent decline in foreign aid in the early 
1980s was not matched by substantial budgetary cutbacks. According to El-Said 
(2000), even though the advice of foreign and local economists, to tackle the 
problem, called for austerity measures from the early 1980s, the government 
followed an expansionary policy based on running down reserves and increasing 
foreign borrowing. El-Said (2000: 10), explains that the government indeed 
responded to the pressure from the business community and connected businessmen 
whose interests and profits were threatened by a regional and local recession that 
reduced demand for their products. More details on how main macroeconomic 
variables behaved before the SAPs will be presented in the next chapter. 
5.3 Jordan and the World Bank 
The World Bank officially the -International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development- was established by the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement along with the 
IMF. The World Bank's adoption of structural adjustment through conditionality 
was in the era of Robert McNamara, the Word Bank President, who in 1979 first 
proposed conditionality, which he described as: 
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"The ideal of encouraging economic growth and development by 
linking financial assistance of the adoption of particular set of 
policies recommended by the World Bank" [Pender, 2001: 399]. 
Although the Bank still engaged in a great deal of project lending much of that was 
centered on improving infrastructure maintenance and commitments to reforming 
state enterprises. The main objective of the World Bank, however, is to focus on 
long-term economic development and poverty reduction issues. Indeed, the Bank's 
evolving outlook poverty has become the core issue in the Bank's agenda. The 
World Bank declares in its website "Our Mission is a World Without Poverty". 
The World Bank consists of two institutions making loans for development: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which makes loans 
for middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries, and the International 
Development Association (IDA) which makes interest-free loans to the 78 poorest 
countries, where average incomes are less than US$ 500 per year. The Bank is 
owned and governed by its 183 member countries, who are also members of the 
IMF. 
Unlike the UN, the Bank's governing body was not set up on a `one-country one- 
vote' basis but rather gave a disproportionate vote to the richer nations, the major 
contributors. Indeed, a country's share is based on the size of its economy, the USA 
is the shareholder with 16.41 per cent of votes, followed by Japan 7.8 per cent, 
Germany 4.4 per cent, United Kingdom 4.31 per cent and France 4.31 per cent. The 
rest of the shares are divided between other member countries. 
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For nearly 40 years Jordan and the World Bank have been partners in development. 
Jordan joined the World Bank in 1952 and received its first International 
Development Aid (IDA). Credits and loans have been granted to Jordan for a total 
amount of US$ 536.7 million. Figure (5.1) shows the World Bank lending in Jordan, 
which mainly concentrates on macroeconomic adjustment 32 per cent of the World 
Bank lending and 30 per cent for the Energy and Mining sectors. Table (5.1) 
represents the commitments and disbursements of the World Bank-supported 
projects to Jordan under the SAPs for the period 1993-2001. 
It is worth noting that the cooperation between the Bank and Jordan remained limited 
on Bank-supported projects such as education, health care and infrastructures until 
1989 when the Bank began to support Jordan to enhance the macroeconomic 
stability and structural reform under structural adjustment loans. This was by 
providing non-project assistance in the form of policy loans, analytical studies, 
policy recommendations, training and institutional development which are designed 
to spur on development in Jordan. 
According to World Bank (1998: 6) the central objective of the World Bank's 
assistance to Jordan is to promote rapid and sustainable outward orientated growth. 
However, there are sub-objectives associated with this overall theme, as the World 
Bank refers to as in the following: 
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(i) To support the macroeconomic transition taking place and to assist the 
government as it builds a market-responsive private sector capable of 
creating thousands of new jobs, while offsetting the temporary social 
adjustment likely to occur as Jordan continues its process of trade 
liberalization, privatization and financial and regulatory reform. 
(ii) To help the government address infrastructure constraints while encouraging 
environmentally sound investment practices by providing investment loans 
and other forms of assistance in key sectors of the economy such as water, 
energy, telecommunications, transportation, tourism, agriculture and natural 
resource management. 
(iii) To support the government's attempt to reduce poverty through targeted 
investments and to continue its efforts of ensuring quality access to education 
and health care for all Jordanian. 
The partnership between Jordan and the World Bank reached its peak when James 
Wolfensohn the World Bank President visited Jordan in 2003. He described 
relations with Jordan as the best in the Middle East and North African region. The 
World Bank President in his visit held talks with the King and top officials on the 
progress in implementing ongoing bilateral projects. He also met a number of 
private sector and civil society representatives in an open dialogue. Wolfensohn said 
at the conclusion of two-day visit that Jordan can count on World Bank support and 
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real partnership to brave the storm of a war in Iraq and confirmed it will invest just 
under US$ 400 million in development projects in Jordan over the period 2003-2005, 
under the recently announced Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)" [Sawalha, 2003]. 
It is worth noting that the CAS will focus on education and public sector reform as 
well as other national development priorities. The CAS complements the 
government's efforts to fight poverty by adopting five main objectives [World Bank, 
2002]: 
(i) Promoting human development. 
(ii) Improving governance through public sector reform. 
(iii) Enhancing conditions for growth led by the private sector. 
(iv) Addressing resource conservation and exploitation. 
(v) Gender inclusion in development planning analysis. 
The World Bank Group has been actively assisting the Jordanian government, 
through the Executive Privatization Commission (EPC) in crafting a privatization 
strategy, designing an institutional framework for implementing the program and 
supporting the implementation of the program. In a recent report, the World Bank 
considered the Jordanian privatization program "as one of, if not, the most successful 
programs in the Middle East region" [World Bank, 2001: 11. To date the following 
main projects have been privatized: 
(i) The Jordan Cement Factories. 
(ii) The Public Transport Corporation. 
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(iii) Ma'an Spa. 
(iv) The Jordan Telecommunications Corporation. 
(v) The Water Management for Grater Amman Area. 
(vi) Aqaba Railway. 
The result has been that the government was divested of its shares in approximately 
44 companies worth approximately US$ 113 million. Total proceeds are in excess of 
US$ 900 million. Moreover, the ongoing projects include: Royal Jordanian Airlines, 
Jordan Phosphate Mining Corporation, Postal Services, Electricity Sector, Petra 
Drilling Corporation, Royal Jordanian Air Academy and Customs Department 
Warehouses. They are scheduled for completion by the end of 2003. The World 
Bank on the other hand, helped Jordan through the CAS with its technical assistance 
in improving the policy design for poverty alleviation. 
5.4 Jordan and the International Monetary Fund 
In 1945,29 countries signed the Bretton Woods Agreement, which established the 
IMF to maintain exchange rates for international free trade. Today it is a universal 
financial institution, having grown from the 44 states represented at 1944 Bretton 
Woods Conference to 182 countries. It includes almost every economy in the World. 
The IMF's operations are very general and are laid down in the first Article of 
Agreement as follows 2: 
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(i) To promote international monetary co-operation through a permanent 
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration 
on international monetary problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of world trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high employment 
and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all 
members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid competitive devaluations 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members, and in the elimination of foreign 
exchange restrictions, which hamper the growth of world, trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing 
them with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of 
payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or 
international prosperity. 
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(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of members. 
Membership requires a contribution to the IMF called a country's "quota" the size of 
which depends on the size of the member's economy. A member-country can freely 
draw up to 25 per cent of its quota to address balance of payments deficits. 
However, to draw on more than 25 per cent, according to Article I, requires a special 
agreement with the IMF. The IMF attaches to these loans conditions 
(Conditionality), which oblige countries to undertake specific policies in order to 
receive the loan installments (SAPs). Indeed, there are three main types of IMF 
agreements as illustrated in IMF (2002b) as follows: 
(i) The Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) is the core of the IMF's lending policies 
and they were first introduced in 1952 to provide assurance to a member 
country that it can draw up to a specified amount, usually over 12-18 months, 
mainly to deal with a short-term balance of payments problem. According to 
the IMF, the term "Stand-By" means that subject to conditionality, a member 
has a right to draw the money made available if needed. 
(ii) The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is intended for countries with BOP 
difficulties related to structural problems. It provides assurance to a member 
country that it can draw up to a specified amount usually over 18 months. 
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(iii) The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which replaced the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1999, is designed to help 
the poorest member countries. Most (PRGF) or (ESAF) cases were with 
Sub-Saharan African countries and former planned economies facing 
protracted balance of payments problems. 3 
Polak (1991) describes the differences among these arrangements as they relate to 
the conditions, timing and size of the loan disbursements. However, Polak notes that 
the fundamental objectives of these programs do not differ. 
The IMF is owned by the government of its member countries as represented through 
a Board of Governors. The voting systems is in accordance with the size of a 
country's share-holding (quota), consequently, the United States is the largest 
member of the IMF, currently with 17.78 per cent of the vote alongside the other 
largest members of the IMF. 
Jordan joined the IMF in 1952 and the first dealing with the IMF was in 1983 when 
the country withdrew 16.6 million Special Drawing Right (SDR) 4 In the year after 
Jordan bought 7.4 million SDR and in early 1985, Jordan used 5.7 million under the 
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF). In 1989, Jordan signed the first structural 
adjustment program getting 40 million SDR units under the Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) arrangement to compensate for the losses in its export earnings and workers' 
remittances [Al-Wazani, 1994b]. The IMF statistics show that Jordan got 200.8 
156 
million SDR units during the period 1996-1998 [IMF, 1996 and 1997a]. Table (5.2) 
shows Jordan's position in the IMF as of 2003. 
5.5 Structural Adjustment Program 1989-1993 (SAPI) 
A topical SAP begins with an explicit request from the authorities of a member of 
the IMF and the World Bank. In Jordan case, both the World Bank and IMF 
responded to the Jordanian authorities' request (the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank of Jordan) by sending their help to Jordan in April 1989. With regard 
to the IMF's program, the literature explains the process of an IMF-supported 
program as described by Mussa and Savastano (1999: 9). A program begins with a 
request from a member. The IMF staff then prepares a blueprint of a program that is 
used as the basis for negotiations. The outcome of the negotiations is summarized 
in a "Letter of Intent" which declares the main objectives of the program, the policy 
actions and reforms that the authorities have taken or intend to take and the 
arrangement itself. When agreement is reached, it is then approved by the IMF 
Executive Board. 
Monitoring is the largest phase of the IMF program, involves checking and keeping 
track of the timely implementation of policy measures agreed and the numerical and 
structural performance criteria and benchmarks of the arrangement. Completion is 
the final stage in the program, which usually does not imply that the numerical 
targets of the country's program have been met. 
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According to Mussa and Savastano, completion of an IMF-supported program does 
imply that, in the IMF's view, the country has made substantial and satisfactory 
progress towards the primary objectives of its adjustment program (especially 
external viability) and that the policies of the authorities were broadly in line with 
the understanding reached with the IMF during the life of the arrangement. The 
programs do not always follow the above described formulae, however, as the 
country might be unable to comply with one or more performance clauses at some 
point during the arrangement, so in this case the program is suspended permanently 
or temporally. 
In this context, following Jordan's request for financial support from the IMF, the 
government issued Letter of Intent, which described the policies that Jordan intended 
to implement during the program. Both institutions greed to create an enabling 
environment for long-run sustainable growth by improving the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the economy. In the following sections objectives and policies of 
the first Jordanian SAPs will be presented: 
5.5.1 The Program Objectives 
In general, the main objectives of Jordan's SAPi are to correct the structural 
imbalances, maintain high level of growth and monetary and fiscal stability. The 
objectives of the SAPi can be summarized as follows [Jaradat, 1994: 57-58]: 
(i) Achieving a progressive increase in the real GDP growth rate to increase in 
real terms from -3.5 per cent in 1988 to 4 per cent in 1993. 
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(ii) Reducing the current account deficit to reach a balanced state by the end of 
the program. 
(iii) Lowering the inflation rate. 
(iv) Tackling the expected negative social impacts by recommending some 
policies and procedures to protect vulnerable groups. 
(v) Reducing the budget deficit. 
(vi) Achieving stability in the Jordanian Dinear (JD) exchange rate by rebuilding 
the level of official foreign reserves. 
Moreover, the program included a group of general intermediates and structural 
reforms aims, such as reducing balance of payment deficit, domestic credit ceilings, 
raising domestic savings, increasing investments, debt rescheduling and openness 
policy. In general, Table (5.3) summarizes the main targets of the first structural 
program 1989-1993. 
5.5.2 The Program Policies 
To achieve these objectives, integrated fiscal, monetary, trade and sectoral policies 
were introduced. These policies summarized in [ibid, 1994] as follows: 
(A) Fiscal Policy: the central issue of macroeconomic adjustment was the fiscal 
deficit. The program aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit gradually from 22 per cent 
of GDP in 1988 to 10 per cent of GDP in 1993. In relation to revenues, the program 
aimed to increase domestic revenues by: 
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(i) Broadening the tax base and reducing tax exemption. 
(ii) Increasing consumption tax on some commodities and including other 
commodities in this tax. 
In relation to expenditures, the aim was to reduce both capital and current 
expenditures by: 
(i) Reducing the public sector's employment and keeping real wages and 
salaries low in this sector. 
(ii) Reducing military spending. 
(iii) Controlling social spending, mainly health and education expenditure. 
(B) Monetary Policy: money and credit were essentially geared toward stimulating 
domestic economic activity. Accordingly, the program includes policies to stabilize 
the JD exchange rates and control inflation by: 
(i) Floating interest rates to ensure the availability and efficient allocation of 
credit and to attract the capital inflow of workers' remittances and the return 
of local capital from abroad. 
(ii) Controlling credit growth rate and money supply. 
(C) Balance of Payment Policies: these policies aimed to eliminate the balance of 
payment deficits through reduced current account deficits and trade deficits. This is 
to be done by adopting an elastic exchange rate policy reflecting the developments of 
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the balance of payment and foreign reserves at the central bank. The program, also 
recommended increasing the exports of goods and services and reducing imports. 
Moreover, the program emphasized debt rescheduling with the donor and improving 
the external debt profile over the longer run. According to the program, the 
government has to remove all its obligations during the program period by paying or 
rescheduling principle and interest for all its debt. Interestingly the program 
recommended to the Jordanian authorities to accelerate its efforts to insure aid and 
other external fund. 
(D) Sectoral Policies: these policies carried out mainly by the World Bank to 
improve the supply side of the economy. They emphasized a reduction in the role of 
the government in direct production and a rationalization role for the public sector in 
economic activities, to enable them to work on a commercial basis as a first step 
toward selling them to the private sector. In addition to this, there were other 
recommendations, for example, in the agricultural sector, there were 
recommendations to eliminate the subsidization of agricultural inputs gradually and 
to increase irrigation water prices to cover their average operational and maintenance 
costs and through progressive pricing to improve the investment environment. 
Moreover, the World Bank emphasized the elimination of trade restrictions and 
amending the customs tariff structure. 
(E) Policies for Protecting Vulnerable Groups: the program's approach to protect the 
poor during the adjustment program includes the following procedures: 
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(i) Restructuring public expenditures with a view to protect essential social 
services. Thus while military spending and fiscal outlays for generalized 
price subsidies were cut, public spending on key social services such as 
health and education were not. The government on the other hand, has to 
introduce a targeting mechanism to replace food subsidies by applying a 
coupon system or any other adequate mechanism available to support low- 
income groups. 
(ii) Establishing the development and employment fund to provide needy 
families with the necessary fund to set up small productive projects. 
(iii) Expanding training opportunities for the unemployed and low-income groups 
to help them acquire the skills needed for the jobs created by economic 
growth. 
5.6 Structural Adjustment Program 1992-1998 (SAPII) 
The World Bank and the IMF staff emphasized that Jordanian economic 
circumstances after the first Gulf war and its aftermath determine a continuing and 
comprehensive program. Therefore, Jordan found itself obliged to apply structural 
adjustment program aimed at sustaining high economic growth, maintaining low 
inflation and securing a strong balance of payments position. To these ends, policy 
measures have been taken to reduce the fiscal deficit, contain domestic liquidity 
expansion, improve financial intermediation and to liberalize the trade exchange 
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systems. The IMF and the World Bank imposed the program policies to cover the 
period 1992-1998. 
5.6.1 The Program Obiectives 
There is no important difference between the aims of the SAPi and the SAPNi as 
shown in the Tables (5.3) and (5.4). Indeed, the only difference is that the second 
program was extended a longer period to cover 7 years. In addition, the program 
took into consideration the country's circumstances after the first Gulf war and its 
aftermath, particularly in the terms of: 
(i) Financial support: it was reported in the last four months of 1990 that 
Jordan's financial loss stood at US$ 1.3 billion, including exports losses, 
remittances and losses from tourism and transit [Milton-Edwards and 
Hinchcliffe, 2001: 76-79]. 
(ii) The return of more than 300,000 Jordanian workers including their families, 
thus increasing the population by 10 per cent and the level of unemployment 
to 30 per cent. 
(iii) Poverty rate: a UNICEF survey in 1991 claimed that over 30 per cent the 
population was living below the official poverty line (family income of less 
than US$ 130 a month) compared to 20 per cent before the Gulf war, 
[Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001: 76-79]. 
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It is worth noting that the program is based on many hypotheses that are essential for 
the achievement of the program aims. These hypotheses are shown as follows, 
[Jaradat, 1994: 61-62]: 
(i) Achieving a gradual increase in domestic savings. 
(ii) Increasing investment and investment efficiency. 
(iii) Supporting the private sector's role in the economy. 
(iv) Continuing measures to liberalize the economy with regard to interest and 
exchange rates. 
(v) Continuing the institutional and structural reform in government departments. 
(vi) Re-opening the traditional markets for Jordanian exports and employment in 
the Gulf countries. 
5.6.2 The Program Policies 
The implemented policies in this program extended those in the first program 1989- 
1993. The main policies carried out by this program can be summarized as follows 
[Maciejewski and Mansur, 1996]: 
(A) Fiscal Policy: as mentioned earlier, fiscal adjustment was the essential element 
of macroeconomic adjustment. Therefore, the authorities targeted a significant 
reduction in fiscal deficits through both revenue enhancements and the containment 
of current expenditures, including increases in the domestic prices of some of the 
main goods and services, such as petroleum products, electricity and water supply. 
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Also, the authorities were asked to continue their efforts to broaden the tax base. In 
this regard, the government was asked to impose a General Sales Tax instead of a 
consumption tax 5 On the expenditures side, a central element was reducing public 
expenditures and focusing more on the reduction of current expenditures, including 
military spending and food subsidies, in addition to freezing wages. In general, the 
aim was to reduce the budget deficits from 4.0 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 2.5 per 
cent of GDP in 1998, Table (5.4). 
(B) Monetary Policy: the monetary policy plays a vital role in structural adjustment 
programs by ensuring monetary stability and thus stimulating domestic economic 
activity. Therefore, it is an intermediate targets which affects real variables such as 
economic growth and investment. In practice the government followed a steadily 
tightening monetary policy, aimed at establishing a strong base for non-inflationary 
growth by controlling the credit expansion consistent with the external and inflation 
objectives and with achieving interest rates that were positive in real terms. The 
authorities started to use indirect monetary control mechanisms. For instance, in 
1993, the CBJ started to issue Certificates of Deposit (CDs) denominated in JD, as a 
new indirect instrument of monetary control. As for exchange rates, monetary policy 
aimed at maintaining flexible and competitive exchange rates to maintain external 
competitiveness. Moreover, this policy called for the building up of gross official 
reserves. 
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(C) Balance of Payment Policy: this policy was aimed at eliminating current 
account deficits to reach a balanced state by the end of the program, mainly by 
increasing the export of goods and services and controlling imports. This is to be 
done by expanding the production base directed toward exports, opening new export 
outlets, expanding traditional markets and improving export incentives and the 
quality of products needed to meet the requirements of export markets. Along with 
these measures the program recommended equality between locally produced and 
similar imported products with regard to consumption tax and amending the 
customs tariff structure. 
(D) Productive Sectors: as this policy aimed to improve the supply side of the 
economy, it emphasized on the privatization program and the need to increase 
investment efficiency driven by the forces of market competition, encouragement of 
private sector investment and implementing reform measurement in the productive 
sectors. For instance, under the ongoing reform of the energy sector operations 
supported by the World Bank Energy Sector Adjustment Loan (ESAL), the 
authorities are seeking to achieve certain financial targets in the operations of the 
Jordanian Electricity Authority (JEA) and to formulate financial and institutional 
restructuring plans for the power sector. 
(E) External Debt Management Policies: according to the program, the government 
has to remove all its obligations during the program period by paying or rescheduling 
principal and interest and limiting short and medium term hard loans. The measures 
taken to manage the external debt were not limited to debt restructuring, which 
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provides only temporary relief. The government also adopted a more comprehensive 
approach to debt management, in addition to debt restructuring; it sought to reduce 
the level of its debt stock through market based operations such as swaps and debt 
buybacks. 
It is worth noting that the Jordanian government, which committed itself to the 
implementation of an economic adjustment program, introduced the Economic and 
Social Development Plan 1993-1997 to make the adjustment program an integral 
part of overall social and economic planning. Indeed, this plan has distinguished 
itself from the previous development plans in a number of important respects [World 
Bank, 1994: 1-2] as follows: 
(i) It has strongly emphasized the importance of creating a stable fiscal and 
monetary environment as necessary conditions for achieving sustainable 
growth. 
(ii) It has embodied specific policy measures to encourage the private sector to 
play a greater role in the economy. 
(iii) It has complemented the on-going structural adjustment program by giving 
particular attention to the closely related social and development issues. In 
this regard the government established a wide network of welfare programs 
ranging from generalized subsidies to targeted means. Accordingly, the 
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authorities funded the operations of the National Aid Fund (NAF), which 
provides direct income support to the extremely poor. Also, the government 
expanded training opportunities for the unemployed and for low-income 
groups through the Development and Employment Fund (DEF). 
(iv) Finally, the plan has adopted a flexible policy framework and planning 
process in order to effectively respond to changes in the external 
environment. 
5.7 Structural Adjustment Program 1999-2001 (SAPIII) 
The government fell back to the IMF and World Bank, as Jordan's economy was 
almost stagnant during the last three years of the previous program SAPII, where real 
GDP growth slowed to an annual average 1 per cent in 1996-1998. Moreover, the 
fiscal deficit had widened to about 10 per cent of GDP by 1998, instead of being 
reduced to 2.5 as envisaged in the program. On the other hand, domestic and 
regional political uncertainties, coupled with the large fiscal deficit and shortfall in 
exports of goods and services, put pressure on foreign exchange reserves in 1998.6 
Under these circumstances, Jordan was obliged to turn to the IMF and World Bank 
once again, thus in April 1999 the IMF approved approximately US$ 220 million of 
new credit for Jordan under a three-year economic adjustment program covering 
1999-2001. The agreement provides Jordan with US$ 174 million under the (EFF) 
[IMF, 1999]. 
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This Extended Fund Facility (supported-program) is designed mainly to promote a 
gradual recovery in the growth rate of GDP to 3-4 per cent per yearly, maintain 
Jordan's low inflation rate and to insure a substantial strengthening in official foreign 
exchange reserves. The summary of the SAPm objectives appears in Table (5.5). 
As for the structural reform agenda, the program emphasizes the areas of taxes; in 
this regard the government was asked to adopt a value added tax (VAT). In the 
financial sector, the program recommended the government to adopt a new banking 
law that will enhance bank regulation and supervision. In the trade area, the 
maximum tariff rate will be lowered in two steps from 40 per cent currently to 30 per 
cent by early 2000 [EIU, 2001a: 23]. The public enterprise reform and privatization 
program will pick up speed, where significant steps are being taken to privatize the 
other institutions such as the Royal Jordanian Airline and the National Electric 
Power Company. 
Finally, the government will continue the efforts started in the previous program to 
protect the more vulnerable social groups and promote employment generation, in 
particular through the Social Productivity Program. 
7 These medium-term 
macroeconomic objectives will be pursued through fiscal consolidation, a continued 
prudent monetary policy consistent with the stability of the JD and wide-ranging 
structural reforms. 
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5.8 General Assessment of Jordan's SAPs 
After reluctance and economic crisis, Jordan finally committed itself to a 
comprehensive typical structural reform package for more than 14 years. The 
program included monetary and fiscal restraints, devaluation and market reforms. 
These macroeconomic policies and structural reforms were necessary to overcome 
the external and the internal imbalances. 
It is clear that the structural adjustment programs in Jordan are a part of the IMF and 
World Bank typical package for the developing countries, which essentially include 
what is called demand-side policies and supply-side policies. These are aimed at 
overcoming the imbalances and maintaining macroeconomic soundness to improve 
economic performance and efficiency for sustainable economic growth. 
With regard to the Jordanian SAPS objectives, although there were three programs 
during 1989-2001, their objectives, however, are identical, as the BWIs consider 
these programs a core aspect of macroeconomic soundness. These objectives as they 
appear in the tables are: 
(i) Achieving sustainable growth. 
(ii) Reducing inflation. 
(iii) Stabilizing the exchange rate. 
(iv) Tackling the current account deficit. 
(v) Enhancing the country official reserves. 
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On the policies side, the previous tables suggest that devaluation was not included in 
the SAPs package. Obviously, devaluation in the Jordanian case has been a 
precondition as Jordan had already devalued its currency before requesting the BWIs 
help in early 1989. With regard to the balance of payment policy, both programs 
SAPi and SAPii deem workers' remittances and tourism income as key elements in 
the financing of balance of payment deficits. In fact the SAPII expected that the 
remittances and the income from tourism would constitute 21.5 per cent of GDP in 
1998. 
Moreover, the program also clearly calls the authority to look for financial aid to 
finance the country's needs. In the light of the above, one can argue that these 
recommendations are not appropriate policies for Jordan. This is because these 
sources of fund contain a high degree of uncertainty. Jordan's future revenues in this 
form will depend heavily on uncertain political and economic circumstances in 
neighboring country and the rest of the world. Therefore, the dependency on 
external fund go against the IMF and the World Bank aims at achieving self reliance 
and unremitting growth in the country's official reserves and thus leaving Jordan's 
economy extremely vulnerable to external shocks. 
As for the budget deficit, the program approach to reduce the budget deficit partly 
focuses on the tax side more than the expenditure side, through a broadening of the 
tax base and imposing Sales Taxes, later on the government was asked to adopt 
(VAT). The SAPs call for reducing tariffs on imports in order to liberate foreign 
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trade will have an adverse effect on the Jordanian economy. This is because, these 
measures will lead to adverse effects on new national industries which the 
government encouraged according the World Bank's recommendations. On the 
other hand, considering that the tariffs are an essential source of government 
revenues in Jordan, the reduction of tariffs and removal of imports tax in the short 
run would reduce government revenues, making fiscal balance harder to achieve, and 
potentially leading to an expansion of the government's deficit. According to 
financial report, the contribution of customs duties to the state budget fell by about 
50 per cent, from an average of 22.3 per cent during 1992-1995 to 14.4 per cent in 
2001 [Kardoosh, 2003]. 
There is some doubt that Jordan's economy will be able to sustain economic growth, 
without the financial help from the BWIs. In fact Jordan has adopted three SAPs 
during the period 1989-2001. Recently the government signed a new agreement with 
the IMF and the World Bank for the period 2002-2004. The main goals for this 
program (as for the previous one) are to raise further economic growth and to 
continue implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and structural reforms. 
As the government official announced that this program is the last SAP Jordan needs 
to adopt under the supervision of the BWIs. By the end of this program 2002-2004 
the country will end almost 14 years of structural adjustment and market reforms. 
This might lead us to question of the ability of Jordan's economy in sustaining stable 
macroeconomic environment without the help from the BWIs and other donors. At 
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the moment we are not able to answer this question as the country still under the 
SAPs. However, there are some indicators in the literature that support our argument. 
According to Pugel and Lindert (2000: 499) many countries appear to be chronically 
dependent on the IMF and World Bank loans even after the SAPs. Indeed, sixty 
countries have borrowed in almost every year since their first borrowing from the 
IMF. In general, Jordan needs the IMF and the World Bank help to gain the 
following support: 
(i) The program supported by the BWIs offers financial fund "Hard Currency" 
to support adjustment and reform polices. Without this help it might be 
extremely difficult for the country to correct the maladjustment in balance of 
payments and fiscal deficits. In fact most developing countries seek the 
collaboration of the IMF and the World Bank since they offer the adjusting 
countries loans to support their stabilization process. Moreover, the BWIs 
collaboration open the door for new private and official lending to the 
country. The IMF plays a unique role, in this respect; it is the only institution 
with the responsibility to approve a country adjustment program. The 
important thing is that when the IMF approves an adjustment program it 
provides a Seal of Approval or (seal of good house keeping) for borrowing 
countries. This means, for the outside world, a country is taking the 
appropriate steps to improve its economy. According to Wood (1997), this 
important approval function is equally an important signal for the go-ahead of 
donors and lenders to provide resources in support of adjustment programs 
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and it reassures lenders, including private capital. Thus, without the IMF seal 
of approval, Jordan cannot expect to receive a significant amount of balance 
of payments support from other donors. 
(ii) The IMF and the World Bank provide the adjusting countries with a wide 
range of technical assistance and training to help the government design and 
establish the reform program. 
(iii) The World Bank and the IMF agreement with Jordan under the SAP have 
been helping the government to get support from international donors by 
getting soft loans or debt forgiveness. 
(iv) In many cases the governments of developing countries prefer to resort to the 
IMF and World Bank to adopt SAPs, mainly because they can easily blame 
the IMF and the World Bank for politically difficult policy changes, while 
they privately know that economic reform are inevitable with or without the 
BWIs. However, if the government of the developing country adopts a 
national program they have to face the public, which might put the 
government's popularity at risk. 
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Figure (5.1) 
World Bank Lending in Jordan 
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Source: At, World Bank Group (2002 and 2001) Quarter/v Publication o/the Jordan 
Coýuntrv Unit, (DifFcerent Reports). 
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Table (5.1) 
The World Bank Supported Project in Jordan (1993- 2002) 
Loan Amount 
Project Name Approval 
Amount Disbursed 
Year US$ Million 
Health Management 1993 20.0 17.8 
Human Resources Development 1995 60.0 48.7 
Housing Finance & Urban Sector Reform 1996 20.0 19.1 
Tourism Development II 1997 32.0 10.2 
Community Infrastructure Development 1997 30.0 12.9 
Training & Employment Support 1998 5.0 1.5 
Amman Water & Sanitation Management 1999 55.0 16.6 
Health Sector Reform 1999 35.0 9.3 
Higher Education Development 2000 34.7 1.5 
Public Sector Retorm Lean 2001 120.0 120.0 
Horticultural Export Promotion 2002 5.0 5.0 
Second Public Sector Reform Loan 2002 120.0 0.0 
Total 536.7 262.6 
Source: The World Baiik Group) (2002 and 2001) Quarterly Publication ýý(thc. /orclun 
Cowan, nUnit. (Dit/ rent Reports). 
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Table (5.2) 
Jordan Financial Position in the IMF (2003) 
General Resources Account SDR Million % Quota 
Quota 170.50 100.00 
Fund holding of Currency 508.86 298.45 
Reserve Position in Find 0.05 0.03 
Holding Exchange Rate .... .... 
SDR Department SDR million % Allocation 
Net Cumulative Allocation 16.89 100.00 
Holdings 1.20 7.12 
Outstanding Purchases and Loans SDR Million % Quota 
Stand-By Arrangements 10.66 6.25 
Extended Arrangements 306.43 179.73 
Contingency and Compensatory 21.31 12.50 
Latest Financial Arrangements SDR Million SDR "Drawn" 
Stand-By 2002-2004 85.28 10.66 
EFF 1999-2002 127.88 127.88 
EFF 1996-1999 238.04 202.52 
Source: IMF (-2003) "Jordan. Financial Position in the Fund" Retrieved 5"' may, 
2004. from World Wide Web <n irit. iml. nr ý/e. rternaUnp/tre... /exfin2. cfºn/ntentbet'kc ý'1. 
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Table (5.3) 
Structural Adjustment Program Targets 1989-1993, (SAP i) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Real GDP Growth 3.5 0.0 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.0 
Inflation Rate 4.6 14.0 12.1 10.2 8.7 7.3 
Domestic Credit (growth rate) 7.4 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.7 
Money Supply M2 (growth rate) 12.1 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 11.0 
As Percent of GDP 
Consumption 103.2 103.0 97.0 94.0 92.0 91.0 
Investment 26.1 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 27.0 
Domestic Revenue 31.8 29.0 31.0 33.0 34.0 34.0 
Foreign Grants 7.3 10.0 8.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 
Total Expenditures 53.7 49.0 48.0 47.0 46.0 44.0 
Budget Deficit 22.0 20.0 17.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 
Trade Deficit 37.4 43.0 36.0 32.0 29.0 28.0 
Exports 22.4 30.0 31.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Imports 59.8 73.0 67.0 62.0 59.0 58.0 
Currant Account 6.1 5.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
Workers' Remittances (Net) 16.4 21.0 19.0 18.0 18.0 17.0 
Tourism Income (Net) 3.1 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 
Soour(. e: Jorcluninn Gorernntent (198 9) "Struc tural il djustiitcnt l'ro, t ruin - Anunwt : Dorthin 
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Table (5.5) 
Adjustment program Targets 1999-2001, (SAPiii) 
1999 2000 2001 
GDP Growth 2.0 2.5 3.5 
Inflation Rate 1.9 2.8 2.4 
Money Supply M2 (Growth Kate) 8.2 8.7 8.4 
As percent of GDP 
Fiscal Deficit (E: -, cit, (iing, 7.9 5.5 4 
Trade Deficit 25.1 25.0 24.1 
Current Account Deficit 0.7 1.7 1.8 
Total Revenues 28.9 27.1 ... 
Source: ('! 3J (2001) "1nniuul Rej or s" 
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Endnotes 
In fact this program has been reviewed in the end of 1995 and the result of this revision 
was what is called the expended program for the period (1996-1998). 
Z See, Snowdon (2004). 
3A number of other short-term IMF arrangements have been introduced to supplement SBA 
and EFF. These arrangements include the supplemented Reserve Facility (SRF), the 
Country Stabilization Fund (CSF), the Compensatory and Contingent Financing Facility 
(CCFF), and the Systematic Transformation Facility (STF). For more dateless see the IMF 
website, (www. imf. ora). 
4 SDR is an international reserve to asset introduced by the IMF in 1969. The SDR =US$ 
1.363. 
s The Jordanian parliament agreed to apply the Sales Tax in 1994 after long discussion with 
the government. 
6 The Palestinian Intefada (uprising) in the West Bank in the late of 1990s, in addition to the 
Iraq crises are badly affected the economic reform process. 
' It is an ambitious comprehensive program, which is launched by the government in 1997 
aims at alleviating poverty in Jordan. This program will be implemented over a ten-year 
period. See the Jordanian ministry of planing website (www. mop. gov. jo). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF JORDAN'S SAPs: 
A COMPARISON APPROACH 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to assess the impact of SAPs on the Jordanian economy, taking 
the main macroeconomic variables as program performance indicators. In 
recognition of the methodological shortcomings in the alternative techniques that are 
used to estimate the program effects, as explained in Chapter Four, this study will 
apply different methodologies in an attempt to gauge the program's effectiveness. In 
particular, this study will address the issue by answering the following questions: To 
what extent do the programs achieve their own targets? Did the SAPs result in an 
improvement on the initial situation in Jordan? What are the effects of SAPs 
instruments on the main macroeconomic indicators in Jordan? To answer the above 
questions, the study will apply the following approaches to the above questions, 
respectively, the target-actual approach, the before-after approach and econometric 
modeling. 
Accordingly, this chapter will utilize the actual-target approach and the before-after 
approach. Econometric modeling, however, will be our theme in the next chapter. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will begin with 
the actual-target approach. In the second section, we will give an assessment of the 
macroeconomic effects of the SAPs using the before-after approach, which provides 
182 
useful information about the economic situation before and after the program. 
Finally, the main conclusions will be given at the end of the chapter. 
6.2 The Program Outcomes: Target -Actual Approach 
This section attempts to evaluate the macroeconomic performance under the SAPs, 
using an actual-target approach. In particular, this section looks at economic growth 
rates, current account deficits, budget deficits, inflation rates and trade deficits. 
Basically, this approach compares what a program actually achieves with what it was 
planed to achieve. A major weakness of this methodology (as explained in Chapter 
Four) is that the target values contain forecasting errors. However, an attempt can be 
made to overcome these weaknesses, as has been argued by Chalira (1993: 192). In 
this regard, the quality of the target values has to be evaluated and such evaluations 
may yield useful insights into ways of improving the methodology by which the 
targets are set. 
Notwithstanding these criticisms of the actual-plan approach, one should state that 
this methodology is still useful in knowing to what extent the programs achieved 
their own targets. In relation to the program's targets we assume that they are based 
on a scientific framework applied by the IMF and the World Bank. In some cases 
the program considers the individual country circumstances in setting its targets as 
the case was in Jordan. Moreover, using this approach enables us to explain why the 
program was under-performance or over-performance. Similarly, this approach sheds 
light on how the country's macroeconomic performance was affected by the SAP. 
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Consequently, this section will utilize the target-actual methodology to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Jordan's SAPs at the macro level during the program period. The 
analysis will be supplemented by a comparison of program target-actual outcomes 
during the program period against pre-SAP economic performance, partly with the 
view to assessing how realistic the program targets were in relation to their outcomes 
and to the corresponding pre-SAPs average performances. 
Table (6.1) is a companion of two programs (1992-1998) and (1999-2001). It 
provides an overview of Jordan's macroeconomic performance during the whole 
program period 1992-2001. Unfortunately, one problem which we faced with regard 
to our attempt to interpret the macroeconomic performance during the programs 
period is that the published data does not provide target figures for all the 
macroeconomic indicators in the (1999-2001) program, as shown in Table (5.5). As 
the aim is to undertake a detailed target-actual comparative analysis of SAPs and 
during the whole program period (1992-2001), Table (6.1) therefore, includes only 
the macroeconomic targets which are available in both programs (1992-1998) and 
(1999-2001). On the other hand, Table (6.1) also includes actual outcomes and 
targets of SAPs for the period (1992-2001) supplemented with the average of both 
the actual performance pre-and post-SAPs and the program targets (Columns A, B). 
In this respect, it is worth pointing out that Appendix (ii) offers the actual 
macroeconomic performance compared with the program targets for the period 
(1992-2001) using Column Graphs. 
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A quick glance at Table (6.1) and from comparing the average targets (1992-2001) 
for the macroeconomic indicators with the average actual performance for the same 
period (Column B), one can observe that the program has significantly achieved its 
targets, with respect to inflation rate, the current account balance and the money 
supply. However, by and large, the figures were unsatisfactory for the budget 
deficit, the economic growth and the trade balance. 
Notwithstanding, what we have pointed out above, if we dwell on the table we 
observe slightly different behavior regards to the program's targets during the 
structural adjustment period. Indeed, Table (6.1) indicates that the program targets 
for economic growth and the budget deficit during the (1999-2001) program were 
modest compared to their identical targets in the previous program (1992-1998). 
However, the targets for trade balance, the current account and the money supply 
seemingly follow the same trends for both programs (1992-1998) and (1999-2001). 
With respect to the inflation rate, Table (6.1) shows that the targets figure for the 
(1999-2001) program were more optimistic compared to their identical ones in the 
(1992-1998) program. 
It may be argued, that the economic growth and the budget deficit targets for the 
period (1992-1998) were unrealistically optimistic compared with their targets for 
the period (1999-2000), particularly if we compare the targets with the actual 
outcomes for these variables during the (1992-1998) program. Consequently, the 
targets for both the budget deficit and the economic growth were adjusted, taking 
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into account the modest achievements registered during the initial years (1992-1998). 
In relation to the trade balance and the money supply, the (1999-2001) program 
targets kept follows the same initial trends in (1992-1998) program. This is because 
the targets, which had been set for these variables, were generally achieved during 
the (1992-1998) program. 
Finally, by examining the inflation rate actual performance compared with the 
program targets we can see that the SAP not only achieved its targets but also, in 
most cases, the actual inflation rates were less than those the program was planed to 
achieve. On the other hand, looking at the inflation targets for the (1999-2001) 
program, we can see how they were optimistic compared with the inflation targets 
for the initial program (1992-1998). Consequently, from what has been explained 
above, regarding the inflation rate, one can realize the deflationary nature of SAPs. 
Generally speaking, in comparing the actual-target indicators, Jordan's economic 
performance is over-performance in relation to the inflation rate, the current account 
and the money supply growth rate. However, targets set for economic growth and 
the trade balance were generally under-performance, see Table (6.1) Column, B. 
As for the budget deficit performance, although the table provides support for the 
interpretation that the SAPs were successful in improving the government budget 
balance to a significant degree compared with its historical average of 21.8 per cent 
per annum for the period (1979-1988), however, Table (6.1) concludes that the 
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program has failed in terms of meeting its targets. As the target figures for the 
expenditure and the revenue side of the budget deficit were not available for the 
whole program period, it was difficult to investigate the main reasons behind the 
budget deficit outcomes. However, more investigation into this issue will be 
illustrated in the before-after approach. 
With regard to the economic growth performance, Table (6.1) shows that 
notwithstanding, the remarkable achievements, which were registered during the 
initial years (1992-1995) and in the last years of the (1999-2001) program, the 
overall performance of economic growth was dismal during the program period 
(1992-2001). Table (6.1) shows that the actual real GDP growth rate was 5.0 per 
cent per annum during the adjustment period as contrasted with the average 
economic growth targets of 5.6 per cent and with 4.2 per cent the average growth 
pre-SAP. 
Although the above comparisons show that the SAP almost met its targets with 
regard to the economic growth, in fact, the chief reason for the high rates of growth, 
17 per cent, 5.8 per cent, 7.8 per cent and 3.9 per cent in 1992 to 1995, respectively, 
was due to the mini boom which resulted from the return of 300.000 Jordanians 
previously living and working in Kuwait. ' The majority was able to liquidate its 
assets and repatriate them to Jordan where they were channeled into property 
construction and new businesses. 
188 
Figure (6.1) provides evidence to the argument above. According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (1997: 16) the reasons for the continuation of strong economic 
growth were threefold: the boost to the services economy from the arrival the 
returnees, the increasingly strong performance of manufacturing industry and finally, 
the peace treaty with Israel which gave an immediate boost to business confidence. 
Not surprisingly, by 1996 the returnee-led boom had largely run its course and hopes 
of sustaining growth had dissipated. 
Figure (6.1) 
Construction Sector Relative Importance of Gl)P (1991-2001) 
irrrr-rrrrNN 
Source: CBJ (1991-2001) "Annual Rehort " 
II I relation to the monetary policy. which plays an important role in determining the 
adjustment programs, Table (6.1) provides evidence of adequate adherence of the 
authorities in controlling money growth to a level lower than the program targets. 
Looking at the money supply growth rate, an average of 7. K per cent per annum was 
significantly lower than the corresponding 16.2 per annum during the pre-SAI' 
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period. On the other hand, it is clear from the table that monetary policy during the 
program period played a vital role, as much of the impetus for economic growth has 
been non-inflationary. This is because monetary policy has remained tight without 
precipitating a renewed bout of long deep recession. It would perhaps, consequently, 
appear that fully adhering to the implementation of tight monetary policy during the 
program period contributed towards achieving the program targets. 
Bearing in mind that the SAP aims at achieving internal as well as external 
stabilization, Table (6.1) provides support for the interpretation that the SAPs were 
relatively successful in improving the external sectors (the trade balance and the 
current account balance), which reflected positively towards an accumulation of 
gross official reserves. Table (6.1) shows that the actual current account balances 
outcomes were generally over-performance during the programs period. In relation 
the actual trade balance outcomes, from Table (6.1), we can observe some evidence 
of an unsustainable trade balance position which derives from the fact that the trade 
balance deficit after declining from 41.7 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 29.2 per cent in 
1995 rose again to 37.3 in 1996 and then declined to 23.2 in 1999, etc. In general, 
the average trade balance deficit of 40.8 per cent of GDP before SAPs declined to an 
average of 32.5 per cent of GDP after SAPs. 
To sum up, the important inferences which we are able to draw from Table (6.1) are 
as follows: 
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(i) The government budget is one of the main obstacles and one where the 
adjustment program registed failure in terms of keeping the deficit under 
control. Bearing in mind that SAPs rely on controlling the budget deficit as a 
crucial target towards achieving external and internal stabilization, reducing the 
budget deficit remains a significant target, which has not been fully achieved 
during most of the 10 years of the SAPs. 
(ii) In relation to the economic growth, although real economic growth has slightly 
improved in the recent years of the SAP period, these outcomes need to be 
sustained in the coming years, particularly as the registered economic growth 
performance in the initial years of the SAP was due to non-program factors. 
Consequently, it is hared to belief that SAPs have significantly improved the 
economic growth in Jordan. 
(iii) From the program design point of view, an examination of the table reveals 
that some of the projected figures were unrealistic, at least compared with the 
outcomes during the adjustment period, particularly for the budget deficit and 
economic growth. In relation to the budget deficit, if we examine the average 
budget deficit before the SAP, Table (6.1) reveals that with a budget deficit 
average of 21.8 per cent of GDP per annum, it is quite difficult to reach 4.5 per 
cent by the end of the SAPs period, unless the target figures are unrealistically 
optimistic, particularly in a country where government services remain one of 
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the largest single contributors to GDP; accounting for 17.2 per cent of GDP in 
2001, Table (2.2). 
6.3 The Program Outcomes: Before-After Approach 
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of the stabilization and 
adjustment components of the SAPs using the before-after approach. Basically, this 
approach compares the macroeconomic performance before with the performance 
after the program was initiated. One argument against this approach, as has been 
explained by Ul-Haque and Khan (1998) is that this approach has its limitations as a 
counterfactual estimator, which means that it assumes no changes would have 
occurred in the absence of the program. 
However, this criticism is not relevant in our case because the intention is to simply, 
identify and assess the impact of policy changes such as those imposed by the IMF 
and the World Bank. Therefore, this criticism is not relevant to our study, as it does 
not claim that the objective is to measure the efficiency of this approach as an 
estimator of the ideal counterfactual method. 
Thus, in this section, the evaluation of the adjustment program effects in Jordan are 
based on the comparison of the observed behavior of certain selected economic 
variables before and after the program. The comparison will also be made by testing 
for statistically significant differences between the pre-program and post-program 
periods in the main selected macroeconomic variables. The statistical test was done 
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on a yearly basis, ten years before and ten years after, in order to determine any 
observed differences in the values of the variables before and after the introduction 
of the program. To do so, a non-parametric test, the Mann-Whitney (u-test) was 
chosen. 
This test, also known as the (Wilcoxon Rank Sum test), depends only on the 
assumption of the independence of the respective observations and that these 
observations are subject to ordinal measurement and can be ranked. This test is one 
of the most powerful of the non-parametric tests for comparing two samples. It is 
used to test the null hypothesis that two samples have identical distribution functions 
against the alternative hypothesis that the two distribution functions differ only with 
respect to the median. The Mann-Whitney test does not require the assumption that 
differences between the two samples are normally distributed. 
In many applications, the u-test is used in place of the two-sample t-test, when the 
normality assumption is questionable. This test can also be applied when the 
observations in a sample of data are in ranks, that is, ordinal data. Further, since the 
Mann-Whitney procedure is essentially a test of the medians of the two periods, the 
significance levels obtained are not biased by the presence of outliners (as in using 
mean), see Weinberg and Goldberg (1990) and Connors (1979). For these reasons, 
this study used such non-parametric procedures. 
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Indeed, earlier work by Reichmann and Stillson (1978), Pastor (1987) and Killick 
(1984) looked at the effects of the IMF programs using non-parametric tests. In these 
studies the significance of the change in pre and post SAPs observations is 
determined by using several of the non-parametric tests like the U-test. For our 
study purpose, the Mann-Whitney (u-test) will be applied for the ultimate SAPs 
targets. 
In all cases, the null hypothesis is that there is no change in the variable during the 
course of the SAPs program (e. g. that post = pre). A low significance level indicates 
rejection of this null hypothesis in favor of the specified alternative. The results are 
briefly summarized in Table (6.6). In the following sections the before-after 
approach will be used to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of Jordan's SAPs. 
6.3.1 The Economic Growth Performance 
In Jordan, achieving sustainable economic growth was emphasized in all the IMF 
and World Bank-supported programs, as is clear from the program targets, Tables 
(5.3,5.4 and 5.5). However, it might be useful to state that some of the sharpest 
critiques of SAPs are related to the effect of these programs on economic growth. 
The general criticism is that SAPs are in some senses inimical to economic growth. 
According to Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), the IMF staff response to this 
criticism can be split into two specific criticisms. The first is that IMF policy 
recommendations relating to the restraint of aggregate domestic demand and to 
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altering exchange rate are said to exert an adverse effect on economic growth. The 
IMF response to these criticisms is that as long as the initial problem in the countries 
requesting the fund is excess aggregate domestic demand (absorption), then 
absorption must be reduced in order to achieve the program objectives. 
The second issue is how the reduction in absorption will influence the output level or 
real income. In addressing these issues, IMF staff distinguishes between the short- 
run effects and the long-run effects of the IMF programs on growth. In practice, they 
admit that a decline in the growth rate is a necessary part of adjustment to eliminate 
underlying imbalances in the economy. However, the critical question, of course, 
concerns the size and the duration of the short-run effects of policies designed to 
reduce absorption. 
Even if it was determined that stabilization programs reduce output in the short-run, 
a longer-term aspect of the relationship between the programs and growth needs to 
be considered. Indeed according to the IMF staff, it is a basic premise of IMF 
programs that balance of payments recovery does not conflict with economic growth 
when the time-horizon of both objectives is specified to be the medium term. The 
IMF staff explains that this view is based on a number of considerations [Khan and 
Knight, 1985: 4-81, which can be summarized as follows: 
195 
(i) The supply side or the structural policies in adjustment programs are intended to 
enhance the productive potential of the economy by improving the allocation of 
resources and stimulating domestic savings and investment. 
(ii) The structural polices allow for a higher rate level of sustainable capital inflows 
and thus a higher rate of economic growth in the long run. 
(iii) As the SAPs include financial reform and stability measures, thus a successful 
stabilization program can have a beneficial effect on the state of confidence in 
the economy leading to gains in employment, productivity and output. 
Yet whether or not the SAPs have positive effects on economic growth is an 
empirical question. However, here again, the results are ambivalent, while 
Reichmann and Stillson (1978), Connors (1979), Pastor (1987) and Gylfason (1987) 
reported no effect. Killick (1995) found ambiguous effects and Conway (1994) 
argued that while growth declines in the first year of a program, the negative effects 
diminish thereafter. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) argued that if growth is the 
primary objective of the SAPs then these programs are badly designed. Indeed, their 
results indicate that countries that do not enter into SAP grow faster than those that 
do. 
In relation to Jordan, the effect of the SAPs on growth can be seen in Table (6.2). 
The sharp reduction in the growth rate prior to the program (-3.7) (-16.7) in 1988 and 
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1989 (the year of the economic crisis), respectively, turned to high growth rates, 
higher than had been predicted (17). (5.8). (7.8) and (3.9) for the period 1992-1995. 
Unfortunately the high growth rates were not sustained after 1995. Indeed, the 
dismal economic performance of the Jordanian economy after 1995 is made clear in 
Table (6.2), with stagnating economic growth and humble or negative per-capita 
income growth rates. By 1999, the growth rate had improved to an economic growth 
rate of 4.2 per cent in 2001. Statistically, there is not enough evidence to believe that 
SAPs have any effect on economic growth, Table (6.6). 
Table (6.2)* 
Growth Rate and Real Income (pre- and post-program) 
Growth Rate Per-capita Real **Gross Capital 
(%) Growth Rate (%) As percent of GDP 
1984 4.5 0.3 26.6 
1985 -1.2 -4.8 19.0 
1986 7.1 3.2 19.0 
1987 2.3 -1.3 20.3 
1988 -3.7 -7.1 22.7 
1989 -16.7 -19.6 23.4 
1992 17.0 -10.2 30.0 
1993 5.8 28.2 34.2 
1994 7.8 2.4 33.1 
1995 3.9 3.9 30.2 
1996 1.0 -7.6 30.0 
1997 1.3 2.3 25.8 
1998 1.7 2.4 21.1 
1999 3.1 -0.8 23.5 
2000 4.0 0.3 25.6 
2001 4.2 -0.2 27.1 
Sonn": ( 11.1 (19S4-20U /) i-lnnual Report" .. Rc. e arel, er (, 1, luin, n 
* The tublc' c'. X('luc/C. s the rears tir/heree the SAP has been suspended. 
**Reprc. voitc expenclitures oil fi_xecl capital goods plus c/lange in stocks 
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From Table (6.2) we can see how the economic growth rates performance are 
associated with the changes in gross capital as percent of GDP. The economic 
growth increases when the gross capital increases and when the former decreases the 
later also decrease. 
With respect to private sector investment during the program period, despite the 
market reforms undertaken by the government under SAPs, the fact remains that 
Jordan's private sector investment has been disappointing during 1990s [Carroll, 
2003: 93-99]. This is not surprising according to Carroll (2003) considering that the 
business community is still plagued by government policies and practices that make 
business difficult. 
Carroll explains that the limited information provided regarding forthcoming policy 
changes, the business community's limited role in policymaking and Jordanian 
bureaucracy imposes huge costs on business operations and delays their investment2. 
According to EIU (1998: 15), the government's failure to improve the investment 
climate has not only discouraged foreign investors, but has also pushed growing 
numbers of Jordanian investors to look to other countries, such as Egypt and Dubai, 
for investment opportunities, see FDI figure in Jordan, Appendix (iii). 
In connection with per-capita income, the table indicates that per-capita income 
growth had improved associated with the mini boom at the beginning of the 
program. However, it turned into a negative or humble growth rates. Practically, not 
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all the citizen reaps the fruits of this positive economic growth in the initial years of 
SAP. This is because economic growth has been concentrated in some sectors such 
as construction, finance, transport and communications, due to the return of 300,000 
Jordanians from Kuwait, where majority were able to liquidate their assets which 
they channeled into property construction and new businesses. Simultaneously, the 
agricultural sector suffered from a serious fallback with (-8.5), (-29.3) growth rates 
in 1996 and 1999, respectively and humble growth rates in other years [CBJ, 1999]. 
Fixed income earners were also affected negatively due to the high taxes associated 
with SAPs where some studies indicate that the tax burden in Jordan is high 
constituting 20-25 per cent of per capita income [Henry, 2003]. 
As is apparent from the table, the growth rate seemed to recover after almost 10 
years under comprehensive SAPs. Although the world economy suffered from 
recession in 2001, as a consequence of the 11 September attack, the Jordanian 
economy achieved 4.2 per cent economic growth. However, achieving sustainable 
economic growth higher than the population growth rate remains a future challenge 
for Jordan, particularly in a region, which is undergoing comprehensive political and 
economic liberalization and regime changes, which might be stronger than the 
economic reforms that Jordan is undertaking. 
6.3.2 The Fiscal Policy Performance 
The reduction of the budget deficit in Jordan initially involved the dual solution of 
reforming tax systems to improve the revenue-raising ability of the government, and 
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reducing the overall level of public sector activity. It is notable that although, the 
country suffered from a substantial decline in the external fund in the early 1980s, as 
explained in Chapter Two, Table (6.3) shows that the government followed an 
expansionary policy in the second half of 1980s (contrary to what was expected in 
such circumstances) which was based on running down reserves and foreign 
borrowing. Therefore, foreign debt increased from 123.3 per cent of GDP in 1984 
to 187 per cent in 1988 as shown in Table (6.3). In the light of what has been 
explained in Chapter Two, the conclusion we might be able to draw here is that both 
external and internal factors (mismanagement of the economy) were responsible to 
the major economic crises in 1988/1989. 
Table (6.3) shows the main contributions to the budget deficit reductions as a 
proportion of GDP. It seems that both expenditures and revenues contributed to the 
fiscal deficit reductions. On the revenues side, the main increase was as a result of 
non-tax rises rather than through tax-revenue, which might give an indication of the 
slow implementation of tax reforms. On the expenditures side, Table (6.3) indicates 
that the reduction in expenditure was mainly as a result of cuts in capital expenditure. 
Surprisingly it does not seem that there was any reduction in current expenditure, on 
the contrary, it appears that there was an increase in the country's expenditure after 
1995. In recent years, IMF policy advice to its members has placed greater emphasis 
on the need for discipline through reductions in unproductive public expenditure 
(current expenditure). 
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To shed some lights on this subject, an internal study was undertaken by the IMF 
(Fiscal Affairs Department) to assess the nature and depth of this advice for a sample 
of 17 member countries (11 of which had adjustment programs, including Jordan) for 
various periods during 1990-1995. The main elements of the IMF's policy advice on 
reducing unproductive expenditure in IMF program countries covered four areas, 
summarized in the IMF Survey (1997b) as follows: 
(i) Wages and Salaries: as a reflection of both inappropriate wages policy and 
overstaffing, the outlays on wages and salaries have been a major source of 
excessive public spending. The IMF recommended a lower wage bill in all 
countries with IMF-supported adjustment programs. The IMF staff 
specifically identified an excessive number of ministries and duplications of 
functions. 
(ii) Subsidies and Transfers: the IMF advice to the countries with IMF-supported 
adjustment programs emphasized establishing more cost-effective social 
safety nets. 
(iii) Military Expenditure: the IMF recommendation emphasized that excessive 
military expenditure imposes a heavy fiscal burden on adjusting countries. 
Consequently, the IMF's advice on such spending often called for reviewing 
military expenditure to identify potential fiscal savings. 
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(iv) Health and Education: the IMF recommended a shift in the pattern of 
expenditure to accommodate increased spending in the previously neglected 
sectors of primary health care and basic education in many countries with 
IMF-supported adjustment programs. The IMF policy advice in these areas 
also focused on the powerful links between social spending and education 
and health indicators. 
With regard to the Jordanian experience in reducing unproductive expenditure, 
according to Abu-Hammour (2000) the reasons why it was so difficult for Jordan to 
reduce unproductive expenditure, as shown in Table (6.3), is that Jordan had 
obligated some 25 per cent of its budget to pay back its foreign debt and accumulated 
interest, which was considered part of current expenditure. Moreover, it was so 
difficult in the short-run to reduce some current expenditure items such as salaries, 
wages, pensions, purchase requirements and other emergency expenses, because 
such items are inelastic in the short-run. 
The government procedures to reduce current expenditure include sharp cuts in its 
subsidies of basic commodities like bread and fuel oil. In fact the IMF agreed to 
extend the country's three-year (US$ 174 million) Extended Fund Facility for the 
period 1999-2001 on the basis that the government should implement the price rises. 
According to the Finance Minister, subsidizing of oil derivatives costs the 
government about JD 115 million (US$ 162 million) a year, while the cost of 
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subsidizing bread, barley and bran is estimated at JD 45 million (US$ 64 million) 
[MEED, 2002b]. 
In the area of military expenditure, the statistics refers to the fact that Jordan's 
defense expense decreased from an average 35 per cent of total expenditure in the 
1980s to nearly 25 per cent in the 1990s [CBJ, 1996]. As far as education 
expenditure is concerned, Jordan's development strategy has emphasized the social 
and human resources dimensions. Expenditure on education accounted for 7.3 per 
cent of GNP in the 1990s [World Bank, 1999]. 
With respect to health expenditure, although Jordan does not have a formal health 
insurance system, the coverage of the current health system is quite comprehensive, 
about 80 per cent of the population has some formal public or private insurance 
coverage and the Ministry of Health acts as a last safety net for people without 
coverage [Alonso-Gamo and El-Erian, 1997]. However, associated with SAP 
recommendations and with fewer resources available for social expenditure, the 
focus has been on increasing efficiency and targeting in order to protect the lower- 
income groups. 
In the last working visit to Jordan in 2003 a team from the IMF completed a review 
of the current and last economic arrangements with Jordan leaving the government 
with a number of recommendations regards the budget deficit to be completed by the 
end of the 14-years old structural reform programs. According to the IMF team, the 
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biggest challenge for the government lies in compensating the treasury for the loss of 
the Iraq oil grant. Jordan's US$ 5.5 million worth of oil supply from Iraq was halted 
at the outbreak of war in 2003. The oil was provided under a protocol giving Jordan 
half of the 5.5 million of oil annually for free and the remainder at preferential rates. 
Accordingly, the IMF team recommended to the government a move to market- 
based prices to compensate for lost revenue. As a result, the full price went up by 
different percentages. On the other hand, the government's obligation in keeping 
the budget deficit to 2.5 per cent of GDP, by the end of the SAPs, pushed it into 
taking serious measurements to reduce unproductive expenditures, mainly ministerial 
expenses such as cars, communications, extra travel, fuel and electricity bills. 
Recently, the Jordanian Minister of Finance announced that such expenses will be 
reviewed and might eventually be slashed [Aloul, 2003]. This is an indication of bad 
fiscal deficit management by the government. Indeed the government needed 14 
years to realize the importance of cutting extra and luxury ministerial expenses, 
while food subsides was cut in the first year of the program. This shows that the 
SAPs package were far more concerned about cutting food subsidies. 
Generally speaking, the fiscal adjustment made by Jordan is impressive when 
compared with the budget deficit to GDP of 22.5 per cent in 1988, before the 
program, to about 7.0 per cent of the GDP in 2001. Although the focus of the 
programs was mainly on fiscal aspects, stipulating that Jordan should reduce its 
fiscal deficit to 4 per cent of GDP (excluding grants) in 10 years, the government, 
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however, lost its fiscal discipline after 1995 causing the budget deficit to rise to more 
than 10 per cent in 1997. The government indeed has underscored the potential 
benefits of reducing unproductive expenditures for achieving equitable and efficient 
fiscal adjustment. 
6.3.3 The Monetary Policy Performance 
Concurrent with fiscal discipline, the short-run burden of controlling inflation and 
macroeconomic adjustment in the program's countries falls on monetary policy. 
Consequently, tight monetary policies are required not only to control inflation but 
also, to prevent sharp rises in balance of payments deficits and to maintain financial 
stability. As explained in Chapter Three, the theoretical underpinnings of the IMF's 
monetary policy recommendations are grounded in a monetary approach to the 
balance of payments. Virtually all SAPs involve restrictive monetary policies, 
specifically ceilings on the rate of domestic credit expansion, whether imposed by 
the banking system as a whole or by the central bank. 
Table (6.4) shows that prior to the adjustment programs, all monetary indicators 
were extended. The increase in government expenditure (as explained before) led to 
a rapid rise in domestic credit and the money supply, which in turn accentuated the 
decline in international reserves. The effects of the SAP on monetary policy can be 
seen in the same Table (6.4). The sharp reductions in domestic credit and the money 
supply, the key elements in SAPs, were met during the program period. 
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It is interesting to see how the two components of domestic credit behaved before 
and after the program, as the credit extended to the government was high while the 
credit extended to the private sector was small before the program. In the period 
after the program, the two components were adjusted to maintain the net domestic 
credit ceiling in the program. Thus, as the credit extended to the government 
declined sharply during the program period, the credit extended to the private sector 
expanded slightly to maintain the net domestic credit ceiling and to meet the IMF 
recommendations. 
From this table one can conclude that the fundamental assumption underlying the 
SAPs that monetary authorities in developing countries are able to control money 
supply and credit is quite justified in the case of Jordan. The most striking 
development from the implementation of monetary reform is the sharp increase in 
foreign reserves. In 1988 the country's reserves were US$ 109 million, which 
increased to US$ 3062 million in 2001, after 10 years of SAPs. 
In fact, the actual international reserves have developed far more favorably than had 
been anticipated in the program during the period 1992-1998. What is clear too is 
that the tight monetary stance achieved a rapid decline in the inflation rate. The table 
indicates that the inflation rate declined from 6.5 per cent in 1988 to about 2.4 per 
cent in 1995. However, statistically the u-test fails to reject the null hypotheses 
therefore; the conclusion is that the SAPs had no effect on the inflation rate in 
Jordan. 
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6.3.4 The External Sector Performance 
With respect to the external sector, the 1992 and the subsequent structural adjustment 
programs encouraged the authorities to follow policy reforms of the foreign sector 
that would be consistent with a market-based outward economy, which would help 
revitalize the private sector and make it more integrated into the global system. 
In Jordan, diversifying the export base and the geographical distribution of exports 
was of paramount importance in order to achieve export-led growth. Indeed, Jordan 
registered partial success in this area. This included the accession to the (WTO), the 
ratification of the US Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the EU-Jordan 
Association Agreement and the establishment of special free trade areas such as the 
Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs). All these developments had a visible impact in 
boosting Jordan's exports, as shown in Table (6.5). Practically, Table (6.5) indicates 
that the volume of foreign trade has increased during the SAPs when seen in relation 
to GDP, which is a sign that the economy has become as roughly liberalized and 
outward oriented as was hoped by the advocates of reform process. 
Table (6.5) shows that the adjustment programs have not brought about any 
substantial change in Jordan's chronic trade deficit. Indeed, the continual growth in 
imports would make the reduction of the trade balance slow and more difficult. This 
is because Jordan's heavy dependence on imports for industrial inputs and energy 
cannot be overcome in the foreseeable future. Statistically, the u-test indicates that 
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there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis (trade balance pre = trade balance 
post) thus; the conclusion is that the programs had no effect on the trade balance. 
Table (6.5)* 
The External Sector (pre-and-post program) 
Export As Exports Imports As Imports Trade Balance Reserve Foreign Trade 
percent of growth rates percent of growth rates As percent of Us $ AS percent of 
GDP % GDP % GDP Million GDP 
1984 14.7 38.0 54.0 -3.0 -39.3 0.551 68.6 
1985 15.4 6.9 53.1 0.3 -37.7 0.422 68.5 
1986 11.8 -17.6 39.2 -20.9 -27.4 0.437 51.0 
1987 14.3 23.3 41.3 7.6 -27.1 0.424 55.6 
1988 16.9 20.8 45.1 11.8 -28.2 0.109 61.9 
1992 23.7 7.6 63.4 29.4 -40.0 0.767 87.1 
1993 22.7 4.3 64.4 6.9 -41.7 1637 87.1 
1994 23.8 15.1 56.4 -3.7 -32.6 1692 80.1 
1995 26.9 24.7 56.1 9.6 -29.2 1972 82.9 
1996 27.3 3.8 64.6 17.5 -37.3 1759 91.9 
1997 25.3 1.1 56.6 -4.5 -31.3 2200 81.9 
1998 22.8 -1.8 48.4 -6.7 -25.6 1750 71.2 
1999 22.5 1.6 45.7 -2.9 -23.2 2629 70.0 
2000 22.6 3.6 54.4 23.7 -31.9 3331 76.8 
2001 26.0 20.9 54.9 7.2 -28.9 3062 80.9 
Source: CBJ (1984-2001) "An nrtul Repor t "Re, wa rcher cal rulation. s 
'': j'/ t(ihle exclude s the Years where the SAP has been su. spe! u/ecl. 
Specifically, while there is evidence to believe that exports performance has 
improved after the program, as shown in Table (6.5), this improvement, however, 
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was not coupled with a reduction in the imports as the program predicated. A number 
of factors may help to explain the performance of imports. Firstly, Jordan's trade 
regime has been undergoing substantial changes since 1989. Reform effects and 
freedom under SAPs have been conditional and strong and almost all areas of the 
economy have been opened. Import licensing restrictions on intermediates and 
capital goods have been mostly eliminated, quantitative restrictions on imports have 
been replaced by tariffs and tariffs have been also reduced. 
Secondly, although Jordan has devalued its currency by about 50 per cent during 
1988-1990, it does not seem that it helped to reduce imports as anticipated. This is 
due to the fact that more than 50 per cent of Jordan's imports are concentrated on 
raw materials and intermediate goods, which are essential to the development 
process and are likely to be price inelastic in developing countries like Jordan. 
Finally, large growth in imports, particularly following the return of more than 
300.000 Jordanians between 1991/1993, increased the trade deficit during this 
period. 
Clearly Jordan has reaped the potential benefits from the liberalization of its trade 
sector. In particular, Jordan's total exports to GDP were almost twice what they 
were before the SAP. However, in some respects, Jordan's exports growth rate is 
not enough when compared to Asian countries, where the export sector played a vital 
role in boosting economic growth rates. 
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Table (6.6) 
Mann-Whitney Test Results* 
Variables Alternative Hypothesis Significance Level 
Growth Rate Post < Pre 0.744 
Inflation Rate Post < Pre 0.153 
Trade Balance Post < Pre 0.165 
Exports Post > Pre 0.000 
Imports Post < Pre 0.568 
International Reserve Post > Pre 0.001 
* The tests have been performed using (SPSS, I1 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter. an attempt has been made to evaluate the Jordanian experience under 
the SAPs. The chapter provides a detailed and comprehensive comparison of' 
program performance with regard to the main macroeconomic indicators; more 
emphasis has been made to assess the macroeconomic effects of Jordan's SAPS 
using the target-actual evaluation methodology and the hef'ore-after approach. 
The target-actual approach shows that Jordan's SAPs nmanaýged to achieve their 
targets but to different degrees. In this regard. the inflation rate and the current 
account were over-performance. The economic growth and the trade balance were 
under-performance. With regard to the hudget deficit performance, the SAP 
registered a failure in meeting its target. However. acco>rdino tu the hefe)rc-after 
approach. the statistical tests show cliffercnt outcomes, while there was nog effect on 
the economic growth. the inflation rate and the trade halance. the program proved to 
have a significant positive impact can the exports and the international reserves. 
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In connection with the economic growth and the performance to grow at the targeted 
rates, two points relating to growth rated performance have been highlighted. The 
first is that the over-performance in the initial years of SAPs (1992-1995) was caused 
by external factors (non-program factors) resulting from the Jordanian returnees and 
their consumption. The second point is that the failure of GDP to grow at the 
targeted rate was associated with the decline in gross investment during (1997-1999), 
as shown in Table (6.2). 
In relation to the budget deficit performance, the results also reveal that the budget 
deficit average in the 1980s has significantly declined from 21.8 per cent of GDP to 
an average of 7.6 per cent of GDP during the program period. However, the target- 
actual approach shows that reducing the budget deficit remains a significant target 
has not been achieved yet. In this regard, the results of our evaluation exercise 
indicate that the target figures are unrealistically optimistic, particularly in a country 
where the government is still the major player and the privatization program was 
initially slow and only began in earnest in late 1998. 
Another point which has been highlighted in connection with reducing the 
government's budget deficit is that although the IMF emphasizes on the need for 
discipline by reducing unproductive expenditures, it seems that the reduction in 
government expenditure was mainly as a result of cuts in capital expenditure rather 
than on current expenditure (unproductive expenditure). These results indicate that 
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Jordan's experience has underestimated the potential benefits of reducing 
unproductive expenditure in order to achieve efficient fiscal adjustment. 
It was found that the reduction in the inflation rate was associated with the decline in 
money supply growth. In this regard the results are broadly in line with the view 
expressed by the IMF. However, it has been noticed also the actual reduction in the 
inflation rate was largely bigger than had been anticipated, Table (6.1), so these 
results might reveal the deflationary nature of the SAPs packages. The most striking 
development from the implementation of monetary reforms is the sharp increase in 
foreign reserves, which also is in line with the view expressed by the IMF. 
Finally with regard to trade balance performance, the result shows that they were 
partly successful in reducing the trade deficit, mainly due to the increase in Jordan's 
exports. However, the results indicate an unsustainable trade balance position during 
the SAPs period. 
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Endnotes 
According to one report the refugees brought in about US$ 1.5 billion much of it for 
housing construction. This was a massive infusion into an economy with GDP US$ 5 
billion in 1992. See Kanovsky (1997). 
2 According to Carroll (2003: 95-99) some Jordanian businessmen argued that private 
investment failure to respond to policy change was a result of the poor regional and 
international climate. However, others indicate that there would naturally be a time lag 
between policy change and the private sector response. Indeed, more empirical study 
needed to explain the behavior of the private sector during the SAPs period. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF JORDAN'S SAPs: 
AN ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter an attempt has been made to assess the macroeconomic effect 
of Jordan's SAPs, using before-after approach and target-actual approach. In this 
chapter, econometric approach /time series will be used to evaluate Jordan's SAPs. 
Specifically, the aim is to examine the effects that typical SAPs may have on five 
macroeconomic variables: the economic growth (RGDP), the inflation rate (INF), the 
international reserves (RES), the exports (EXP) and the imports (IMP). 
Applied economists have been aware of certain difficulties that arise when unit roots 
are present in the data series. However, ignoring this fact and proceeding to estimate 
a regression model containing non-stationary variables, as pointed out by Harris and 
Sollis (2003: 1) at best ignores important information about the underlying statistical 
processes generating the data, and at worst leads to what Granger and Newbold 
(1973) call "spurious regression. " 
One consequence of such discoveries is that it has now become a common practice 
to test for non-stationarity of economic time series data prior to any econometric 
estimation. Therefore, in the light of recent advances in time-series econometrics, 
this chapter starts the estimation process by testing the time series properties of the 
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data. To do so, concepts and definitions of the methodological procedure for testing 
for unit roots and cointegration are outlined. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test and Johansen technique were used for testing for unit roots and cointegration. 
The empirical results and the estimations are reported at the end of this chapter. 
7.2 Concepts and Definitions 
7.2.1 Unit Root Test 
As our empirical research involve time-series, the distinction between stationary and 
non-stationary becomes very important because assuming time-series are stationary 
when, in fact, they are not, can produce very misleading results. Particularly the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression model necessitate that the series of all 
the variables entering the standard regression model are stationary and that the errors 
have a zero mean and finite variance. In the presence of non-stationary variables, 
there might be what Granger and Newbold (1973) call a `spurious regression' in 
which regression coefficients appear statistically significant and have a high R2 even 
when the variables are, in fact, unrelated. 
A time series is said to be stationary if its mean, variance and auto-covariance remain 
the same no matter at what point we measure them, that is, they are time invariant. 
Such a series may be said to be integrated of order zero, 1 (0). If, however, a time 
series is non-stationary and needs to be differenced once to induce stationarity, the 
series is said to be integrated of order 1,1 (1). Similarly, if a time series is I (d), we 
obtain an 1 (0) series, after differencing it to (d) times. In this regard Engle and 
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Granger (1987) pointed out that although first differencing may induce stationarity, 
first differenced regressions could also filter out long run information when the 
variables in the levels are cointegrated. 
The investigation of stationarity or (non-stationarity) in time series is closely related 
to the test for unit roots. Existence of unit roots in a series denotes non-stationarity. 
This preliminary step is important in any test for the existence of a long-run co- 
integrating relationship. In practice, although the order of integration of a variable is 
often obvious from a visual inspection of the time plots of the series; however, 
appropriate statistical tests are needed because what might appear to be stationary to 
one researcher may not necessarily be of the same view to another. 
Indeed, the literature on time series suggests a number of alternative tests for testing 
whether a series is stationary. One of the most widely used methodologies (because 
of its simplicity and general nature) to establish the order of integration of the 
variables is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test [Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 
1981]. The (ADF) test for unit roots indicates whether an individual series, say (yt) 
is stationary by running regression. The simplest from of the Dickey-Fuller test 
amounts to estimating the following auto-regressive model: 
k 
AYt = aY, _, 
+ ß, DYt_r + Ut (i) 
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Where (AY) is the first differences of the series, (k) is the number of lags and (t) 
donates to the time period. Note that equation (1) does not contain any intercept. An 
ADF test, however, can be extended to allow for the possibility that the underlying 
data generating process (d. g. p) of (Ay) contains a stochastic trend with drift. This 
would require extending (1) to give: 
k 
AY, =p+ PYº-ý 8, AY, -i + 
U, .... (2) 
Similarly, equation (1) could be further augmented to allow the underlying (d. g. p) of 
(yý) to contain deterministic components (i. e. a constant and time trend). In general, 
the models are needed to test for the null hypothesis that a series does contain a unit 
roots (i. e. it is non-stationary) against the alternative of stationarity. Thus, the ADF 
tests for the model that contains a stochastic trend and constants can be formed as 
follows: 
k 
AY, = /. t + A, + pYt_, + 21 AAY, _, 
+ U, .... (3) 
r=i 
Rejection of the null hypothesis (p = 0) in favour of the alternative (p<O) implies that 
(yt) is stationary and hence integrated of order zero, I (0). If the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, then (y, ) has a unit root and is integrated of order 1, (i. e. yt -I (1) ). The lag 
length (k) could be chosen either by some arbitrary criteria, or more usefully, at the 
length necessary to whiten the residuals [Price, 1998: 163]. However, according to 
Charemza and Deadman (1992: 135) the practical rule for establishing the value of 
219 
(k) is that it should be relatively small in order to save degrees of freedom, but large 
enough not to allow for the existence of autocorrelation in U, 
7.2.2 Cointegration Test 
The cointegration concept, first introduced by Granger (1981), is relevant to the 
problem of the determination of long-run relationships "equilibrium" in economics. 
Statistically, cointegration is the implication of the existence of a long-run 
relationship between variables [Thomas, 19931. According to Linda and Dimitri, 
(1993) a long-run relationship means that the variables move together over time, so 
that short-run disturbances from the long-run trend will be corrected. However, the 
economic interpretation of cointegration is that if two or more series are linked to 
form an equilibrium (move closer together) in the long-run, even thought the series 
themselves are trended (i. e., are non-stationary) they will nevertheless move closer 
together over time and the difference between them is constant (i. e., stationary). 
Thus, it is possible to make sense of regressions involving non-stationary variables, 
if there is cointegration, and then regression analysis imparts meaningful information 
about long-run relationship [Harris and Sollis, 2003]. A lack of cointegration 
suggests that such variables can wander arbitrarily far away from each other, which 
implies they have no long-run relationship [Dickey, et. al., 1991]. 
There are a number of different ways that can be used to test for the existence of 
cointegration. In the following we utilised the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
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Juselius (1990) method for the empirical analysis. The Johansen-Juselius technique, 
tests and estimates for the existence of cointegration relationships within a 
multivariate Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) framework, involving (k) lags of (Xi) 
[Harris and Sollis, 2003: 110-115]. 
X, = A, X, _, 
+..... +AkX, _k 
+u, ... (4) 
Where Xt is an (n x 1) column vector of observations on the system. 
AI is an (n x n) matrix of parameters. 
Uý is an (n x 1) column vector of error terms. 
The system is a reduced form with each variables in (X, ) regressed on only lagged 
values of both itself and all the other variables in the system. Using A= 1- L, where 
L is the lag operator. The statistical model in equation (4) can be rewritten as a 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), of the following form: 
AX ,= rl X º-l + ... + rk-I LX r-k+l 
+ IIX 
, _k + u, ... (5) 
Where I' =- (I - A1- """ -A1) (i =1... 
k- 1) and, 
II =- (I -A, -... -Ak) is the matrix of long-run coefficients. 
This way of specifying the system contains information on both the short-run and 
long-run adjustment to changes in (X, ). In other words, the key insight of the 
Johansen-Juselius cointegration technique is that if there is a genuine long-run 
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relationship, according to Price (1998: 166) this test can be simplified by assuming 
that we have a set of variables (y, x, z) -I (1); that is, each variable is non-stationary, 
and needs differencing once to obtain stationarity. Thus, for long-run relationships 
to exist among these variables, we require that a vector (ß1, B2, ß3) exists such that: 
ß, Y»+ß2X1+ß2Z, =u1-I(0) ... (6) 
Basically, there is a linear combination of (y, x, z) which is stationary. In these 
cases, (y, x, z) is referred to a cointegration set, with an associated cointegrating 
vector (B1,132, ß3). However, in the absence of any cointegration amongst the 
variables, one may have the advantage of adopting the Vector Auto-Regression 
model (VAR), dynamic time series simultaneous system. This is because (VAR) is a 
system of simultaneous auto-regression equations allowing for non-linear 
relationships amongst variables in a multivariate setting. Nevertheless, applied 
economists tend to consider (VAR), as a last resort for modelling purpose since its 
theoretical property is less appealing [Taghavi, 2000]. 
7.2.3 The Error Correction Model 
In the literature, the notions of cointegration and the Error-Correction Mechanism 
(ECM) are closely linked. Originally the ECM according to Clarke, et. al., (1998) 
was developed in an engineering control environment and first used in economics by 
Phillips (1954,1957). Subsequently it was used by Sargan (1964) in his paper on 
wage and price determination, and then popularised by Davidson, et. al. (1978) in a 
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widely cited paper [Price, 1998: 167]. In fact, if cointegration relationships among 
variables exist, according to Engle and Granger (1987) there must be an error- 
correction specification that can be applied to the data. This result is known as the 
Granger Representation Theorem' - so that it is possible to analyse non-stationary 
series, which are cointegrated using an Error-Correction Model (ECM) specification. 
Indeed, in simple terms, if we estimate an ECM for a set of I (1) variables then they 
must be cointegrated, for this to be a valid regression, or, in the other words, if they 
are cointegrated, then the lagged equilibrium error (et-1) is stationary and regression 
is valid. Obviously, if one concludes that the series are non-stationary and 
cointegrated, it is appropriate to model them in error-correction form. As illustrated 
by Clarke, et. al. (1998: 145) assuming that we have two series (y1) and (xt) 
hypothesising that the (yt) is a function of the (xt), then the ECM will take the form: 
AY, =ßo+AAX, +/32ECM, -, +u, ... 
(7) 
Where: 0= difference operator (i. e. x1 - x1.1) 
Bo = constant 
Bi, B2 = regression coefficients 
ECM = error-correction mechanism, derived from the cointegration 
regression. 
U1 = error term. 
The main feature of the ECM is that all terms in the model are stationary, so standard 
regression techniques are valid. In addition, it provides a useful and meaningful link 
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between the long-run and short-run approach to economic modeling. 2 From what 
has been discussed so far, the modelling strategy to be adopted in dealing with time- 
series suspected of being non-stationary, 
suggests a straightforward approach as has 
been illustrated in literature [Clarke, et. A,: 144] as follows: 
(i) Test the series to determine if they are non-stationary, by employing 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, where the null hypothesis is that a 
series has a unit-root. If all of the series are stationary then model them in 
level form. However, if two or more series are non-stationary then move to 
point two. 
(ii) Test to determine if the non-stationary series are cointegrated by applying the 
Johansen-Juselius maximum likelihood method of cointegration. If they are 
not found to be so, then model them in differenced form. However, if the 
non-stationary series are cointegrated then move to point three. 
(iii) As the non-stationary series cointegrated then they may be modelled in error- 
correction form and estimated using standard OLS methods. 
In the following section we will apply the above modelling strategy in dealing with 
Jordanian time series for in the period (1972-2001) for the purpose of evaluating the 
effectiveness of Jordan's SAPs. Data definition, measures and sources are cited in 
an Appendix (i). 
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7.3 Test for Stationarity 
The empirical investigations begin by examining the basic time series properties of 
the data. Using annual data for the period 1972-2001, first we employed the ADF 
test to determine the degree of integration of each variable. Given that the sample 
has limited observation only 30 years, the lag length was selected based on one year. 
On the other hand, the tests are performed in natural logarithms, constant and linear 
time trend terms are included in each test as a visual inspection reveals that the series 
may exhibit a trend. 
The results of the ADF test applied to level and first difference are reported in Table 
(7.1). The values given in this table are the equivalent of calculated student t-test in 
the level (L), first difference (A). According to the test if a variable is found to 
exhibit a calculated ADF value larger than the critical value of Dickey-Fuller at say 
(5) per cent significance, the variable is said to be stationary. The results of these 
tests are presented in Table (7.1) with critical t-statistics for the ADF test at the (1), 
(5) and (10) per cent significance levels, as computed by Mackinnon (1991). 
Although the tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary for most of 
the series in their levels (confirming the existence of unit roots), in the levels of some 
variables (EP, ER) the ADF test does confirm stationarity at the (1) per cent and (5) 
per cent significance levels. 
Since in some levels not all the variables appear to be stationary, the next step is to 
determine whether they are stationary after taking first differences. In other words, 
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this amounts to test whether the variables are I (1). The results of the ADF test in 
the first differences (0) are shown in Table (7.1). The results indicate the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Therefore, confirming stationarity for all 
of the variables at 1 per cent and 5 per cent significance levels, except that (INT) and 
(Ms) were significant at the 10 per cent level. However, for consistency, we treat 
them as stationary variables at the first difference. Thus, the conclusion is that the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity is consistently rejected for all variables expressed 
at first differences. 
7.4 Test for Cointegration 
We are now in a position to apply Johansen and Juselius technique to test the 
existence of cointegration in the underlying series. Their method applies the 
maximum likelihood procedure to determine the presence of cointegration vectors in 
non-stationary time series. The Johanson and Juselius provide more robust results 
when there are more than two variables [Gonzalo, 1994]. The test based on 
maximum likelihood estimation procedures, amounts to calculating two test statistics 
known as X-Max and Trace which are used to determine the number of cointegrating 
vectors. The Johanson test of cointegration here attempts to compare the size of the 
estimated X-Max and Trace against its critical values at 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
significance levels. Cointegrating hypotheses are rejected if the former estimates 
exceed their critical values. 
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The results of the X-Max and Trace are reported in Tables (7.2 a, b, c, d, e). Starting 
with the null hypothesis of no cointegration (r = 0), the results of the both X-Max and 
Trace tests showed that the null hypothesis of no cointegration among all variables 
that enter into our models (except the import model) can be rejected at both 1 and 5 
per cent levels of significance. Moreover, the X-Max and Trace tests show that the 
null hypotheses of r : 51, r <_ 2 also can be rejected at the 5 per cent level of 
significance for the RGDP, RES, EXP and INF models. 
Consequently, there are at least two cointegrating relationships involving our 
variables included in the models mentioned above, apart from import model. Among 
the variables of the import demand model, there was only one cointegrating vector 
according to Trace test at the 5 per cent significance level. However, turning to the 
X-Max test, the test fails to reject the null hypotheses of (r = 1) at any of the 
significance levels. 
Our conclusion is that by relying on at least the Trace test, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can be rejected for all our variables included in the models at the 5 per 
cent level of significance and this suggests that there is a cointegrating vector. 
Therefore, our annual data from 1972-2001 appears to support the proposition that in 
Jordan there exists a stable long-run relationship between the variables in our 
models. 
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7.5 Application and Findings 
The aim of this section is to identify through econometric modelling the effect of 
structural adjustment programs on the macroeconomic performance of Jordan. 
Specifically, the objective of our econometric procedure to estimate the effects that a 
typical SAP's policies may have on the main macroeconomic targets. The ideal 
approach to investigating the macroeconomic impact of SAPs is to undertake 
regression analysis over the entire period of the SAPs 1992-2001. 
Our analysis is, however, severely constrained by the fact that only annual data, not 
quarterly data is available for most of the variables under consideration. As such it is 
not feasible to undertake estimation analysis meaningfully for the program period 
1992-2001. As an alternative, we will run our analysis for the period 1972-2001 
with a dummy variable included in the models to capture the effects of the SAPs3. 
Consequently, if the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable in any given model 
is statistically significant we can then argue that the SAPs have affected the 
macroeconomic targets. On the other hand, the other estimated parameters will 
reveal the effectiveness of the program policy tools as well as the impact of external 
variable. The following models examine the relationship between relevant 
macroeconomic targets and the SAP's instruments as has been illustrated earlier in 
Chapter Three. 
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7.5.1 Estimated Growth Model 
The aim here is to examine directly the effects that structural adjustment policies 
may have had on the economic growth in Jordan. In other words, the purpose is to 
estimate the growth model parameters, which reflect the significance of the 
parameter's associated tools. On the other hand, the coefficient of the dummy 
variable will indicates whether the program has any significant effect on growth. 
Moreover, to capture the effects of the external circumstances surrounding the 
adjustment process in Jordan we will be looking at the workers' remittances 
coefficient. Our economic growth model may be presented as: 
LIRGDP= ao +a, Nldc+a2Nlbd+a3Llex+a4il int+a5jlwr+a6d +a7ecfn_, +e, 
Where, d represents the SAPs dummy and ecm is the residual derived from the Error 
Correction Mechanism through applying cointegration. As explained in Chapter 
Three dc, bd, ex and fnt are the typical SAP tools, expressed in real terms - the 
parameters to be estimated. All variables - ecm and d excepted - are expressed in 
differenced form and natural logarithm. 
The evidence for the impact of the SAPs on the economic growth is shown in Table 
(7.3). The T-values are shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
General examinations of these findings suggest that the estimated R2-adjusted value 
indicates a reasonably good fit for the estimated equations, considering that our 
model being in differenced form. The D. W statistic indicates that the model does not 
reveal any problem of serial correlation. 
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According to the estimation, some of the program's tools coefficients appear to be 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent significance levels. The 
estimated coefficient of domestic credit appears to be highly significant at the 1 level 
with a positive sign, which suggests a reduction in domestic credit is associated with 
adverse effects on the level of economic activity. In other words, the IMF 
stabilisation policy, which calls for a reduction in domestic credit by the central bank 
or the banking system, and on the credit extended to the public sector, appears to 
have a deflationary effect on Jordan's domestic output. 
As for real interest rates, the statistical results support the SAPs, where the estimates 
for real interest rates are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level with a positive 
sign, suggesting that there is a positive relationship with the degree of development 
of the financial sector including freer interest rates and economic performance. It 
can be inferred that raising the domestic real interest rate can stimulate domestic 
saving and hence promote domestic investment. To capture the external effects of 
the circumstances surrounding the adjustment program the estimated coefficient of 
workers' remittances have a positive sign, however, it is statistically insignificant. 
As to whether the adjustment programs have had any effect on the economic growth, 
the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable shows that, although it has a positive 
sign, the SAPs have had no statistically significant effect on the economic growth. 
Both budget deficits and exchange rates or devaluation have had an insignificant 
effect on the economic growth. Finally the estimated coefficient of ecm is 
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statistically significant at 5 per cent level and with a negative sign. This suggests the 
validity of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables in the long-run 
equation. 
The findings for the growth model indicate that although the dummy variable has a 
positive sign, it is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, it seems that only 
domestic credit growth and interest rates have significant effects the economic 
growth. However, the estimated coefficient of the domestic credit is higher than the 
real interest rates coefficient, thus one might suspect the deflationary impact of the 
program on the economic growth. 
7.5.2 Estimated Reserve Model 
Enhancing Jordan's international reserves is one of the ultimate important targets of 
the SAPs. Thus, by estimating the reserve model our aim is to find out the effect of 
the programs as well as the attached policies in improving the country official 
reserves. Based on equation (5) in Chapter Three, the reserve model for estimation 
purposes may be shown as follows: 
AIRES = f0 +A Aldc+ ß2OIbd + ß301ex+ ß40l int+ ß5Olwr + ßß6d + ß, ecm, _, 
+ e, 
Here, RES is Jordan's international reserves; d, ecm and wr represent the program 
dummy, the residual and the workers' remittances, respectively. As explained in the 
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growth model dc, bd, int and ex are the typical tools of the SAPs. All program's 
tools are expressed in real terms and differenced logarithm form. 
The estimated results, given in Table (7.4), generally comply with the theory and 
offer a reasonable fit based on R2-adjusted. Also the results do not reveal any 
problem of serial correlation as D. W statistic indicates. First of all, like the growth 
model, real interest rates and domestic credit are highly statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level and both estimates have the correct sign. These findings support the 
IMF position that excessive domestic demand produced by an expansion of domestic 
credit reduces the level of international reserve through the purchase of foreign 
goods as was explained in Chapter Three. 
As for real interest rates, the statistical results are again supportive of the SAPs. The 
estimates for real interest rates are significant at the 1 per cent level and have a 
positive sign. Therefore, it can be inferred that raising the domestic real interest rate 
can stimulate domestic saving and hence discouraging capital outflow and, 
consequently, would alleviate pressure on the country foreign reserves while 
enhancing capital inflow. These results show that a 1-percentage increase in 
domestic real interest rates would cause, ceteris paribus, the international reserves to 
improve by 0.19 percent. Both the fiscal deficit and real exchange rates appear to be 
insignificant in the reserve model. 
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With respect to Jordanian workers' remittances, unsurprisingly the estimated 
coefficient appears to be statistically significant with high parameter 0.53, which 
implies that an increase of 1 percent in workers' remittances sent home from abroad 
would increase, ceteris paribus, the country's international reserves by 0.53 percent. 
This might also explains why the SAP emphasised on the importance of the workers' 
remittances in the economy of Jordan in the early stage of SAP. 
Finally, as to whether the introduction of SAPs in 1992 is associated with 
improvements in the international reserves of the country, the evidence indicates that 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
which suggests that the SAPs have had a positive impact on the country's 
international reserves. The estimated residual derived from the cointegration 
procedure ecm has a negative sign, but it is statistically insignificant. On the basis of 
these results, we conclude that both program and non-program factors improve the 
international reserves in Jordan. 
7.5.3 Estimated Inflation Model 
To demonstrate whether the SAP has impact on the inflation rates in Jordan over the 
programs period we attempt to estimate an inflation model as function of the 
program policies and dummy variable to take account of the post SAP period, based 
on the inflation model expressed in Chapter Three. The inflation model as in 
equation (4) can be rewritten as: 
233 
iVCPI=8o +8, N1dc+82N1bd+83Nlex+8N int+85Alwr+ 56AIms+5, d +öecn 1 +ee 
Where OICPI represents the inflation rate, d is the dummy variable ecm is the 
estimated residual derived from the cointegration procedure and Ms is the money 
supply (M2). The other variables represent the main policies implemented under 
SAPs as explained earlier. 
The estimated results given in Table (7.5) offer a reasonable fit based on R2-adjusted. 
The D. W statistic 1.9 indicates that the model does not reveal any problem of serial 
correlation. All SAP instruments appear to be significant. The fiscal deficit is 
statistically significant with a positive sign. This implies that as the government's 
fiscal deficit diminishes the rate of inflation would decrease, ceteris paribus. A 1- 
percentage reduction in the government deficit would decrease the rate of inflation 
by a 0.11 per cent. As for the exchange rate, the results appear to prove that 
devaluation of the Jordanian dinner against US$ has an inflationary effect on the 
economy. 
With regard to money supply, the results are again supportive of the IMF programs. 
The estimates for the Ms are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and the 
estimate coefficient has a positive sign, which implies that the rate of inflation is 
sensitive to the money supply growth rate. A 1-percentage increase in the money 
supply would increase the inflation rate by 0.10 per cent. Interestingly, the interest 
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rate variable shows a positive coefficient in the model. A similar result has been 
found in Rother (2000: 16-17). A potential explanation lies in the nature of this 
variable, which is set administratively in the period before the program. Even in the 
period after the implementation of the program the interest rate was not fully freely 
set. Turning to the external factor (Wr), the findings indicate that the estimate is 
positive and statistically insignificant. 
The answer to the question whether the implementation of SAPs since 1992 has 
affected the inflation rate, comes from the coefficient of the dummy variable. 
Although it is negative (nearly equal zero), it is statistically insignificant. However, 
according to our results, fiscal deficit, money supply and exchange rate are the main 
factors affect the inflation rate in Jordan, Table (7.5). Consequently, to further our 
investigations, we re-estimate the inflation model, taking into account only the above 
variables and the dummy variable as well. The results unfortunately do not differ 
from the previous model, where the dummy variable remain insignificant, but with 
higher coefficient 0.06. Interestingly, not only the coefficient of the dummy variable 
increased, but also all coefficients increased and remained significant with 0.19,0.25 
and 0.09 for budged deficit, money supply and exchange rate, respectively. 
From what has been illustrated, although some of the SAP instruments have a 
favourable impact on the inflation rate, the introduction of SAPs in 1992 seems to 
have no effect as suggested by the coefficient of the dummy variable in both models. 
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7.5.4 Estimated Imports Model 
As we discussed earlier, the Jordanian economy has been undergoing substantial 
changes since 1992. Reform efforts under SAPs have been conditional and strong. 
Almost all areas of the economy have been opened to both domestic and foreign 
private investment, import-licensing restrictions on intermediates and capital goods 
have been mostly eliminated, quantitative restrictions on imports have been replaced 
by tariffs, and tariffs have been also reduced in stages. The maximum tariff rate, in 
some products, was reduced from 318 per cent in 1989 to a maximum of 30 per cent 
in 2000. In the light of the developments above, the reason behind estimating 
Jordanian aggregate imports is to investigate the effect of Jordan's import 
liberalisation policy under the SAPs. The imports demand model could be written as 
follows: 
EIIMP=' + A, Oly+A2i\lpm+ Nlwr+ß, 4d +ASecn}_, + e, 
Where, IMP is the real value of imports, y is the real level of income, and pm is the 
relative price. Thus, the parameters A represent the elasticities relating factors to 
imports, d and ecm are the program dummy and the residual derived from the 
cointegration procedure. 
The results in the imports model, Table (7.6), are statistically significant at the 1 and 
5 per cent significance levels, with the exception of the coefficient of the dummy 
variable, which appears to be insignificant. The signs of the coefficients are as 
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expected and the estimated model explains more than 60 percent of the variations in 
imports demand, the results also, show that the model does not reveal any problem of 
serial correlation. 
The aggregate import demand is found to be price-inelastic, the short-run price 
elasticity estimate equal -0.29. The real income elasticity is 0.68 suggesting that the 
demand for imports also is inelastic with respect to real income. The estimated 
coefficient of the error correction term -0.51 is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level with a negative sign. This suggests the validity of the long-run 
equilibrium relationship among the variables in the Jordan's imports model since it is 
derived from the long-run cointegrating relationship. 
With regard to the remittances of Jordan nationals working abroad, as expected the 
results show they are significant as important sources to cover the country's needs 
for imports. Finally, the dummy variable capturing the effect of the SAPs, 
particularly import liberalisation on imports volume, although has a negative sign; it 
emerged as insignificant determinants of the import demand for Jordan. 
From the above estimated model the aggregate import volume is found to be both 
price and income inelastic. Therefore, one can argue that the value of the short-run 
elasiticities implies that imports are regarded as necessary goods in Jordan. In fact 
looking at the Jordanian imports distribution, according to economic function, 
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reveals that raw materials and intermediate goods account for more than 50 per cent 
of total Jordan's imports [CBJ, 2000]. 
7.5.5 Estimated Exports Model 
Having examined the effect of SAPs on Jordan's imports demand, our empirical 
analysis here will investigate the impact of SAPs and trade liberalisation on Jordan's 
exports demand at the aggregate level. Exports in Jordan are generally not subject to 
taxes and there are no explicit restrictions on exports from Jordan. However, to 
overcome the hidden bias against exports, a number of initiatives have been 
undertaken since 1989 to promote exports under SAPs. 
Measures to streamline administrative procedures were implemented, the 
requirements for admission of intermediate inputs were eased and the arrangements 
for export finance were rationalised, as were incentives for investments in general. 
The government upgraded the existing export-promotion institution the -Jordan 
Commercial Centre Corporation (JCCC) - giving it primary responsibility for exports 
and investment promotion which resulted in the signing of several trade agreements 
to promote exports as summarised in Table (7.8). 
To test for the presence or absence of trade liberalisation under the SAPs on Jordan's 
exports volume we estimated an exports model where a set of explanatory variables 
determines the exports demand. These variables are the level of world income and 
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the relative price. Based on equation (7) in Chapter Three, our exports model may be 
presented as: 
iIEXP=ao +a, zlwg+a2Alep+ä3d +a4ecrr}_, +e1 
Here EXP is the total real exports, wg and ep are the world income (the growth rate 
of the world income) and the exports relative price, respectively; d, ecm, and et are 
the program dummy, the residual and the error term, respectively. The exports 
demand estimation is shown in Table (7.7). Considering that our exports function 
being in differenced form, one should argue that the estimated R2-adjusted values 
indicates a reasonably good fit for the estimated equations. The D. W statistic 
indicates that the model does not reveal any problem of serial correlation. 
The empirical results show the positive and significant impact of the world income 
on exports demand. The income elasticity of exports is 0.14, which implies that a 
one per cent increase in the growth rate of world income increases the level of 
exports by 0.14 per cent. The interesting variable is the relative price variable, this 
has an expected negative impact and is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
The price elasticity of exports demand is -0.43 which implying that the demand for 
Jordan's exports is found to be price inelastic. The estimated coefficient of the error 
correction term -0.22 which contains the long-run information since it is derived 
from the long run co-interacting relationships is statistically significant at less than 
the 1 per cent level. 
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Finally as to whether SAPs and mainly trade liberalisation implemented since 1992 
have had an impact on Jordan's exports demand. The estimated coefficient of 
dummy variable shows a positive and significant impact of SAPs and trade 
liberalisation on the level of exports. 
Now as far as SAPs instruments are concerned, it is possible to further our 
investigation to determine the validity of the devaluation of the JD as a policy 
measure to reduce the trade deficit problem. The question now is does devaluation 
improve the Jordanian trade balance? According to the SAPs, devaluation is an 
important macroeconomic policy recommended to reduce the trade deficit. 
Following our discussion in Chapter Three of the elasticity approach to BOP and the 
Marshall-Lerner condition, it is a worthwhile exercise to estimate the trade 
elasticities for Jordan as the exports and imports models permit. 
Since the Marshall-Lerner condition is a long-run condition [Bahmani-Oskooee, 
1998] a long-run imports and exports model were estimated. The traditional 
approach is one of estimating the size of import and export demand elasticities and 
determining whether their absolute values add up to more than unity. If they do, 
depreciation is said to improve the trade balance. 
Table (7.9) provides estimated parameters that represent long-run elasticities along 
with their respective sort-run elasticities. In the case of the exports model, the 
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estimated coefficients suggest that foreign economic activity elasticity carries a 
negative sign. However, the activity elasticity is still inelastic -0.26. The export 
price elasticity is elastic -1.07, which implies that high price elasticity, suggests that 
as the exports price decreases, Jordan will be in a position to boost its exports. 
Regarding the imports model, the long-run elasticities of real imports demand with 
respect to real income and relative price can be interpreted in a similar fashion. 
Briefly, real income elasticity carries the expected positive sign and is inelastic 0.71. 
The estimated relative price elasticity has a negative sign, and inelastic -0.48. 
To draw our conclusion from the above exercise, it seems that the Marshall-Lerner 
condition is satisfied by our results. This condition indicates that for devaluation to 
be successful as a balance of payments adjustment mechanism the sum of exports 
price elasticity and the imports price elasticity must add up to more than unity. 
When applied to our results, the long-run Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied 1.55 
indicating that devaluation could improve the trade balance in the case of Jordan. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a time-series approach is used to assess the effects of the 1992-2001 
Jordanian structural adjustment programs on the ultimate macroeconomic targets, the 
growth rate, the inflation rate and the international reserves. Imports and exports 
models were estimated for the purpose of assessing the SAPs impacts on the 
behaviour of Jordanian external trade and the existence of the Marshall-Lerner 
condition was also investigated. 
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To improve the degree of precision in our economic estimation of the models, we 
considered examining the time series properties of our variables using the unit root 
test and cointegration methods. Having determined the order of integration of 
variables by applying Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, we applied the 
Johansen-Juselius method of cointegration in all our models. The empirical findings 
were one cointegration equation explaining the long-run relationship amongst 
variables within a given model. Finally, the chapter specified an Error Correction 
Model and estimated it using standard methods. In general, most of our models 
exhibited meaningful statistical significance. 
The statistical results show that the structural adjustment programs, in general, are 
more successful in correcting external imbalances than they are in improving 
economic growth and curbing inflation. Indeed, the SAPs do not have much impact 
on the level of economic growth or inflation; however, they do improve the 
international reserves and exports performance. 
As to the effectiveness of the program's tools, it is shown that domestic credit and 
interest rates have significant impact on the behaviour of key macroeconomic 
variables. Although the variation in these variables leads macroeconomic targets 
towards the desired goal it appears in some cases that they move the program 
objectives with unfavourable effects. The exchange rates appear to have no effect on 
the growth and the reserve models, while it appears to have significant effect on the 
inflation. 
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Further investigation of the long-run price elasticity of imports and exports revealed 
that the M-L condition is satisfied for Jordan, implying that devaluation of the JD 
against US$ will have favourable long-run effect on the country's trade balance. The 
budget deficit comes at the end of the list in terms of its effectiveness, while it found 
to be significant only in the inflation model. 
The dummy variables introduced to capture the effect of SAPs and trade 
liberalisation policies on both import and export demand, have emerged to indicate 
that while they show no effect of trade liberalisation policy on aggregate import 
demand in Jordan, trade liberalisation under SAP recommendations appears to have 
a significant effect in improving Jordanian exports. Practically, this result 
necessitates the importance of encouraging the diversification of exports and their 
market accessibility to minimise external shock effects on exports and thus widening 
the trade deficit. 
The results also show that the restrictive monetary policies have an adverse effect on 
the economic growth. However, as policy implication, these results necessitate 
careful use of this policy through orientating domestic credits towards income- 
generating projects at the expense of those for consumption purposes, in order to 
accommodate between keeping up the external performance and accelerating 
economic growth. 
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Although there was no significant evidence that SAPs reduces the inflation rates, the 
results show the effectiveness of the reduction in money supply growth in curbing 
the inflation rates, which indicates that inflation in Jordan might be a monetary 
phenomenon following the monetarist view. However, it was shown that the actual 
inflation rate in Jordan was less than the program expectations (as in Chapter Six). 
Perhaps this is due to the excessive use of the monetary restrain mechanisms 
followed by the program or it is an indication of the deflationary nature of the SAPs 
as whole. 
The most striking development from the implementation of SAPs reform is the sharp 
increase in international reserves which on one hand, accords with the monetary 
approach of the program and on the other hand, corroborates previous results on the 
impact of SAPs, showing that the latter programs are more successful in correcting 
external imbalances than they are in achieving economic growth. Finally, in relation 
to the external factor, it emerged that workers' remittances have a significant effects 
on of both the Jordanian total imports and the international reserves. 
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Table (7.1) 
AI)F Unit-Roots Test for Stationari ty 
Variables Level First Difference Conclusion 
(L) (A) 
RGDP -2.158 -3.664 l(1)'* 
DC -1.487 -5.266 l(1)*** 
BD -3.652 -8.278 1(1)*** 
EX -2.926 -3.534 I(1)** 
INT -3.240 -5.779 1(1)*** 
WR -3.709 -3.559 I(1)** 
RES -2.794 -5.299 1(())''` 
MS -2.342 -3.149 1(1)' 
INF -3.240 -5.802 I(I)I': ': 
IMP -2.194 -4.742 1(1)** 
PM -3.93 I -4.591 1(1)' +: `: 
WG -4.161 -4.595 1(1)T** 
EP -6.080 -4.516 1(0)' .:: 
EXP -2.147 -5.011 1(1 )*** 
Note: Unit root tests wirre performed usinL, I: vicws (\rrmo n . 
4) 
a.. k Si'milicautce at I %%% 
** Significance at 5(7(, 
Significance alt 10 %%% 
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Table (7.2, a) 
Johansen Cointegration Test for (R(: 1)I') 
TRACE TEST 
Null Alter Statistic Critical Critical Null Alter 
(Ho) (HI) Value Value (Ho) (HI) 
(95 (/) (l'7( ) 
r=0 r>1 163 94.15 103.18 r=0 r=0 
r< 1 r> 2 95.0 68.52 76.07 r< l r= t 
r<2 r>2 61.14 47.21 54.46 r<2 r=2 
r<3 r>3 34.51 29.68 35.65 r<3 r=3 
r<4 r>4 15.45 15.41 20.04 r<4 r=4 
r<5 r>5 0.75 3.76 6.65 r<5 r=5 
Notes: (1) The t est was p erformed u sing EvieA s (version . 
4) 
(2) r stands for t he number of cointegrating ve ctors. 
MAXIMAL EINGENVALUE TEST 
Statistic Critical Critical 
Value Value 
(95`7) (I7) 
68.16 39.37 45.10 
33.94 33.46 38.77 
27.63 27.07 32.24 
19.05 20.97 25.52 
14.70 14.07 18.63 
0.75 3.76 6.65 
Table (7.2, h) 
, 
Johansen Cointegration 'l'est (RFS) 
TRACE TEST MAXIMAL EINGEN VALUE TEST 
Null Alter Statistic Critical Critical Null : \Iter Sl tistic Critical ('iiti. al 
(1k)) ( 11 1) Value Value (I l) (I11) Value Value 
(95 /, ) ( 11", ) (96 "4) (I `4 ) 
r=0 r>1 174.75 94.15 103.18 r=0r=0 62.07 39.37 45.10 
r< I r> 2 112.68 68.52 76.07 1--- I 1. =I 45.35 13.46 _38.77 
r<2 r? 2 67.32 47.21 54.46 r<2 r=2 35.63 27.07 32.24 
r<3 r? 3 31.69 29.68 35.65 r-3r; 19.35 20.97 25.52 
r<4 r>4 12.34 15.41 20.04 r<4 r=4 11.19 14.07 19.63 
r<5 1-=-5 1.149 3.76 6.65 r-'5 r=5 1.14 3.76 6.65 
Notes: (1) The t est was pe rformed u sing Fvie s (\ersion . 4) 
(2) r stands for the number cif cointeggratittg vectors 
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Table (7.2, c) 
Johansen Cointegration Test for (INF) 
TRACE TEST MAXIMAL EINGENVALUE TEST 
Null Altern Statistic Critical Critical Null Altern Statistic Critical Critical 
(Ho) (HI) Value Value (Ho) (HI) Value Value 
(9517) (I', 4) (95'7) (1'/) 
r=0 r>1 212.52 124.24 133.57 r=0r=0 82.52 45.28 51.57 
r< I r>2 129.99 94.15 103.18 r< Ir=1 42.91 39.37 45.10 
r<2 r>2 87.08 68.52 76.07 r<2r=2 40.03 33.46 38.77 
r< 3 r> 3 47.05 47.21 54.46 r<3r=3 31.12 27.07 32.24 
r<4 r>4 15.92 29.68 35.65 r<4 r=4 9.94 20.97 25.52 
r<5 r>5 5.97 15.41 20.04 r<5 r=5 5.86 14.07 19.65 
Notes: (1) The test was performed us ing Eview s (version . 
4) 
(2) r stan ds for the number of cointegra ting vectors 
Table (7.2, (1) 
Johansen Cointegration Test for (I 11I ) 
TRACE TEST MAXIMAL EINGENVALUE TEST 
Null Altern Stati, tic Critical ('ritical Null Alm 11. tiiari"tiL (liural ('iit .d 
(Ho) (I11) Value Value (Ilu) (III) Value Value 
(95 '/) (I', ) (95"t) (I'G) 
r=o r>1 53.03 47.21 54.46 r=or= () 25.03 27. O7 32.24 
r< I r>2 28. OO 29.69 35.65 r_Ir=I 12. O2 2O. 97 25.52 
r<2 r>2 15.98 15.41 20.04 r<2 r=2 9.27 14. O7 18.63 
r<3 r>3 6.71 3.76 6.65 r<3 r=3 6.71 3.76 6.65 
Notes: (I) The test was performed using Fv iews (version . 4) 
(2) r sta nds for the numher o t'cointegr ating vectors 
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Table (7.2, e) 
Johansen Cointegration Test for (EXP) 
TRACE TEST MAXIMAL EINGENVALUE TEST 
Null Altern Statistic Critical Critical Null Altern. Statistic Critica l Critical 
(Ho) (H1) Value Value (Ho) (111) Value Value 
(951/, ) (1'%) (95(/, ) (1'/, ) 
r=0 r>1 54.44 29.68 35.65 r=0r=0 28.45 20.97 25.52 
r< 1 r>2 25.98 15.41 20.04 r< Ir=1 17.94 14.07 18.63 
r<2 r? 2 8.04 3.76 6.65 r<2 r=2 8.04 3.76 6.65 
Notes: (1) The test was p erformed using Fviews (version . 
4) 
(2) r stands for the number o f' cointegrating vectors 
Table (7.3) 
Estimated Growth Model 
OIRGDP=ao +a, 0ldc+a., 0lbd +a3Alex+a401 int+ci A1wr+a(, d +a7e(, n, 
Parameters (10 (11 ". ' (I ? U3 (14.. (Is (14, (17- 
-0.00 0.29 -0.07 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.46 
T-value (-0.20) (2.9 7) (-0.34 (0.33) (2.4! ) (1.23) (0 93) 42 (18) 
R2-adj = 0.51 *** 1% Significance 
F-stat = 6.78 ** 517v Significance 
D. W = 1.7 1017c Significance 
Notcs: (i) 'I'hc c tinrttiom was I>crfurmcd usin; L, I". ' iL"vv s (\ cl lOn .l1. 
(ii) The correlation matrix (not reported here) reveals that the explanatory variahies 
constitute near-orthogonal regressions and therelOre. Mu ltieoýllinearity is not a 
problem. 
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Table (7.4) 
Estimated Reserve Model 
AIRES = ßo + /J1Alclc + AAlbd +, ß3Alex + ßa01 int+ ßsAlwr + 13, d + ß7ecm, _, 
+ e, 
Parameters ßo ßt,., ß, ß3 f34... 135.1jß,.. 137 
9.90 -0.76 -0.56 -1.64 0.19 0.53 0.58 -0.08 
T-value (9.49) (-4.09) (-0.39) (-0.93) (3.78) (x. 23) t'-. 03) (-0.5! ) 
R2-adj = 0.74 *** 1% Significance 
F-stat = 15.30 ** 5% Significance 
D. W = 1.9 * 10% Significance 
Notes: (i) The estimation was performed using Eviews (version . 
4). 
(ii) The correlation matrix (not reported here) reveals that the explanatory variables 
constitute near-orthogonal regressions and therefore. Multicollinearity is not a 
problem. 
Table (7.5) 
Estimated Inflation Model 
NICPI(inf)=8 +b, Alhd+o, Nex+ö Nl int+öö4Nlwr-+c55 Alms+(5(, d +(S, ecn}, +e, 
Parameters 60 c) I. 61- 6i.. 64 651- 66 67 
0.01 O. 11 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.09 -0. (>t) 0.30 
I-value (1.1)7) II `X5ý 04) 66l 156) 23) (-097) (0 IX) 
R2- adj = 0.74 *** 1%%, Significance 
F-stat = 7.36 ** 5% Significance 
1). W = 1.9 * 10% Significance 
Notes: (i) 'l'hc estimation was performed using Fvicws (version . 
4) 
(ii) The correlation matrix (not reported here) reveals that there was high correlation 
between I)(' and Ms. Therefore, we eliminate the U(' from the model and re- 
estimated. 
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Table (7.6) 
Estimated Imports Model 
AIIMP=A +i A v+A,, Alpm+ANltit, r+ß, 4d +2secrt{_i +e, 
Parameters }gyp XI** Xz** ý; *+* aý3 ý, 5#>+ 
0.00 0.68 -0.29 0.20 -0.01 -0.51 
T-value 0.17) (2.74) (-1.90) 1,67) (-0.32 (-3.18) 
R2-adj = 0.62 1°kß Significance 
F-stat = 10.50 ** 5%% Significance 
D. W = 2.1 ' 10% Significance 
Notes: (i) The estimation was performed using Eviews (version . 4) 
(ii) The correlation matrix (not reported here) reveals that the explanatory variables 
constitute near-orthogonal regressions and therefore, Multicollinearity is not a 
problem. 
Table (7.7) 
Estimated Exports ]Model 
41EXP=c)(, +d Alwg+a, Nlep+a, d +c4ecn}_i +e, 
Parameters ý. O» (. I.., i.,., (-. ". (-4... 
0.05 0.14 -0.43 0.12 -0.22 
T-value (1,79) (4.51) t _'45) (1.92) (i X10) 
R2- adj = 0.56 1% Significance 
F-stat = 9.7 5'%% Significance 
D. W = 1.9 ` 1O'%% Significance 
Notes: (i) 'I'hc estimatitm ww, ts perforn)erl nsitt . 
F. teww's (Version . 
4) 
(ii ) The correlation matrix (not reported here) reveals that the explanatory variahlcs 
constitute near-orthogonal regressions and therefore. Multirollinearity is not a 
problem. 
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Table (7.8) 
The Agreements Signed Over the Years 1997-2000 
Agreements Date Signed Implementation Comments 
The Arab free trade agreement 19/2/1997 1/1/1998 Free trade with the Arab 
Countries throughout the 
10-year duration of the 
agreement 
The Jordan-USA bilateral 1/7/1997 1/7/1997 Encouragement and 
investment treaty reciprocal protection of 
investments and 
economic co-operation. 
The Euro-Mediterranean 1/11/1997 1/1/2000 Free trade zone by 2010 
agreement and strengthen joint co- 
operation between EU 
members and the 
Mediterranean countries. 
The agreement of establishing 16/11/1997 16/11/1997 Free trade with the USA 
the Qualified Industrial Zones within the QIZ (one- way 
(QIZs) in Jordan trade). 
The Jordanian European joint 24/11/1997 1/1/1999 Free trade with the 
partnership European Union 
throughout the 12-year 
duration of the 
agreement. 
The World Trade Organisation 17/12/1999 11/4/2000 This agreement permits 
(WTO) retaining a maximum of 
20%-30% Customs Fees 
throughout the 10-year 
duration of the 
agreement. 
The Free Trade Agreement 30/9/2001 Free trade with the USA 
(FTA) with the USA throughout the 10-year 
duration of the 
agreement. 
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Table (7.9) 
Summary of Short-Run and Long-Run Elasticities 
Variable Short-run elasticities 
Export demand Relative price -0.43 
Real income 0.14 
Import demand Relative price -0.29 
Real income 0.68 
Marstall-Lerner 
Condition (0.73) 
Long-run elasticities 
-1.07 
-0.26 
-0.48 
0.71 
(/., 5,5) 
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Endnotes 
The Granger Representation theorem states, "If two variables y and x are cointegrated, then 
the relationship between the two can be expressed as (ECM)". See, Gujarati (2003: 825). 
Z For more details regarding to the advantages of using the ECM, see: (i) Harris and Sollies 
(2003: 25-39) (ii) Clarke, Norpoth and Whiteley (1998: 127-155). 
3 The dummy variables are constructed so that they will take zero values for the period prior 
to 1992 and unit values for the post 1992 period. 
4 According to Khan and Knight (1985,12) the effects of fiscal policy (deficit) "is difficult 
to establish empirically because of the linkage between fiscal policy and monetary policy, 
which is generally much tighter in developing countries... this is because there is a close 
correspondence between the fiscal deficit and changes in the supply of domestic credit.... 
as such, in models that include the rate of domestic expansion , empirical test tend to 
suggest that fiscal variables have only a relatively modest independent role. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS 
This study is essentially based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of structural 
adjustment programs on the macroeconomic performance of Jordan. The previous 
chapters provide the theoretical background of SAPs, methodologies of the 
program's evaluation and overall evaluation of structural adjustment programs using 
different approaches. This final chapter covers the main research conclusions, 
recommendations and contributions. Finally, points for future research will be 
outlined in the last section. 
8.1 Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, attempts have been made to assess the effects of SAPs on the main 
macroeconomic targets of these programs. To do so, the research has examined the 
main features of the Jordanian economy and the origins of the economic crisis in the 
late 1980s offered in Chapter Two. The major characteristics of the Jordanian 
economy were identified as follows: Firstly, Jordan's economy represents a small 
open economy intricately tied up with the external world, particularly with 
neighboring Arab countries. Secondly, Jordan is a semi-rentier economy. 
Consequently, these main features made Jordan's economy extremely vulnerable to 
external economic and political shocks, which have been highlighted in many ways 
throughout the last five decades of Jordanian history. 
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The onset of the economic crisis in Jordan was seen as a reflection of both past 
domestic policy mistakes or mismanagement and external shocks. The consequence 
was unsound macroeconomic performance, where the external debt was twice of the 
GDP, the inflation rate registed 25 per cent, the budget deficit 22.6 per cent of the 
GDP and a negative growth rate of almost 17 per cent in 1988. To overcome these 
imbalances, the Jordanian government responded, as a last resort, with stabilization 
and structural adjustment programs agreed with the IMF and World Bank. 
Both theoretical and empirical aspects of SAPs were discussed, with special attention 
paid to the objectives and main instruments of SAPs. It was agreed that the need for 
macroeconomic adjustment essentially arises when a country has fundamental 
imbalances between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. These imbalances 
also, appear in the macroeconomic level as an overvaluation of the exchange rate, 
high inflation rates, widening external deficits and high levels of debt and 
deterioration of economic growth. Consequently, the fundamental objective of SAPs 
is to meet the principle macroeconomic objectives. 
To achieve these objectives, the SAPs combine stabilization policy, typically 
including monetary and fiscal instruments, designed to adjust the aggregate level of 
demand to production. On the other hand, the SAPs contain structural policies aimed 
at increasing the efficiency of the economy through, privatization, liberalization and 
structural reforms. In this regard, it was concluded that although SAPs are based on 
the assumption that economic problems arise from mismanagement of the economic 
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polices of individual countries, Jordanian experience, however, proves that the 
problems faced by the country are related to both external and internal factors. 
In order to assess the effects of SAP's instruments on the macroeconomic targets, 
and based on the main links between policy instruments and SAPs objectives; the 
study suggested the main features of the econometric model (objectives- instruments 
approach) for estimation purposes. Given the fact that only annual data, not 
quarterly, was available, an alternative was to run the analysis for the period 1972- 
2001 with a dummy variable included in all the models to take into account the 
introduction of SAPs. On the other hand, to reflect the nature of the Jordanian 
economy, the models included the Jordanian workers' remittances as external factor. 
In order to evaluate the SAPs, it was essential to review and discuss the 
methodological issues related to the evaluation of SAPs. In this regard, Chapter Four 
concluded that evaluation of SAPs is not a straightforward task; it raises a number of 
difficult statistical and analytical problems. Although it was revealed that there is no 
ideal approach to assessing the SAPs, one should not stop evaluating these programs, 
but rather be more careful and objective in doing so. 
Moreover, it was emerged that SAPs evaluation and outcomes are counterfactual 
issues. Consequently, a researcher should be also aware of the limitations of these 
approaches as well as in interpreting its outcomes. In this regards this study 
concluded that any effective assessment of the IMF and the World Bank programs 
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requires taking into account the internal and external economic and political 
environment surrounding the implication of SAPs. In general, it was found that the 
structural adjustment programs were associated with improvements in the external 
imbalances, but had an insignificant impact on growth rates and mixed effects on 
inflation. 
As this study used different methodologies in attempting to evaluate the effect of 
SAPs in Jordan, it was difficult to draw clear conclusions regarding the effect of 
SAPs without summarizing the outcomes of the evaluation, see Appendix (iv). In 
summary, the statistical evidences available suggest that the structural adjustment 
programs have a positive impact on the international reserves and the exports. 
However, the findings also suggest that the programs do not have significant impact 
on the level of economic activity, the imports and the inflation rate. These finding, 
indeed, relatively corroborate previous results on the impact of SAPs, showing that 
the latter programs are more successful in correcting external imbalances and 
boosting international reserves than they are in curbing inflation and improving 
economic growth. 
As to the effectiveness of the SAPs instruments, the results show that the changes in 
the domestic credit and the interest rates appear to have significant impacts on the 
behavior of key macroeconomic targets. Although the variations in these instruments 
lead macroeconomic targets towards the desired goal, however, it appears in some 
cases that it moves the program objectives with unfavorable effects. Investigation 
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into the price elasticity of imports and exports revealed that the M-L condition is 
satisfied for Jordan, implying that devaluation of the JD have favorable impact of the 
country's trade deficits. 
Finally, although fiscal policy was one of the important tools of SAPs, the results, 
however, show that the budget deficit comes at the end of the list in terms of its 
effectiveness. In this regard, it appears that the government mismanaged its fiscal 
discipline where the increase in the revenues did not associated with appropriate 
reduction in the expenditures, particularly the current expenditures, making the fiscal 
discipline more difficult to control. It was found that Jordan's experience 
underestimated the potential benefits of reducing unproductive expenditure in order 
to achieve efficient fiscal adjustment 
It is noteworthy that, despite the fact that this study has tried to isolate the effects of 
external factors on the performance of the Jordan economy under SAPs, however, 
several exogenous factors, which had nothing to do with SAPs, affected the 
performance of the economy during the program period 1989-2001, and thus made 
the task extremely difficult. In this regard it was emerged from this study that 
workers' remittances, as non-program factor, are a significant determinant of both 
the Jordanian total imports and the international reserves. 
In attempting to draw general conclusion with regard to the Jordanian experience 
with SAPs, the study concluded that after reluctance and serious economic crisis, 
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Jordan finally committed itself to a program of comprehensive structural adjustment 
and market reforms. The policies implemented during the past decade have touched 
virtually each and every aspect of the national economy, fiscal and monetary 
policies, exchange rates, tax system, industry, agriculture, transport, international 
business cooperation, banking and financial markets, foreign trade and tariffs, 
administration and the public sector. What has been clear is that despite more than a 
decade of economic adjustment and marker reform, apart from some macroeconomic 
achievements, the key factor in the Jordanian economy is still external outflow. 
Indeed, there remains the unsettling fact that the response of private investment, or 
even the FDI, to the policy changes has been quite disappointing. Much of the 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that sustained economic growth and 
sound economic performance required not only stable macroeconomic policies, but 
also a human capital base and high-quality institutions. A number of recent 
empirical studies and even the World Bank publications, have highlighted the 
importance of institutional reforms in shaping economic performance, see for 
instance, World Bank (1993), Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). 
As far as Jordan is concerned, what is clear is that the extensive programs of 
adjustment were necessary, but insufficient. There are real obstacles to the 
development of the private sector, investment and growth, which are the serious 
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institutional regulatory and political constraints that are basically incoherent with the 
free market. 
Many recent studies and reports reviewing the transformation process in Jordan, see 
Carroll (2003), Joffe (2002) and Ryan (2002), stressed the importance of institutional 
reforms and identified the main institutional impediments, inter ala, and have 
reported that patronage and its concomitants are disincentives to economic 
efficiency, there was a failure to tackle a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, foot- 
dragging on new legislation, high levels of corruption and cronyism have been the 
most obvious problems. These issues handicap the country and prevent it from 
achieving sustainable long-term growth. Finally, there is a lack of policy 
transparency, predictability and mistrust of the State. Joffe (2002: 20) points out 
that: 
"... As Jordan starts the new millennium, the record of the last 
decade of the twentieth century does not suggest that the 
promises of political and social change and even economic 
changes that have been introduced have been met, on the 
contrary, little real progress has been made. " 
From what has been outlined above, the general conclusion from the Jordanian 
experience is that: it is difficult to be optimistic in the country's ability to produce 
sustained long-term growth and prosperity without real and in-depth institutional and 
political reforms commensurate with the economic reforms as well as a peaceful 
Middle East. I 
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8.2 The Contributions 
The contributions of this study emerge from the point that it is the only study, to the 
author's knowledge, that deals with the evaluation of the Jordanian experience under 
structural adjustment programs. This study has made an attempt to offer some 
contributions in many ways as follows: 
(i) In attempting to gauge the effects of structural adjustment programs, this 
research makes interlace of different approaches, using before-after, target- 
actual and econometric modeling. On the other hand, this study demonstrated 
that detailed use of target-actual evaluation methodology, complemented with 
a before-after approach can yield helpful insights into the reliability of the 
programs criteria and help to understand the reasons behind the program 
outcomes. 
(ii) The study applied recent advances in time-series econometrics to SAPs 
evaluation and to the Jordanian macroeconomic data. In all cases we applied 
methods of testing for non-stationarity, co-integration. The findings of this 
exercise were supportive of co-integration application. 
(iii) In the light of the fact that most empirical studies concerned with SAPs's 
evaluation are on cross-country bases, it emerged that a SAP is only one of 
many macroeconomic shocks to the country undertaking SAPs. Indeed, 
external factors, economic, politic or even natural shocks will also affect the 
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country's ability (positively or negatively) to achieve the macroeconomic 
targets of the SAPs. Therefore, measures or assessment of these programs 
requires the undertaking of the evaluation exercise based on an individual 
country's experiences. 
(iv) Finally, this study extracts large number of macroeconomic indicators from 
the published raw data, which will be important source for other researchers. 
8.3 The Recommendations 
It was important for this study to come up with some suggestions, which may prove 
useful in improving the Jordanian economic performance, and to give some insight 
to other researchers. Accordingly this study recommends: 
(i) Sensible use of restrictive domestic credit expansion through orientating 
domestic credits towards income-generating projects at the expense of those 
for consumption purposes, in order to accommodate between keeping up 
external performance and accelerating economic growth. 
(ii) Increasing exports with an emphasis on the importance of encouraging the 
diversification of exports and their market accessibility. 
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(iii) Reducing current expenditures, in this regard the study recommends 
establishing an expenditure-monitoring unit to make sure of the efficient use 
of public revenue and to monitor any waste or misspending. 
(iv) Adoption of a realistic and stable exchange rate and monetary policy, which 
would curb inflation and enhance economic growth. 
(v) Setting macroeconomic indicators unit to calculate, classify, unify and 
publish the macroeconomic data. 
(vi) To enhance the achievements and to address the shortages of the SAPs, 
reform efforts should continue and be accelerated through adopting national 
economic, social and political program. However, this national program 
should be the outcome of civil society partnership with the government. 
8.4 Topics for Further Research 
To give overall representation of Jordanian experience with SAPs, a number of areas 
remain of great importance for further research. These are mainly: 
(i) Assessment of the social impacts of SAPs, particularly on poverty, 
unemployment and inequality. 
(ii) The response of private sector to SAPs and market reforms. 
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(iii) An up-to-date study of the evolution of external and internal debt under the 
SAPs. 
(iv) The sectoral effect of SAPs, mainly on agricultural and industrial sectors. 
(v) The role of institutional reform and socio-cultural changes in the reform 
process. 
(vi) Investigating the validity of the main hypothesis of SAPs in Jordan, in this 
regard, export-led growth, money demand satiability and saving increases. 
(vii) The role of the financial resources associated with the SAPs. 
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APPENDIX (i): Definitions of Variables Utilized in the Econometric Equations 
All data are yearly for the period 1972-2001. The main sources of the data set are: 
(a) Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), several Annual Reports and Monthly Bulletins. 
(b) International Financial Statistics (IFS), of the International Monetary Fund. 
RGDP: Real GDP, nominal GDP is deflated by the domestic price level CPI 
(1995 = 100) to obtain real GDP. GDP from source (a) CPI from source (b) 
DC: Domestic credit, we obtain real domestic credit by deflating nominal domestic 
credit to price level index CPI (1995 =100). All data come from source (b). 
BD: Overall budget deficit, we obtain this measure by deflating nominal budget 
deficit {Total revenue -Total expenditure} to domestic price level CPI (1995 
= 100) to obtain real budget deficit. Apart from CPI, all data come from 
source (b). 
INT : Stands for real domestic interest rate (end of the period), which was obtained 
on the basis of the following equation (INT = Lint - Lp) where: 
Lint : Natural logarithm of domestic interest rate. 
LP : Natural logarithm of the consumer price index for Jordan. Note that all 
data are from source (b). 
EX : Refers to the real exchange rate, which was derived on the basis of the 
following equation: 
(EX = e. P/P*) where : 
e: The nominal bilateral rate, expressed as the number of US$ unit per JD 
unit. 
P: The price level of the home country (1995 =100) 
P* The price level in USA (1995 =100). All data are from source (b). 
WR : Jordanian workers' remittances (nominal WR is deflated by the domestic 
price level CPI (1995 =100) to obtain real WR. From source (a). 
RES : Refers to official reserve of foreign currencies. From source (a). 
MS : Denotes to money supply (M2). From source (a). 
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INF : Stands for inflation rate, measured by percentage change of CPI (1995 =100) 
From source (b). 
EXP : Exports volume, (nominal exports are deflated by export price index (1995 = 
100) to obtain real export. EXP from source (a), CPI from source (b). 
IMP : Imports volume, (nominal imports are deflated by import price index (1995 = 
100) to obtain real imports. IMP from source (a). CPI from source (b). 
PM : Refers to the Import relative price (The ratio of the import price index (1995 
=100) to the domestic price index (1995 =100). All data are from source (b) 
EP : Denotes to exports relative price (The ratio of the exports price index (1995 
=100) to the World price index (PW) (1995 =100). All data are from source 
(b) 
WG : Growth rate of World income. From source (b) 
PW : World Price Index (1995 =100). From source (b) 
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APPENDIX (ii): The Actual Macroeconomic Performance Compared with 
the program Targets (1992-2001) 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
APPENDIX (iv): Summary of the Macroeconomic Effects of SAPS in Jordan 
(1992- 2001) 
Indicator Actual-Target Before-After Before-After Model 
(Average) (Average)* (U Test) (Dummy Var. ) 
Economic Growth Rate Under-performance + 0 0 
Inflation Rate Achieved + 0 0 
Current Account Under-performance 
_ 
0 # 
Budget Deficit Not achieved + + # 
Trade Balance Under-performance + 0 # 
Exports # + + + 
Imports # 0 0 0 
International Reserve # + + + 
Notes: (i) (+) Positi%e change. (0) No ctfret. (-) Negative effect. (#) mea n it hau not hcen tested. 
(ii) *Annual average l oi period under consideration . 
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APPENDIX (v): Before-After Comparison of Jordan's Macroeconomic 
Performance- Selected Indicators* 
Indicator (1979-1988) (1992-2001)** 
Real GUI' Growth 4.2 5.0 
Inflation Rate (`-) 5.9 2.9 
Budget Deficit (as percent of GDP) 21. X 7.6 
Trade Balance (as percent of GDP) -40.8 -32.2 
Current Account as percent of (; UI') -2.7 -3 4 
Exports (as percent of GDP) 14.4 24.3 
Imports (as percent of GDP) 55.9 56.2 
International Reserve (US$ million) 701.3 2080.3 
* Annual average for period under consideration. 
The table excludes all years Ahere SAT's hate been suspended. 
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